Preamble

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Cirencester Gas Bill,

Read a Second time, and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

London Passenger Transport Board Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday 4th March, at half-past Seven of the Clock.

Wolverhampton Corporation Bill (by Order),

Read a Second time, and committed.

Ministry of Health Provisional Order Bury and District Joint Hospital District) Bill,

Ministry of Health Provisional Order Chester and Derby) Bill,

Read the Third time, and passed.

Perth Corporation Order Confirmation Bill [Lords] (by Order),

Consideration deferred till Wednesday 4th March, at half-past Seven of the Clock.

Oral Answers to Questions — INDIA.

MR. S. C. BOSE.

Sir REGINALD CRADDOCK: asked. the Under-Secretary of State for India under what conditions was Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, a detenu in Bengal, permitted to leave India; and how has he been permitted to visit Ireland?

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Butler): As my hon. Friend will be aware, Mr. Bose was permitted to leave India in order to receive particular medical treatment. The territorial validity of his passport was framed accordingly. The question of his admission to the Irish Free State is one for the Free State authorities.

Mr. THURTLE: Does the hon. Member think that any harm will come from Mr. Bose's visit to Ireland?

Major-General Sir ALFRED KNOX: Can the Under-Secretary say whether he obtained medical treatment in Dublin?

Mr. BUTLER: I am not aware of what he did in Dublin?

CIVIL SERVICE.

Sir R. CRADDOCK: asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the unsatisfactory state of recruitment of British candidates for the Indian Civil Service in 1935, as


reported by the Civil Service Commission, he proposes to take any action to restore the proportion of British to Indian recruits to the 50–50 ratio fixed in 1924?

Mr. BUTLER: Yes, Sir. My Noble Friend hopes to be in a position very shortly to make an announcement of the measures to be taken to restore the 50–50 ratio as soon as Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, comes into force. If present expectations are fulfilled, it should be possible to make a beginning in 1937.

Sir R. CRADDOCK: asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether he will bring up to date the numbers of British and Indian members, respectively, in the All-India Services, as compared with the last published Return which showed the composition of those services on 1st January, 1933?

Mr. BUTLER: I am circulating a statement showing the composition of the All-India Services on 1st January, 1935. Figures for 1st January, 1936, are not yet available.

Following is the statement:

Statement showing the composition of the All-India Services on 1st. January, 1935.


Service.
Europeans.
Indians.


Indian Civil Service (including incumbents of listed posts).
756
544


Indian Police
495
170


Indian Agricultural Service.
39
28


Indian Educational Service (Men's Branch)
75
64


Indian Educational Service(Women's Branch).
11
3


Indian Forest Service
188
89


Indian Medical Service (Civil).
205
100


Indian Service of Engineers.
268
273


Indian Veterinary Service
16
1


Total
2,053
1,272

CHINA (TIENTSIN-PUKOW RAILWAY).

Mr. MOREING: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what has become of the special reserve fund which the Chinese Government set up for the

purpose of paying in monthly instalments to meet the arrears due to the bondholders in the Tientsin-Pukow Railway; and whether payments into this fund are still being made?

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Eden): I understand that the special reserve fund has been used for the service of the original and supplementary loan issues. So far payments have been made on coupons which were eleven years in arrear. Payments continue to be made into the fund, but in December last were 20 months behind the agreed schedule.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1) whether His Majesty's Government or the League accept the position that any country unwilling to co-operate, or judged an aggressor, should indefinitely remain a member of the League without being subject to any penalty for default;
(2) whether any proposals have yet been under consideration to remove from the League those nations which are not prepared to keep the peace of the League or to co-operate in its preservation?

Mr. EDEN: The point raised by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is covered by Article 16 (4) of the Covenant, which provides that any member of the League which has violated any Covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the League represented thereon.

BRITISH TRAWLERS (NORWEGIAN GUN-BOATS).

Mr. LAW: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that three British trawlers, "Esquimaux," "Arkwright," and "Bunsen" have been molested by Norwegian gun-boats on the high seas outside of the red line; and whether, in view of the agreement come to between His Majesty's Government and the Norwegian Government, His Majesty's Government propose to take steps either to secure enforcement


of the agreement or, alternatively, to afford protection to British vessels on the high seas?

Mr. EDEN: I have seen copies of the statements by the skippers of these three trawlers in which they complained that Norwegian gun-boats have interfered with their fishery operations outside the "red line," which is the provisional limit observed in practice by British trawlers and by the Norwegian authorities since 1925. His Majesty's Minister at Oslo has been instructed to ask for information from the Norwegian Government regarding these incidents and to add that if the "red line" were not to be adhered to, a new situation would arise rendering it difficult to continue the negotiations at present in progress for a general settlement of the whole controversy.

Lieut.-Colonel HENEAGE: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether fishery cruisers are working in those waters?

Mr. EDEN: I cannot say without notice.

MANCHURIAN-MONGOLIAN FRONTIER.

Mr. CREECH JONES: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1) whether he will make a statement with regard to the situation on the Manchukuo-Mongolian Frontier;
(2) whether he has any information regarding the incident on 12th February, when Japanese-Manchukuo troops were bombed at Olohodoka, in the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic?

Mr. EDEN: There have during the past year been a number of skirmishes between small bodies of Mongol and Japanese-Manchurian troops along the border between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. The details of the particular incidents referred to are still obscure, but I understand that neither the Soviet Government nor the Japanese Government are disposed to attach any undue importance to it, and that proposals have been put forward with the object of reducing the risk of further similar incidents.

Mr. H. G. WILLIAMS: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Mongolian People's Republic is part of the Republic of China that has been stolen by the Soviet?

Oral Answers to Questions — CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT (ITALIAN PUBLICATION).

MR. EDEN'S STATEMENT.

Mr. DALTON: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will publish as a White Paper the Report of the Inter-departmental Committee presided over by Sir John Maffey on the question of an Italian occupation of Abyssinia; on what date this report was presented; and whether its conclusions have been accepted by His Majesty's Government as the basis of their policy?

Colonel GOODMAN: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been directed to the publication in the "Giornale d'Italia" of a document purporting to be a report to his Department on British interests in Abyssinia from a committee of which Sir John Maffey, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Colonies, was chairman; whether he has caused any inquiries to be instituted as to the means whereby the newspaper in question obtained a copy of this confidential report; and with what result?

Mr. BELLENGER: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been drawn to the publication in an Italian newspaper of a confidential document on Abyssinia, prepared by Sir John Maffey and presented to the Foreign Office in June last; and whether this document represents the views of His Majesty's Government?

Mr. ORR-EWING: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to publish as a White Paper the document relating to Abyssinia which has been published in an Italian newspaper?

Colonel WEDGWOOD: asked the Prime Minister how the Maffey Report came to be supplied to the Italian Government or the Vatican?

Mr. EDEN: The House will be aware that through an indiscretion, or a deliberate breach of confidence which every effort is being made to trace, a confidential document, the property of His Majesty's Government, has apparently come into the possession of an Italian newspaper. The leakage of information of this character must naturally be a


matter of serious concern to the Government and every effort is being, and will be, made to determine the cause. I deprecate, however, any suggestion that the document is in itself, and particularly at this date, of an especially secret character, the disclosure of which can be a source either of any great embarrassment to His Majesty's Government, or of any danger to the interests of the country. Still less is there any justification for the suggestion which has, I understand, been put forward in Italian newspapers that its contents are such as to establish either the variability or the insincerity of the policy followed by His Majesty's Government in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.
I will tell the House precisely how the report embodied in the document originated. Towards the end of January, 1935, when the Abyssinian situation was already a cause of pre-occupation to His Majesty's Government as a member of the Council of the League, an inquiry was made by the Italian Government as to the nature and extent of British interests in Abyssinia. An inter-Departmental Committee was thereupon set up, under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the purpose of estimating British interests in Abyssinia and of attempting an appreciation of the extent to which these interests might be affected by external events. I must make it clear that it was in no sense the task of this Committee to deal with His Majesty's Government's obligations under the Covenant or to attempt to frame a policy for His Majesty's Government in what had by that time come to be the possibility of serious trouble between Italy and Abyssinia. Had it been otherwise, the Committee would have been differently constituted. It was merely concerned to establish facts.
The Committee's investigation naturally occupied some time, and in the ultimate event no specific reply was returned to the Italian inquiry, owing to the fact that by the time the examination was completed the rapid development of Italian activities in regard to Abyssinia was beginning to raise the whole question of the integrity of Abyssinia, as to which any personal interests were naturally subordinated to our obligations as a member of the

League. The Committee reported to my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 18th June last and its report was to the effect that there was no important British interest in Abyssinia with the exception of Lake Tsana, the waters of the Blue Nile, and certain tribal grazing rights. This, I may say ot once, is precisely the consideration which has underlain every authoritative statement of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. That policy has been inspired by no selfish or ulterior motive, but solely by consideration of the duties incumbent on His Majesty's Government as a member of the League of Nations and as whole-hearted supporters of the doctrine of collective security.
After a full review of all these circumstances I have come to the conclusion that no useful purpose would be served by publishing this document as a White Paper.

Mr. DALTON: May I ask whether any steps are being taken to check these leakages, of which this is not the first within recent months, and a continuation of which will undoubtedly lead to very serious consequences? Can we have an assurance that what happened in Paris in the case of the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor and what has happened in this case will really come to an end?

Mr. EDEN: I quite agree with the hon. Member that the leakage of any secret British document must be a matter of grave concern, and I know that the House will not expect me to state what steps the Government propose to take. At the same time I think we must distinguish between the theft or disappearance of a British document and the leakage in Paris, over which His Majesty's Government have no control.

Mr. THORNE: If we did away with secret diplomacy, we should have none of this trouble.

An HON. MEMBER: Can the Foreign Secretary give us the personnel of this Committee? He has given us only the name of the Chairman.

Mr. EDEN: This was a Civil Service inquiry, and I do not think that the House would wish me to go beyond the answer I have given.

Sir WLLIAM DAVISON: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the publication in the "Giornale d'Italia" of confidential reports on British interests in Abyssinia, presented to the Foreign Office last June by an Inter-departmental Committee presided over by the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office; whether he can inform the House as to how this confidential document came into the possession of an Italian newspaper; whether the Press leakages, which occurred during the recent Hoare-Laval negotiations, have yet been traced; and what steps are being taken by the Government to stop similar leakages in future?

Mr. EDEN: As regards the first and second parts of the question I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I have just given to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton). As regards the third part, I understand that the leakage in question took place in Paris. As regards the last part, any precautions which may be considered necessary will be taken in addition to those which are already in force.

Sir W. DAVISON: May I ask whether the recent document which appeared in the Italian Press was printed or not? Was it a letter sent to various people or a typewritten document sent by a confidential secretary?

Mr. EDEN: Does the hon. Member mean, whether the document was printed for our use?

Sir W. DAVISON: Yes, whether it was printed or not?

Mr. EDEN: It was printed.

Sir W. DAVISON: Has the right hon. Gentleman considered a, possible leakage in this way? I do not ask him to give me a definite reply.

ITALY AND ABYSSINIA.

Mr. BELLENGER: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can assure the House that British economic and political interests in Abyssinia are still restricted to those centred on the waters of Lake Tsana and the Blue Nile?

Mr. EDEN: Yes, Sir, with the exception of frontier interests, notably the protection and preservation of tribal watering and grazing rights.

Mr. BELLENGER: Do these "interests" include the construction of a motor road under British control between Lake Tsana and the Sudan?

Mr. EDEN: I must have notice of that question.

Mr. VYVYAN ADAMS: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the Committee of Eighteen is to meet at Geneva to consider the report relating to an oil embargo?

Mr. EDEN: On 2nd March.

Mr. ADAMS: Will the right hon. Gentleman move the committee at the earliest moment to invite the co-operation of the United States of America?

FRANCO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT.

Mr. GARRO-JONES: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether in view of the fact that the terms of the secret Rome accord between France and Italy have been known to the Government since January, 1935, he will make them known to the House?

Mr. EDEN: It would not be proper for me to publish the information in my possession in regard to the terms of an agreement between foreign powers which they have not seen fit to publish themselves.

Mr. GARRO-JONES: Is the right hon. Gentleman making any representations to the French Government that the terms of this accord conflict with their engagements with the League of Nations?

Mr. EDEN: I did not say that I had the terms of the accord, but that I had information in my possession with regard to them.

Mr. GARRO-JONES: Does not that information show that the French Government were acting contrary to their obligations to the League of Nations, and, if so, did the Government make any representations to that effect?

Mr. EDEN: I must decline to answer for any other Government but my own.

Mr. H. G. WILLIAMS: May I ask whether any engagement between two Powers who are members of the League is binding unless it is published?

Mr. BELLENGER: Should not this engagement be registered with the League of Nations?

Mr. EDEN: That question should be addressed to the French Government.

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (FOREIGN OFFICE STAFF).

Mr. THURTLE: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it is the practice of his Department to ascertain at what school recruits to the staff of the Department were educated; and, if so, which are the first four schools, according to the numbers recruited, from which additions to the staff have been made in the last four years?

Mr. EDEN: Information regarding the schools at which candidates for the administrative class of the Civil Service (including recruits to the Foreign Office and Diplomatic and Consular Services) have been educated is furnished to the Civil Service Commission by the candidates. As regards the Foreign Office and Diplomatic and Consular Services, the particulars desired by the hon. Member are as follow:

1. Eton
2. Rugby.
3. Winchester.
4. Marlborough and Repton.

Mr. THURTLE: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the Foreign Office might improve the intellectual standard of its staff if it were to extend its recruitment over a wider area than these rather exclusive educational establishments?

Mr. EDEN: The recruitment is over the widest area. The question is who gets into the net.

Mr. HARDIE: Is not the basis of recruitment the particular colour of the tie worn?

TRIPOLI (BRITISH SUBJECTS).

Commander BOWER: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that Carmelo Psaila and Robert Ghirlando, British subjects, have been imprisoned in Tripoli since

December and January last, respectively, it being stated against them that they had uttered remarks insolent to Italy; whether he is aware that the Italian authorities have declared their intention of bringing them before a military tribunal; and whether His Majesty's Government have taken any steps to secure for these men a fair and open trial without delay?

Mr. EDEN: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome is investigating the facts, and I have asked him to hasten his report with a view to deciding whether action should be taken by His Majesty's Government.

Commander BOWER: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that British subjects in Tripoli are undergoing something like persecution solely on account of their nationality? Has he considered suggesting to the Italian Government that our nationals should get the same courtesy and consideration that the Italians receive here?

Mr. EDEN: I am waiting for the report of the Ambassador.

Sir A. KNOX: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when these two gentlemen became British subjects?

Mr. CHURCHILL: How long does the right hon. Gentleman think that we can afford to wait without some information while these men are in prison—not, I trust, for more than a month?

Mr. EDEN: A very much shorter time, I hope.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND COMMERCE.

BRITISH FAIR, HONG KONG.

Mr. CHORLTON: asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department whether he can give any further information relative to the British trade fair at Hong Kong; to what extent His Majesty's Government are now assisting it; and to what extent it is supported by British manufacturers?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of TRADE (Dr. Burgin): I have been asked to reply. I am informed that the organisers of the British trade fair to be held in Hong Kong in


December next have formed an influential committee in this country and that negotiations are proceeding between the organisers and prospective United Kingdom exhibitors. As regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government, the Governor of Hong Kong has accepted the position of Patron, and His Majesty's Consul-General at Canton and the Commercial Secretary for South China (who is also Trade Commissioner, Hong Kong), have been authorised to accept honorary positions as members of the council of the fair.

Mr. CHORLTON: Are the Government going to support it financially?

Dr. BURGIN: That is another question.

JOHANNESBURG EXHIBITION.

Mr. CHORLTON: asked the Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department to what extent and in what way His Majesty's Government is supporting the exhibition to be held at Johannesburg this year?

Dr. BURGIN: The Department of Overseas Trade is organising on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a prestige exhibit for display in a national pavilion to be erected in the exhibition grounds. The Department is also supplying to United Kingdom manufacturers who contemplate participation, full information and advice regarding the South African market. The closest co-operation exists between the Department and the Federation of British Industries and the exhibition executive committee in Johannesburg.

Mr. CHORLTON: Will the hon. Member see that a similar prestige exhibit is arranged for the exhibition in Hong Kong?

ARGENTINE TRADE AGREEMENT.

Mr. SANDYS: asked the Prime Minister whether the House will be given an opportunity to discuss the question of the renewal or modification of the AngloArgentine trade agreement before negotiations are opened for this purpose?

The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Baldwin): As has already been stated, the question of the future of the agreement referred to by my hon. Friend is under consideration. I fear I can give no undertaking that the Government will be able to afford a special opportunity for discussion.

Mr. SANDYS: Does the right hon. Gentleman not consider it right that the House of Commons should have an opportunity of discussing and reviewing the very far-reaching effects of this agreement upon home production and Empire trade, before renewing it for another period of years?

The PRIME MINISTER: I think it will be obvious that my answer refers to discussion before negotiation. Discussion before negotiation, I think, would probably have a disastrous effect in any case of this kind. After negotiations, it is always open to the House, if it so desires, to discuss the matter, but it is not the usual practice to have such discussion before the negotiations have been entered upon.

Mr. SANDYS: Does the right hon. Gentleman not realise that discussion after the negotiations is not very much use?

EGGS (IMPORTS FROM POLAND).

Mr. LIDDALL: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that, between 1933 and 1935, the imports of eggs from Poland into Great Britain have increased by no less than 40,000,000; and whether he will have the trade treaty with Poland denounced in order that this matter may be rectified?

Dr. BURGIN: I am aware of the figures to which my hon. Friend refers. The agreement with Poland cannot be terminated until 31st December, 1936. The point raised by my hon. Friend will be borne in mind.

DOMINION TARIFF BOARDS (APPLICATIONS).

Mr. H. G. WILLIAMS: asked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether he will furnish information as to the number of applications made by industries in this country under the provisions of the Ottawa Agreements Act to the tariff boards in Canada, Australia and New Zealand; and what have been the results of those applications?

The SECRETARY of STATE for DOMINION AFFAIRS (Mr. Malcolm MacDonald): As the answer is necessarily long and contains tables and figures, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. MABANE: Have any of these applications met with success?

Following is the answer:

CANADA.


Item No.
Items which have been raised as a result of an application by the U.K. Government on behalf of U.K. manufacturers.
British Preferential* Tariff rates at the time of hearing.
Remarks.


551
Yarns, composed wholly or in part of wool or hair but not containing silk or artificial silk, n.o.p.
15 per cent, ad val. plus 11¼ cts. Per Ib.
These items were covered by the comprehensive inquiry of the Tariff Board into the woollen industry. The Board recommended a reduction in the duties under item 554b to 27½ per cent. ad val. 17 cts. per lb. with a maximum of 65 cts. per lb. and the deletion of item 554e. These recommendations were included in the 1935 Budget. At the request of the U.K. Government item 552 was withdrawn and as sufficient material was not available the investigation into items 568, 668a and 568 b was left in abeyance.


551a
Yarns and warps, composed wholly of wool or in part of wool or hair, imported by manufacturers for use exclusively in their own factories, n.o.p.
10 per cent, ad val. plus 7½ cts. per lb.


552
Felt, pressed, of all kinds, in the web, not consisting of or in combination with any woven, knitted or other fabric or material.
15 per cent, ad val. plus 7½ cts. per lb.


553
Blankets of any material, not to include automobile rugs, steamer rugs or similar articles.
22½ per cent, ad val. plus 10 cts. per lb.


554
Woven fabrics, composed wholly or in chief part by weight of yarns of wool or hair not exceeding in weight six ounces to the square yard n.o.p., when imported in the grey or unfinished condition for the purpose of being dyed or finished in Canada.
20 per cent, ad val. plus 9¼ cts. per lb.


554b
Woven fabrics, composed wholly or in part of yarns of wool or hair, n.o.p.
27½ per cent, ad val. plus 18¾ cts. Per lb.


554e
Woven fabrics, composed wholly or in part of yarns of wool or hair, weighing not less than eighteen ounces per square yard.
25 per cent, ad val. plus 20 cts. per lb.


555
Clothing, wearing apparel and articles made from woven fabrics, and all textile manufactures, wholly or partially manufactured, composed wholly or in part of wool or similar animal fibres, but of which the component of chief value is not silk nor artificial silk, n.o.p., fabrics, coated or impregnated, composed wholly or in part of yarns of wool or hair but not containing silk nor artificial silk, n.o.p.
30 per cent, ad val. plus 18¾ cts. Per lb.


568
Knitted garments, knitted underwear and knitted goods, n.o.p.
25 per cent, ad val.


568a
Socks and stockings of all kinds
…
30 per cent, ad val., plus 75 cts. Per doz. pairs.


568b
Gloves and mitts of all kinds, n.o.p.
25 per cent, ad val.


Ex. 156
whisky
…
…
…
$8 per proof gallon§
Withdrawn.


Ex. 120
Canned herrings
…
…
…
1¼ cts. to 3frac12; cts.† per box according to size.
No date of hearing announced.


Ex. 352 and Ex.427
Water meters
…
…
…
20 per cent, or 15 per cent.† ad val.
—


Ex.537
Rovings, yarns and warps, wholly of jute, not more advance than singles.
12½ per cent. ad val.
Free entry accorded

Item No.
Items which have been raised as a result of an application by the U.K. Government on behalf of U.K. manufacturers.
British Preferential* Tariff rates at the time of hearing.
Remarks.


Ex. 537a
Rovings, yarns and warps, wholly of jute, including yarn twist, cords and twines, generally used for packaging and other purposes.
20 per cent, ad val.
Duty increased to 27½t, ad val.


Ex.548
Canvas of flax or hemp, coated or impregnated.
25 per cent, ad val., plus 3 cts. per lb.
Duty reduced to 15 per cent. ad val.


611a
Boots, shoes, slippers and insoles of any material, n.o.p.
25 per cent, ad val.
No reduction recommended


Ex.711
Tin/lead alloys in ingots of 56 lb. upwards and containing not less than 55 per cent, of tin and not more than 3½percent. of antimony
15 per cent, ad val.†
No date of hearing announced.


Ex. 341
Tin/lead/antimony alloys in pigs weighing not less than 100 lb., and containing not less than 15 per cent, of tin and antimony, balance lead.
10 per cent, ad val. †
No date of hearing announced.


66a
Biscuits
…
…
…
15 per cent, or 20 per cent, ad val.
Biscuits valued at not less than 20 cts. per lb., f.o.b. accorded free entry.


430
Nuts and bolts with or without threads; washers and rivets, of iron or steel, coated or not, nut and bolt blanks, of iron or steel.
50 cts. per 100 lb.,† plus 10 per cent. ad val.
No date of hearing announced.


Ex. 506
Wooden doors
…
…
…
17½ per cent, ad val.
Free entry accorded to wooden doors of a height and width not less than 6 ft. and 2 ft. respectively.


572
Turkish or imitation Turkish or other floor rugs or carpets, and carpets, n.o.p.
30 per cent, ad val ‡plus 5 cts. Per sq. ft.



522
Rovings, yarns and warps wholly of cotton, not more advanced than singles n.o.p.
12½ per cent, ad val. plus 2 cts. per lb.
Hearing has taken place but the report of the Tariff Board has not yet been issued.


522a
Rovings, yarns and warps wholly of cotton, not more advanced than singles, when imported by manufacturers of knitted goods, to be used in their own factories in the manufacture of knitted goods.
12½ per cent, ad val.


522b
Yarns, wholly of cotton, coarser than number forty but exceeding number twenty, not more advanced than singles, when imported by manufacturers for use exclusively in their own factories in the manufacture of cotton sewing thread and crochet, knitting, darning and embroidery cottons.
7½ per cent, ad val.


522c
Rovings, yarns and warps, wholly of cotton, including threads, cords and twines generally used for sewing, stitching, packaging and other purposes; n.o.p. cotton yarns, wholly or partially covered with metallic strips, generally known as tinsel thread.
15 per cent, ad val. plus 2 cts. per lb.


523
Woven fabrics, wholly of cotton, not bleached, mercerized, not coloured, n.o.p. and cotton seam-less bags.
17½ per cent, ad val. plus 2 cts. per lb.


523a
Woven fabrics, wholly of cotton bleached or mercerized, not coloured, n.o.p.
20 per cent, ad val. plus 2 cts. per lb.

Item No.
Items which have been raised as a result of an application by the U.K. Government on behalf of U.K. manufacturers.
British Preferential* Tariff rates at the time of hearing.
Remarks.


523b
Woven fabrics, wholly of cotton printed dyed or coloured, n.o.p.
22½ per cent, ad val. plus 2 cts. per lb.
Hearing has taken place but the report of the Tariff Board has not yet been issued.


523e
Woven fabrics, wholly of cotton, with cut pile, n.o.p.
15 per cent, ad val.


561
Woven fabrics, wholly or in part, of artificial silk or similar synthetic fibres produced by chemical processes, not to contain wool, not including fabrics in chief part by weight of silk, n.o.p.
27½ per cent, ad val. plus 30 cts. per lb.


* When the duty exceeds 15 per cent. ad val., or in the case of a specific duty or a specific and ad valorem duty combined, in which the computed rate exceeds 15 per cent. ad val., the British Preferential rate is subject to a discount of 10 per cent. of the duty.


† Present duties.


‡Duty at time of withdrawal.


*Duty at time of withdrawal. The rate was reduced to $5 under the 1935 Budget.

Australia.

A very large number of rates of duty in the Australian tariff have been reviewed by the Tariff Board under Article 11 of the Trade Agreement concluded at Ottawa with His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia, and particulars of the resulting tariff changes have been published from time to time in the Board of Trade Journal.

New Zealand.

There is no Tariff Board in New Zealand but a Royal Commission has already made an inquiry into the protective duties there in accordance with Article 8 of the Trade Agreement concluded at Ottawa. Details of the tariff changes made as a result of this inquiry were published in the Board of Trade Journal on 13th December, 1934.

IRISH FREE STATE.

Sir RONALD ROSS: asked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs what is the estimated value of the increase of trade as a result of the recent agreement to the United Kingdom and the Irish Free State, respectively?

Mr. M. MacDONALD: It would not be practicable to give a detailed estimate of the value of increased trade likely to result from the recent arrangement with the Irish Free State, but there is every reason to hope that the value to the trade between the two countries will be substantial.

Sir R. ROSS: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a member of the Irish Free State Government announced that, in his view, the trade of the Free State would increase by £750,000 a year, while in the case of this country the increase would be nil, and does he think that an accurate forecast?

Mr. MacDONALD: I do not agree that it is an accurate forecast at all.

DANZIG.

Mr. V. ADAMS: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make a statement as to the attitude of the League authorities towards the manner in which tile National Socialist Government in the free city of Danzig is carrying out the undertakings given on its behalf at the last council meeting at Geneva?

Mr. EDEN: I an: not in a position to make any such statement. The League of Nations is represented at Danzig by a resident High Commissioner whose duty it is to report to the council on any matter to which he considers that its attention should be drawn. He can be relied upon to keep careful watch on the matter to which my hon. Friend refers.

COMMONS AND MANORIAL WASTES.

Mr. EDE: asked the Minister of Agriculture the number of instances of


common lands and manorial wastes to which, between 1st August, 1931, and 31st December, 1935, the public have been granted rights of air and exercise under the Law of Property Act, 1925, and the total acreage of such commons and manorial wastes?

The MINISTER of AGRICULTURE (Mr. Elliot): The number of common lands and manorial wastes, to which public rights of access for air and exercise have been granted during the period indicated, is 30; and the total acreage of such lands is 91,030 acres.

Mr. EDE: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether his attention has been called to the report of the Select Committee on Commons, 1913; and whether, in view of the need for legislation on many points affecting common land, he will be able to introduce a Bill implementing the recommendations of that committee next Session?

Mr. ELLIOT: I am aware of the report of the committee referred to, but I am not at present in a position to say whether time can be found next Session for the passage of a Bill implementing the recommendations of the committee.

Mr. EDE: Will the right hon. Gentleman sympathetically consider this question when he is considering his programme for next year?

Mr. ELLIOT: Yes, Sir.

Mr. EDE: asked the Minister of Agriculture the date on which the last reliable survey of the commons and manorial wastes of England and Wales was made; and whether he will consider legislation requiring county and county borough councils to make such a survey and requiring them to see that no further illegal enclosures take place?

Mr. ELLIOT: A return presented to the House of Commons in 1874 gave particulars of waste lands subject to rights of common and of common field lands in England and Wales, so far as could be ascertained from documents in the Office of the Inclosure and Tithe Commissioners, supplemented by estimates. In 1916 the Commons and. Footpaths Preservation Society prepared an estimate of the acreage of commons which was based on the return of 1874 and amounted

to approximately 1,750,000 acres. An exhaustive survey such as the hon. Member would appear to contemplate defining the precise bounds of all common lands would be both complicated and lengthy and I regret that I cannot at present promise legislation on the lines suggested.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE.

NATIONAL MARK EGG SCHEME.

Lieut.-Colonel WINDSOR-CLIVE: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he has considered the recommendations of the committee which he appointed to consider the present unsatisfactory position of the National Mark Egg scheme; and what action he proposes to take in order to deal with that position?

Mr. ELLIOT: I presume my hon. and gallant Friend is referring to an informal committee of the National Mark Egg and Poultry Trade Advisory Committee and National Mark Egg Central, Limited, which was constituted in November last. This committee has not yet presented its final report and, until it has done so, I am unable to forecast what action, if any, may be required.

BACON (EXPORT).

Mr. HALL-CAINE: asked the Minister of Agriculture what steps have been taken by the Bacon Marketing Board since its inception to increase the export trade in British bacon products?

Mr. ELLIOT: Owing to the conditions obtaining in overseas markets since the Bacon Marketing Scheme came into operation, the board have not been able to increase the export trade in British bacon.

Mr. ALEXANDER: Will the right hon. Gentleman confine his attention to supplying enough bacon for the home market at reasonable prices?

Mr. ELLIOT: We are concentrating on that at present.

POTATOES (EELWORM).

Mr. HALL- CAINE: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether his attention has been called to recent outbreaks in this country of eelworm disease in potatoes; and what provision has been


made for research into the question of whether a cheap and practical method can be evolved for overcoming this pest?

Mr. ELLIOT: I am aware of the increasing prevalence of eelworm in potatoes, and substantial additional grants have, after consultation with the Agricultural Research Council, been made to the Institute of Agricultural Parasitology for the purpose of extending and expediting research work on the pest, the object being to devise practical measures of control.

Mr. HARDIE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, judging from a test made in Lincoln in regard to the production of potatoes, this disease is largely due to the use of artificial manure?

TITHE RENTCHARGE (ROYAL COMMISSION'S REPORT).

Lieut.-Commander FLETCHER: asked the Minister of Agriculture on what grounds the Report of the Royal Commission on Tithe, which has till now been withheld from the House of Commons, has been communicated to the Archbishop of Canterbury and other individuals?

Mr. ELLIOT: The grounds are that consultations have been necessary with the object of elucidating certain matters arising from the Report for the convenience of all concerned.

LAND DRAINAGE.

Mr. LIDDALL: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether, in order to relieve the occupiers of cottage property from assessment in respect of land drainage rates, he will consider introducing a Bill which will enable a land drainage board by resolution to assess and levy drainage rates on the owners of all hereditaments, other than agricultural land, in a land drainage district, or any part thereof, where the gross Schedule A assessment does not exceed £35?

Mr. ELLIOT: As I informed my hon. Friend on 4th February, I do not see any possibility of further land drainage legislation being introduced this Session. I have, however, noted his suggestion.

Mr. LIDDALL: That reply is hardly good enough. Does the right hon. Gentleman not realise that something will

have to be done to remedy this, and that there is in my question a suggestion which would provide him with a way out of his difficulties?

OATS (IMPORTS FROM CANADA).

Sir R. ROSS: asked the Minister of Agriculture what is the present position as to the importation of oats from the Dominion of Canada; and whether this position is accepted as satisfactory to oat growers in the United Kingdom?

Mr. ELLIOT: My right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, is at present in communication with the Canadian Government in regard to the importation of oats from Canada into the United Kingdom during the current cereal year, and pending a reply from the Canadian Government I am not in a position to make a statement on the matter.

Sir R. ROSS: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that the importation of oats from Canada last year was greater than ever before, and was that in accordance with existing treaties with the Canadian Government?

Mr. ELLIOT: My hon. Friend will realise that while the matter is under discussion it would be unwise for me to express any opinion.

MILK PRICES (COMMITTEE'S REPORT).

Mr. R. C. MORRISON: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether he has yet received the report of the Committee of Investigation with regard to the contract prices for milk for 1935–36; and whether it is proposed to make the report available to Members of the House of Commons?

Mr. ELLIOT: The Report of the Committee of Investigation referred to has not yet been received. It has been the practice to publish findings but not reports of the Committee of Investigation, and I am not in a position to say at this stage to what extent, if any, this practice will be varied in this instance.

Mr. MORRISON: In view of the importance of this matter, would the right hon. Gentleman give his consideration to the whole question?

Mr. ELLIOT: I will keep an open mind on the subject.

LEVANT FAIR (BRITISH LIVESTOCK).

Sir PERCY HARRIS: asked the Minister of Agriculture whether any arrangements are being made for the exhibition of British livestock in the agricultural section of the Levant Fair at Tel Aviv to be held in May next?

Mr. ELLIOT: No official arrangements are being made for the exhibition of British livestock at the Levant Fair.

Sir P. HARRIS: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that very much livestock is imported into Palestine, and will he make representations to agriculture interests in this country as to the desirability of advertising the advantage of British livestock?

Mr. ELLIOT: I am grateful to the hon. Member for the attention which he has drawn to the matter, and I hope British agricultural interests will see their way to take some such action.

Oral Answers to Questions — POST OFFICE.

DELIVERY OF LETTERS (WEST CENTRAL DISTRICT).

Sir ALFRED BEIT: asked the Postmaster-General whether he is aware that the first delivery of letters in Mecklenburgh Square, W.C.1, takes place about 8.25 a.m.; and if the reorganisation now in progress in the West Central district will result in expediting this delivery at an early date?

The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Major Tryon): Delivery in Mecklenburgh Square normally commences at about 8.10 and finishes at 8.30 a.m. These times will be maintained under the reorganisation, and I am afraid that it would not be practicable to improve upon them.

Sir A. BEIT: Is it not a. fact that certain other districts, such as Hampstead, have a very much earlier delivery, at about 7.45?

Major TRYON: I cannot answer that without notice, but we have tried to improve the position in the district to which the hon. Member refers.

HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP "GANGES" (POSTAL ADDRESS).

Mr. HOLMES: asked the Postmaster-General whether he will restore

the postal address of His Majesty's Ship "Ganges" to Harwich, so that this naval training ship may be associated with the name and place which for so long has been connected with the Royal Navy?

Major TRYON: The change in the postal address of His Majesty's Ship "Ganges" was made at the request of the captain-in-charge. The effect has been to afford some improvement in the postal service to the training ship and there seems to be no justification for altering the arrangements.

BOORS OF STAMPS (ADVERTISEMENTS).

Lieut.-Commander FLETCHER: asked the Postmaster-General whether in view of the note of warning issued by the Stock Exchange in their report on fixed trusts and the fact that these trusts are at present the subject of an inquiry instituted by the President of the Board of Trade, he will discontinue the insertion in the books of stamps sold by the Post Office of advertisements of the National Fixed Investment Trust, Limited?

Major TRYON: Advertisements in the books of stamps sold by the Post Office are subject to certain contractual arrangements, which can, if necessary, be reviewed when the result of the inquiry instituted by the President of the Board of Trade is known. At, present, however, there seems to be no sufficient reason for discontinuing the insertion of the advertisements referred to.

Mr. THURTLE: Does the right hon. and gallant Gentleman realise that the horse will be well away before the stable door is closed?

Major TRYON: I do not know which animal is referred to, but I should have thought it would be better to await the results of the inquiry before doing anything.

TELEPHONE SERVICE.

Lieut.-Colonel SANDEMAN ALLEN: asked the Postmaster-General whether he proposes to put telephone subscribers on a basis of equality with users of call boxes by making no charge for the call when a telegram is sent through the telephone?

Major TRYON: The object of waving the call office fee in the case of telegrams dictated from call offices is by treating


such offices virtually as Post Offices, to facilitate the handing in of telegrams by the general public at all hours of the day and night. Telephone subscribers have the advantage over call office users of being saved the inconvenience of having to visit a Post Office or call office to hand in their telegrams. To waive the penny fee in their case would involve a heavy loss of revenue which I do not feel justified in incurring at present.

Lieut.-Colonel SANDEMAN ALLEN: Does the right hon. and gallant Gentleman consider that call offices should be subsidized at the expense of ordinary subscribers?

Major TRYON: Call offices are not subsidized. It is a great advantage to be able to send a telegram from one's house without going out-of-doors.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.

STONEWORK (DISPOSAL).

Mr. CARY: asked the First Commissioner of Works what arrangements are made for the disposal of stone removed from the Houses of Parliament in connection with the restoration work now in progress?

The FIRST COMMISSIONER of WORKS (Mr. Ormsby-Gore): Large stone suitable for rock gardens is being disposed of in large or small quantities at 10s. a ton, and smaller stone at 5s. a ton, purchasers to pay, or provide for, cartage. Ornamental pieces suitable for sundials, garden ornaments, etc., are available at various fixed prices. The stone available may be seen on application to the Superintendent of Works (Mr. Holman) at the Houses of Parliament.

Sir R. ROSS: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how much has been realised so far from the sale of the stone?

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: Many hundreds of pounds. Many hon. Members have already bought it.

HOUSE OF COMMONS (ACOUSTICS).

Mr. DAY: asked the First Commissioner of Works whether his attention has been drawn to the bad acoustic properties of the House of Commons, and

the difficulties experienced by Members sitting on the back benches in hearing the speeches of Ministers; will he consider having installed in the House microphones and loud speakers to remedy this; and what would be the cost of this installation?

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: I do not consider that the acoustics of this Chamber are unsatisfactory, and I know of no system of microphones and loud speakers which would be suitable for installation in this House, where it is the practice for hon. Members to speak from different places.

Mr. DAY: Will the Minister consider introducing the same system in this House—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."]—as that which is installed in another place?

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: No, for the reason I have already given. The reason why the system referred to works in another place is, I gather, because the microphones are on the Table there, but as hon. Members in this House speak from many different parts of the House, it would not be practicable.

Captain Sir WILLIAM BRASS: Although my right hon. Friend can be heard everywhere in the House when he replies at Question Time, would it not be desirable to have some installation of the kind mentioned, in the Press Gallery, so that the answers given by some other Ministers might be heard in the Press Gallery?

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: I remember Mr. Speaker once saying that anybody who was worth hearing could be heard in this House.

LIGHTING.

Mr. H. G. WILLIAMS: asked the First Commissioner of Works what percentage of the electric lamps in the Houses of Parliament are of the gas filled type; and how long will it be before this type entirely supersedes the less efficient types still largely in use?

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: About 75 per cent. of the electric lamps in the Houses of Parliament are of the gas-filled type: I am not in a position to forecast the date by which this type only will be in general use, as substitution of gas-filled lamps where available takes place as the old types wear out.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Would it not be economic to replace all the old-fashioned lamps forthwith by new ones which only use half the energy; and is it not the case that in this respect at present this House is worse equipped than many private houses in the country?

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: AS I have said, 75 per cent. have already been converted and I am converting all the time. There are still some of the old lamps not actually in the House but in places where bright illumination is not needed. I have no doubt that those remaining old lamps will be replaced in due course.

BUDGET (BROADCASTING ARRANGEMENTS).

Mr. DAY: asked the First Commissioner of Works whether, in, view of the widespread interest throughout the Empire and the world generally in the Budget speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he will consult with the Government departments concerned and other necessary authorities for the purpose of seeing whether arrangements can be made so that the delivery of this speech may be broadcast?

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE: I have consulted the authorities concerned who remain of the opinion, which they believe to be shared by the House generally, that it is undesirable that the proceedings of Parliament should be broadcast. It has been the practice in recent years for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give a broadcast on the Budget in the evening after the Budget speech.

Oral Answers to Questions — DEFENCE SERVICES.

ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY (PROFITS).

Mr. LEACH: asked the Prime Minister what steps, if any, have been taken to ratify his pledge of last May that there shall be no profiteering in the armaments industry; and whether he is satisfied that the present share speculation and inflation does not violate the terms of his pledge?

The PRIME MINISTER: I would refer the hon. Member to statements made by my Noble and right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air in June and July last, of which I am sending him

copies, as to the steps taken to secure that excessive profits are not made in regard to orders placed in connection with the expansion of the Royal Air Force; and to the reply which I gave on Thursday last to the hon. and gallant Member for Nuneaton (Lieut.-Commander Fletcher) when I said that appropriate steps would be taken to ensure that excessive profits are not made in the orders which will be placed to make good deficiencies in the Defence Forces. As regards the second part of the question, His Majesty's Government are determined to give effect to the undertaking that excessive profits are not made on armament contracts; but they cannot accept any responsibility for the movements of share prices on the Stock Exchange.

Mr. LEACH: Has the Prime Minister no concern whatever with this gross public scandal; and will he not take the appropriate means of putting an end to this gambling, by bringing the important industry of armament-making under public ownership and control?

Sir W. BRASS: Is it not a fact that the rise in the price of shares makes absolutely no difference to the cost of production?

Mr. ANEURIN BEVAN: When the right hon. Gentleman makes reference to "appropriate measures" what does he mean?

The PRIME MINISTER: The measures that have been taken, so far, in the limited expansion which has been made, I believe to be satisfactory. The House will have the opportunity, on the pertinent Estimates, of debating that matter. We have, as the House is aware—and they will be told more details presently—a very great problem, in which we desire the co-operation of the whole House, in expansion, that will. have to be met in the next four or five years and, as we go on to meet those conditions, one of our greatest problems will be to consider whether such measures as we have taken hitherto Rill be sufficient. If we think they are not sufficient, we shall certainly suggest others.

Mr. LEACH: May I press the Prime Minister? Will he take no steps whatever to meet this grave public scandal?

Mr. A. V. ALEXANDER: Will the right hon. Gentleman take care, in order to retain public confidence, not to give way to pressure to put in charge of this kind of work, industrial magnates who have profited much in the past from subsidies of the Government?

Mr. HOLMES: Is it not a fact that armament and aviation firms are to-day not making profits out of the arms and areoplanes which they are supplying to our own country, but out of those which they are making for other people?

Mr. GARRO-JONES: asked the Prime Minister whether the insertion of a costings clause in armament supply contracts is the sole safeguard contemplated by the Government against excessive profits?

The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir.

Mr. GARRO-JONES: Is the Prime Minister in a position, in order to allay public anxiety, to specify what other measures will be taken?

The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir. I think I am not prepared at this moment to amplify the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) a few minutes ago, and I would say, with great respect, to the hon. Member, in the words of one of his former leaders, that he should "wait and see."

Mr. HARDIE: May I ask the Prime Minister, since it has been proved already that in this so-called tension, huge profits have been made by swindling or any other term you care to give it—

Mr. SPEAKER: Order.

WORKS, LANCASHIRE.

Sir W. BRASS: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the large expenditure proposed to be spent on modernising and improving our defensive forces, he will consider giving some special inducements to manufacturers to start works in certain of the distressed areas in Lancashire which, although in a depressed condition, are not included in the scheduled areas under the present Special Areas Act?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of LABOUR (Lieut.-Colonel Muirhead): I have been asked

to reply. It is already the practice in placing Government contracts to give a preference, other things being equal, to firms in the scheduled depressed areas, which include large parts of Lancashire. The Government is unable, on grounds of general policy, to accept the suggestion that a special inducement, other than that conferred by the preference above referred to, should be given to manufacturers to start works in any particular district of Lancashire.

Sir W. BRASS: Do I understand from the answer that the areas outside those scheduled in the Act, which I have mentioned in the question, are not to get any benefit from this at all?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: No, the hon. and gallant Member is not entitled to draw that deduction. The policy is, other things being equal, to give a preference to firms in the depressed areas including those in Lancashire. The answer means what it says.

Sir W. BRASS: And is the meaning of it that the areas to which I refer are not to be included?

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Mr. HULBERT: asked the Prime Minister whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to introduce legislation during the present Session for the reform of the House of Lords?

The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir.

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (INFORMATION).

Mr. BERNAYS: asked the Prime Minister whether confidential information regarding the international position is now being given to the Leader of the Opposition, as has been done in previous Parliaments, in periods of tension?

The PRIME MINISTER: No, Sir, but my hon. Friend's suggestion will be borne in mind.

Mr. THURTLE: Does not the Prime Minister think that it is employing unnecessarily alarmist language to use the term "a period of tension"; and may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he thinks that there is a period of tension now?

The PRIME MINISTER: Perhaps the hon. Member would address his question to my questioner.

CABINET MINISTERS (NEWSPAPER ARTICLES).

Mr. GARRO-JONES: asked the Prime Minister who takes the decision whether or not a given newspaper article by a Cabinet Minister infringes the Cabinet rule; and at what date or epoch, or by what other criterion, a subject passes from the permitted historical to the forbidden political sphere?

The PRIME MINISTER: The answer to the first part of the question is that in this, as in other matters, individual Ministers must be judges of their own conduct. If they are in any doubt, they are always able to consult the Prime Minister of the day or their colleagues. In reply to the second part of the question, I can only say that each case must obviously be decided on its merits.

PADDINGTON ESTATE TRUST.

Mr. W. ROBERTS: asked the hon. Member for Central Leeds as representing the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, whether the interest which the Ecclesiastical Commissioners have in the management of the Paddington Estate Trust amounts to a controlling interest; and whether the Ecclesiastical Commissioners' consent is necessary before any change or redevolopment can take place in the property under the control of the Paddington Estate Trust?

Mr. DENMAN (Second Church Estates Commissioner): The position in this estate is that, while the Ecclesiastical Commissioners are entitled to a share, generally one-third, of the income, the management is in the hands of a trust. The basis of the relationship between the two bodies is that the Commissioners are he freeholders, the trust holding a lease for the residue of 2,000 years.
The Commissioners have power to require that they shall join with the trust in the grant of any sublease or tenancy, but this power cannot be regarded as entitling them to claim more than protection of their present financial interests or of the value of their reversion in some 1,900 years' time.

Mr. ROBERTS: Am I right in thinking that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners cannot establish any control over any changes which may take place in the property?

Mr. DENMAN: That is so. They can in no way control changes unless they were manifestly to the financial disadvantage of the Commissioners.

Mr. ROBERT'S: Does the hon. Gentleman consider that it is in the interest of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners that they should derive profits, or at least an income, from a trading estate over which they have so little control?

Mr. DENMAN: The position is admittedly not wholly satisfactory. It is one from which the Commissioners can only escape by Act of Parliament, failing voluntary agreement. They have on more than one occasion attempted to obtain physical division of the property whereby they would acquire absolute control of their own share, but that has not yet been possible.

MERCANTILE MARINE (NEW CONSTRUCTION).

Mr. SHORT: asked the President of the Board of Trade the total tonnage of new shipping constructed during 1935 and the tonnage for 1934?

Dr. BURGIN: I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT a statement showing the tonnage of merchant vessels of 100 tons gross and over launched during 1934 and 1935 respectively and the tonnage under construction at 31st December in each of those two years.
Following is the statement:
Tonnage launched:
According to the returns of Lloyd's Register of Shipping, the tonnage of merchant vessels of 100 tons gross and upwards launched in the world during 1934 and 1935 was 967,419 tons gross and 1,302,080 tons gross respectively.
The corresponding figures for Great Britain and Ireland were 459,877 tons gross in 1934 and 499,011 tons gross in 1935.
These figures include all vessels launched, whether they were completed during the year or not.
Tonnage under construction:
There were under construction in the world on the 31st December, 1935, 1,543,153 tons gross of merchant vessels of 100 tons gross or upwards, of which 743,086 tons gross were under construction in Great Britain and Ireland.
The corresponding figures for 1934 were 1,251,722 tons gross in the world and 596,834 tons gross in Great Britain and Ireland.
These returns of vessels under construction include all vessels not completed whether they had been launched or not.

PALESTINE (LAND OCCUPATION).

Captain CAZALET: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can tell the House how much land still remains in Palestine owned by the Arabs; and what proportion of this land is held, respectively, by owner-occupiers, by landlords, or on some communal system?

The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. J. H. Thomas): I am consulting the High Commissioner for Palestine on the points raised by my hon. and gallant Friend, and I will communicate with him in due course.

Captain CAZALET: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the legislation proposed in Palestine as to the restriction on the sale of land in the future is intended to apply to all land held by the Arabs or only to that held by owner-occupiers?

Mr. J. H. THOMAS: The proposed legislation will apply to all land outside the excluded areas, whether held by Arabs or by Jews and whether held by landlords or by owner-occupiers.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Can we be assured that legislation will not be imposed without this House being consulted?

Oral Answers to Questions — SCOTLAND.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

Mr. ERSKINE HILL: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he has considered the recommendation made by the Commissioner of Special Areas in Scotland that an authoritative Scottish body should be set up to assist

development and research with a. view to the encouragement of Scottish industrial enterprises; and whether he proposes to take, or has taken, any steps to give effect to the recommendation?

The SECRETARY of STATE for SCOTLAND (Sir Godfrey Collins): The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, I hope to be in a position to make a statement at an early date.

Mr. HILL: Will the right hon. Gentleman, in any steps he takes, bear in mind not only those areas which are specially scheduled as distressed areas, but those areas which, although not scheduled, are in a position of considerable distress?

Sir G. COLLINS: That is our present intention.

Mr. HENDERSON STEWART: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider including in the terms of work of this body, in addition to economic and commercial matters, social and cultural matters that will be for the benefit of Scotland?

Sir G. COLLINS: I will consider that.

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (DISABILITY PENSION).

Mr. STEPHEN: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether his attention has been drawn to the decision of the First Division of the Court of Session in the appeal by Aberdeen County Council against the decision of a sheriff who held that the Poor Law Act of 1934 prohibited local relieving officers from taking into account the first £1 of a disability pension; and whether he will introduce amending legislation at an early date to carry out the intention of the Government to disregard such disability pension payments in granting public assistance?

The LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. T. M. Cooper): By the decision to which the hon. Member refers, and which was pronounced by the First Division of the Court of Session on 13th February, it was held, reversing the judgment of the Sheriff, that the direction to disregard the first 20s. of any wounds or disability pension applies only in the assessment of the amount of relief to be afforded, and not in the determination of the question whether the applicant for relief is a poor person within the meaning of the Poor Law (Scotland) Act, 1845. I am informed


that the question of an appeal against this decision is at the moment under active consideration. The whole position is being carefully examined, but at the moment my right hon. Friend is not in a position to say what action, if any, may be necessary.

Mr. BUCHANAN: May I ask whether, in the meantime, Poor Law authorities will operate the decision as originally given by the sheriff, and that while the appeal is pending no ex-service man shall be penalised?

The LORD ADVOCATE: I am afraid that the decision of the Court of Session holds until it is reversed.

Mr. HARDIE: Does a decision such as that override the power of the authorities?

Mr. GUY: Is it not the case that this decision will be applied only to new applicants?

SOUTH AFRICA (NATIVE FRANCHISE).

Mr. H. G. WILLIAMS: asked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether he will make inquiries as to the particulars of the suggested compromise in respect of the native franchise in the Cape Province of the Union of South Africa?

Mr. CREECH JONES: asked the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether he will ask for a report from His Majesty's High Commissioner in the Union of South Africa on the recent proposals as regards native representation?

Mr. M. MacDONALD: The matter relates to legislation which is at present under the consideration of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa. I am being kept informed as to the position by the United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Union.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Does the Statute of Westminster entirely deprive my right hon. Friend of any power to protect the legitimate interests of these natives?

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the other scheme is no compromise whatever, and that they are both diametrically opposed to the interests of justice?

Brigadier-General Sir HENRY CROFT: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that great anxiety has been expressed by those who are qualified to speak for the natives in Cape Province?

Oral Answers to Questions — UNEMPLOYMENT.

STATISTICS.

Mr. GEORGE HALL: asked the Minister of Labour the number of persons in receipt of transitional benefit in each Employment Exchange area in the counties of Glamorgan and Monmouthshire, with the weekly cost of benefit, during the three months ended December, 1934?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: This information is being extracted, and will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT as soon as it is available.

Mr. BEVAN: asked the Minister of Labour the number of unemployed persons in Great Britain up to the last available date; the number of persons chargeable to the Unemployment Assistance Board; the number of persons unemployed in the special areas; and the number of persons chargeable to the Unemployment Assistance Board in the special areas?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: At 20th January, 1936, there were 2,159,722 unemployed persons on the registers of Employment Exchanges in Great Britain, of whom 735,665 were applicants for unemployment allowances. The corresponding figures for the special areas were 423,587 and 226,696, respectively.

STAND-STILL ARRANGEMENT.

Mr. BEVAN: asked the Minister of Labour the number of persons in the special areas who, for various reasons, are not protected by the stand-still arrangement, and the additional cost to the board provided these persons were so protected?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: The provisions of the Unemployment Assistance (Temporary Provisions), 1935, apply to all persons who are in receipt of allowances from the Unemployment Assistance Board, and in all cases applicants receive the amounts which would have been payable by way of transitional payments or the amounts computed on the basis of


the board's regulations, whichever are the more favourable to them. I do not, understand, therefore, the hon. Member's reference to persons who are not protected by these arrangements.

Mr. BEVAN: Will the hon. and gallant Member try to reply to the question? Is there no difference between the board's regulations which were withdrawn and the transitional payments which were formerly in operation? Seeing that the transitional payments were higher than those under the board's regulations will he now tell the House what is the actual difference in the cost between the two?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: The hon. Member asked me to answer his question. His question is, "Will I state the number of persons in special areas who for various reasons are not protected by the stand-still arrangement?" and as I find it difficult to understand to what people the hon. Member refers—and I still find it difficult—I cannot state the number of persons.

Mr. BEVAN: Is not the hon. and gallant Member aware that all new cases, and all cases in which there is a change of circumstances, come under the board's regulations, and not under the stand-still order? Is the hon. and gallant Member not aware of that very well known fact, and is he not in a position to tell the House the additional cost?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: No, the stand-still arrangement means that whichever is the higher sum to which a man is entitled, whether under the Unemployment Assistant Board's determination or under transitional payments, he is to get the higher sum.

Miss WILKINSON: On a point of Order. This is really rather important, because the Minister apparently misunderstands entirely what the position is in the special areas.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member had better put down his question again.

INSURANCE (INCONSIDERABLE EMPLOYMENT) REGULATIONS.

Mr. STEPHEN: asked the Minister of Labour what steps he intends to take to preserve the stamp insurance rights of workpeople who obtain employment under the conditions laid down in the

Unemployment Insurance (Inconsiderable Employment) Regulations, 1935?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given on the same subject on 12th February to the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher).

Mr. BUCHANAN: Does the hon. and gallant Member say that it is his intention not to give the House some form of explanation of the Order other than the answer to a question by the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher)?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: Anybody who wishes to see the Order can get a copy of it.

Mr. BUCHANAN: But is the Minister aware that the Order is not so easily explained? The language used by himself and his officials is not always readily understood, and will he take steps to see that this House and the country are better acquainted with the provisions of the Order?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: I think the hon.-Member will agree that it would be a big order to start explaining Government Orders which were not easily understandable in answer to supplementary questions.

Mr. BUCHANAN: I am not asking the Minister to answer a supplementary question, but will he take the opportunity to explain it to Parliament on some suitable occasion?

Lieut.-Colonel MUIRHEAD: I will certainly consider the hon. Member's suggestion for explaining anything which is not clear to the hon. Member.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE.

AEROPLANES (WIRELESS EQUIPMENT).

Mr. PERKINS: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether the Royal Air Force machine that landed in the sea near Havre was equipped with wireless; whether this; machine was in communication with any wireless station; and, if so, why this machine was not directed by wireless to some English aerodrome free from fog?

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for AIR (Sir Philip Sassoon): The aircraft was in communication throughout


by wireless with Andover wireless station. Bearings were given to the pilot and he was instructed to land at Northolt, as his own aerodrome was obscured by low clouds.

Sir W. BRASS: Does not my right hon. Friend think that the Air Ministry ought to have made quite certain that the weather conditions were suitable before allowing these exercises on that night?

Sir P. SASSOON: One of the reasons for these exercises was to train pilots in flying under cloud conditions.

Sir W. BRASS: But were not these fog conditions?

Sir P. SASSOON: When the weather began to deteriorate the aeroplanes were recalled to their bases, and where the bases were obscured by the fog they were told which other aerodromes to make for.

FOG LANDING FACILITIES.

Mr. PERKINS: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air which Royal Air Force aerodromes are equipped with facilities for fog landings, such as are in use at Heston airport; and how many pilots in the Royal Air Force have any experience of this new invention?

Sir P. SASSOON: The equipment referred to is not in use in the Royal Air Force, but certain aircraft are now being fitted with fog-landing apparatus for experimental purposes.

EDUCATION (GRANTS).

Sir H. CROFT: asked the President of the Board of Education whether, in view of the pledge of 1918, re-affirmed in 1933, that the whole scale and organisation of education services depend upon the central Government making grants-in-aid of them covering at least 50 per cent. of their cost, he is aware that, under the 1931 economies, this principle has been seriously violated in many urban areas and that in Bournemouth the grant falls short by £32,195 and only amounts to 16.6 per cent.; and what steps he proposes to take to rectify this anomaly?

The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of EDUCATION (Mr. Oliver Stanley): I have nothing to add to the answers which I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr. A. Reed) on 13th

February, and of which I am sending my hon. Friend a copy.

Sir H. CROFT: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in no comparable urban area in this country is the burden so great as in the case mentioned in the question, and will he consider whether it is not such a serious position that it must be put right?

Mr. STANLEY: I do not agree that the burden of the cost of education borne by Bournemouth is greater than the burden borne by many more distressed areas?

Sir H. CR0FT: My question referred to urban areas of a similar character, and does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the burden is entirely disproportionate to that of all other similar areas?

Mr. STANLEY: Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member will tell me what towns he regards as being of a similar character to Bournemouth?

Mr. THURTLE: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is no place better fitted than Bournemouth to bear a heavy burden?

QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS.

Mr. GARRO-JONES: On a point of Procedure. May I ask you, with great respect, Mr. Speaker, whether you will give the House a Ruling as to the admissibility of certain questions which hon. Members may desire to put by Private Notice or otherwise. On Thursday the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) rose at the end of the time allotted to ordinary Questions and sought to ask the Prime Minister a question on a point of urgent public importance. You declined to accept that question on the ground that sufficient notice had not been given, but you went on to state that it did not appear to be the wish of the House that such notice should be waived. Speaking as one among many hon. Members on this side who occasionally, to our great regret, have to put Questions which do not win unanimous approval, we should view with concern any feeling by hon. Members that they could prevent questions from being put by indications of dissent. I should therefore like to ask you whether you can give the House your guidance as to the circumstances in which you


will accept a Private Notice Question without the necessity for taking the feeling of the majority against any minority; and, further, whether you can state that hon. Members putting questions of any kind within the Rules of Procedure are entitled to dispense with the approval of the majority? I say that without regard to the present constitution of the House. I thank you for allowing me to put this point.

Mr. SPEAKER: An incident which arose on Thursday last, immediately after Question Time, when the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) rose to put a Question to the Prime Minister of which he said he had given Private Notice, seems, owing to the Ruling which I gave at the time, to have given rise to some misunderstanding among Members as to the proper procedure on the putting of Private Notice Questions. Perhaps, to clear the matter up, it would be as well for me to give a Ruling as to what is the correct procedure.
Members who desire to put Private Notice Questions must give sufficient notice, both to the Minister to whom the Question is to be addressed and to myself, of the Question which they wish to ask. Before giving my consent there are the following points which I have to consider:
First, whether the Question is sufficiently urgent to justify it being put by Private Notice as opposed to it being handed in at the Table to be put on the Paper in the ordinary way. The question of urgency does not apply if the Questions on the Paper do not take up the full hour allotted to Questions.
Secondly, whether the Question complies with the rules which govern Questions which are put upon the Paper.
Thirdly, that there are not already on the Paper Questions dealing with the same subjects.
No question arises as to whether the Question itself meets with the approval of the majority of the House. Whether the Question is allowed is entirely a matter for the Speaker to decide. There are occasions when some unusual inci-

dent arises in the House, and it is obvious to the Speaker that the general feeling of the House is that in that particular instance the usual procedure should be waived. Unless some Standing Order would be violated, the Speaker is reluctant to stand in the way of the general wish of the House. My reference to the feeling of the House on Thursday last may have given rise to this misunderstanding to which the hon. Member refers. This has nothing to do with the putting of Private Notice Questions.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

Mr. ATTLEE: May I ask the Prime Minister how far he proposes to go tonight in the event of the Motion for the Suspension of the Eleven o'Clock Rule being carried?

The PRIME MINISTER: The arrangement which I indicated to the House on Thursday will, we hope, he adhered to. The Motion for the Adjournment is to be moved to allow a. Debate on Foreign Affairs, and we hope the Debate will be concluded by half-past nine, and the Motion withdrawn, so that we can then consider the Committee stage of the Supplementary Estimates for the three Services. We are moving the suspension of the Eleven o'clock Rule, as we must obtain those Estimates to-night. The Committee of Ways and Means which we are taking is a formal item of business on which the Consolidated Fund Bill will be founded. We should like, if possible, and we hope, to get the Motion for the Debts Clearing Offices. I do not believe there is anything controversial in that.

Mr. ATTLEE: I think the last item ought not to be taken if the House should be sitting very late.

The PRIME MINISTER: Oh, no; certainly not.

Motion made, and Question put,
That the Proceedings on Government Business be exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)."—[The Prime Minister.]

The House divided: Ayes, 279; Noes, 98.

Division No. 53.]
AYES.
[3.54 p.m.


Acland, R. T. D. (Barnstaple)
Albery, I. J.
Anderson, Sir A. Garrett (C. of Ldn.)


Adams, S. V. T. (Leeds, W.)
Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'kn'hd)
Anstruther-Gray, W. J.


Agnew, Lieut. -Comdr. P. G.
Amery, Rt. Hon. L. C. M. S.
Aske, Sir R. W.




Assheton, R.
Emery, J. F.
Maxwell, S. A.


Astor, Major Hon. J. J. (Dover)
Emmott, C. E. G. C.
Mayhew, Lt.-Col. J.


Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley
Emrys- Evans, P. V.
Meller, Sir R. J. (Mitcham)


Balfour, G. (Hampstead)
Erskine Hill, A. G.
Mills, Sir F. (Leyton, E.)


Balfour, Capt. H. H.(Isle of Thanet)
Evans, Capt. A. (Cardiff, S.)
Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)


Balniel, Lord
Evans, D. O. (Cardigan)
Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham)


Barclay-Harvey, C. M.
Everard, W. L.
Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H.


Baxter, A. Beverley
Findlay, Sir E.
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univ's.)


Beauchamp, Sir B. C.
Fleming, E. L.
Morrison, W. S. (Cirencesterl


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'h)
Foot, D. M.
Muirhead, Lt.-Col. A. J.


Beit, Sir A. L.
Fraser, Capt. Sir I.
Nicolson, Hon. H. G.


Bennett, Capt. Sir E. N.
Fremantle, Sir F. E.
O'Neill, Major Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh


Bernays, R. H.
Furness, S. N.
Orr-Ewing, I. L.


Blair, Sir R.
Ganzoni, Sir J.
Palmer, G. E. H.


Blaker, Sir R.
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)
Patrick, C. M.


Blindeil, Sir J.
Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir J.
Peat, C. U.


Boothby, R. J. G.
Gledhill, G.
Percy, Rt. Hon. Lord E.


Borodale, Viscount
Gluckstein, L. H.
Perkins, W. R. D.


Bossom, A. C.
Glyn, Major Sir R. G. C.
Petherick, M.


Bowater, Col. Sir T. Vansittart
Goodman, Col. A. W.
Pilkington, R.


Bower, Comdr. R. T.
Graham, Captain A. C. (Wirral)
Plugge, L. F.


Boyd-Carpenter, Major Sir A. B.
Granville, E. L.
Ponsonby, Col. C. E.


Brass, Sir W.
Grattan-Doyle, Sir N.
power, Sir J. C,


Briscoe, Capt. R. G.
Greene, W. P. C. (Worcester)
Pownall, Sir A. Assheton


Brocklebank, C. E. R.
Gretton, Col. Rt. Hon. J.
Purbrick, R.


Brown, Brig. -Gen. H. C. (Newbury)
Gridley, Sir A. B.
Raikcs, H. V. A. M.


Bull, B. B.
Griffith, F. Kingsley (M'ddl'sbro, W.)
Ramsay, Captain A. H. M.


Bullock, Capt. M.
Grimston, R. V.
Ramsbotham, H.


Burgin, Dr. E. L.
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E. (Drake)
Rankin, R.


Burton, Col. H. W.
Guest, Maj. Hon. O.(C'mb'rw'll, N.W.)
Rathbone, Eleanor (English Univ's.)


Butler, R. A.
Guinness, T. L. E. B.
Rathbone, J. R. (Bodmin)


Caine, G. R. Hall-
Guy, J. C. M.
Rawson, Sir Cooper


Campbell, Sir E. T.
Hacking, Rt. Hon. D. H.
Rayner, Major R. H.


Cartland, J. R. H.
Hamilton, Sir G. C.
Remer, J. R.


Cary, R. A.
Hanbury, Sir C.
Rickards, G. W. (Skipton)


Castlereagh, Viscount
Hannah, I. C.
Roberts, W. (Cumberland, N.)


Cautley, Sir H. S.
Harris, Sir P. A.
Ropner, Colonel L.


Cayzer, Sir C. W. (City of Chester)
Harvey, G.
Ross, Major Sir R. D. (L'derry)


Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Haslam, H. C. (Horncastle)
Rothschild, J. A. de


Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)
Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.
Rowlands, G.


Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. N. (Edgb't'n)
Heneage, Lieut. -Colonel A. P.
Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir E. A.


Channon, H.
Hepburn, P. G. T. Buchan-
Runciman. Rt. Hon. W.


Chapman, A. (Rutherglen)
Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmoath)
Russell, A, West (Tynemouth)


Chapman Sir S (Edinburgh S)
Hills, Major Rt. Hon. J. W. (Ripon)
Russell, S. H. M. (Darwen)


Chorlton, A. E. L.
Holmes, J. S.
Salmon, Sir I.


Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.
Hope, Captain Hon. A. O. J.
Samuel, Sir A. M. (Farnham)


Clarke, F. E.
Hore-Belisha, Rt. Hon. L
Samuel, M. R. A. (Putney)


Clarry, Sir R. G.
Horsbrugh, Florence
Sandys, E. D.


Clydesdale, Marquess of
Howitt, Dr. A. B.
Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir P.


Colfox, Major W. P.
Hudson, R. S. (Southport)
Savery, Servington


Collins, Rt. Hon. Sir G. P
Hulbert, N. J.
Scott, Lord William


Colman, N. C. D.
Hume, Sir G. H.
Seely, Sir H. M.


Cooke, J. D. (Hammersmith, S.)
Hurd, Sir P. A.
Shakespeare, G. H.


Cooper, Rt. Hn. A. Duff (W'st'r S.G'gs)
Jackson, Sir H.
Shaw, Major p. S. (Wavertree)


Cooper, Rt. Hn. T. M. (E'nburgh, W.)
Jarvis, Sir J. J.
Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A.


Courtauld, Major J. S.
Keeling, E. H.
Sinclair, Rt. Hon. sir A.(C' thn's)


Craddock, Sir R. H.
Kerr, Colonel C. I. (Montrose)
Smiles, Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. D.


Cranborne, Viscount
Kerr, H. W. (Oldham)
Smith, Sir R. W. (Aberdeen)


Croft, Brig.-Gen. Sir H. Page
Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet Sir R.
Somerset, T.


Crookshank, Capt. H. F. C.
Kirkpatrick, W. M.
Somerville, A. A. (Windsor)


Cross, R. H.
Knox, Major-General Sir A. W. F.
Southby, Comdr. A. R. J.


Crossley, A. C.
Law, R. K. (Hull, S.W.)
Spender-Clay, Lt.-Cl Rt. Hn. H. H.


Crowder, J. F. E.
Leech, Dr. J. W.
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)


Cruddas, Col. B.
Lennox-Boyd, A. T. L.
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'm'l'd)


Culverwell, C. T.
Levy, T.
Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)


Davies, Major G. F. (Yeovil)
Lewis, O.
Stewart, William J. (Belfast, S.)


Davison, Sir W. H.
Liddall, W. S.
Storey, S.


Dawson, Sir P.
Lindsay, K. M.
Strauss, E. A. (Southwark, N.)


De Chair, S. S.
Llewellin, Lieut.-Col. J. J.
Strauss, H. G. (Norwich)


De la Bère, R.
Lloyd, G. W.
Stuart, Lord C. Crichton- (N'thw'h)


Denman, Hon. R. D.
Loder, Captain Hon. J. de V.
Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)


Denville, Alfred
Loftus, P. C.
Sutcliffe, H.


Despencer-Robertson, Major J. A. F.
Lumley, Capt. L. R.
Tate, Mavis C.


Donner, P. W.
Mabane, W. (Huddersfield)
Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)


Dorman-Smith, Major R. H.
MacAndrew, Lt.-Col Sir C. G.
Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (Padd., S.)


Dower, Capt. A. V. G.
MacDonald, Rt. Hn. J. R. (Scot. U.)
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Derby)


Dugdale, Major T. L.
Mac Donald, Rt. Hon. M. (Ross)
Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)


Duggan, H. J.
McEwen, Capt. H. J. F.
Touche, G. C.


Dunglass, Lord
Maclay, Hon. J. P.
Tree, A. R. L. F.


Dunne, P. R. R.
Macnamara, Capt. J. R. J.
Tryon, Major Rt. Hon. G. C.


Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Maltland, A.
Tufnell, Lieut.-Com. R. L.


Edmondson, Major Sir J.
Makins, Brig.-Gen. E.
Turton, R. H.


Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Wander, G. le M.
Wakefield, W. W.


Ellis, Sir G.
Manningham-Buller, Sir M,
Ward, Irene (Wallsend)


Elliston, G. S.
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir J. S.


Elmley, Viscount
Mason, Lt.-Col. Hon. G. K. M.
Warrender, Sir V.







Waterhouse, Captain C.
Williams, H. G. (Croydon, S.)
Young, A. S. L. (Partick)


Wayland, Sir W. A.
Wilson, Lt.-Col. Sir A. T. (Hitchin)



Wedderburn, H. J. S.
Windsor-Clive. Lieut.-Colonel G.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—


White, H. Graham
Wise, A. R.
Sir George Penny and Lieut.-


Wickham, Lt-Col. E. T. R.
Womersley, Sir W. J.
Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward.




NOES.


Adams, D. (Consett)
Hall, J. H. (Whitechapel)
Ritson, J.


Adamson, W. M.
Hardie, G. D.
Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O. (W. Brom.)


Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (H'lsbr.)
Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)
Rowson, G.


Amman, C. G.
Henderson, T. (Tradeston)
Salter, Dr. A.


Anderson, F. (Whitehaven)
Hicks, E. G.
Sanders, W. S.


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Holland, A.
Sexton, T. M.


Barnes, A. J.
Jagger, J.
Shinwell, E.


Bellenger, F.
Jenkins, A. (pontypool)
Short, A.


Benson, G.
Jones, A. C. (Shipley)
Silverman, S. S.


Bevan, A.
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
Smith, Ben (Rotherhithe)


Broad, F. A.
Kelly, W. T.
Smith, E. (Stoke)


Brown, C. (Mansfield)
Kennedy, Rt. Hon. T.
Smith, Rt. Hon. H. B. Lees- (K'ly)


Buchanan, G.
Kirby, B. V
Smith, T. (Normanton)


Burke, W. A.
Lansbury. Rt. Hon. G.
Sorensen, R. W.


Cluse, W. S.
Lathan, G.
Stephen, C.


Clynes, Rt. Hon. J. R.
Lawson, J. J.
Stewart, W. J. (H'ght'n-ie-Sp'ng)


Cocks, F. S.
Leach, W.
Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)


Daggar, G.
Leslie, J. R.
Thorne, W.


Dalton, H.
Logan, D. G.
Thurtle, E.


Davies, D. L. (Pontypridd)
Lunn, W.
Tinker, J. J.


Davles, R. J. (Westhoughton)
McEntee, V. La T.
Viant, S. P.


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
McGovern, J.
Walker, J.


Day, H.
MacLaren, A.
Watkins, F. C.


Dobbie, W.
MacMillan, M. (Western Isles)
Wedgwood. Rt. Hon. J. C.


Ede, J. C.
MacNeill, Weir, L.
Whiteley, W.


Edwards, A. (Middlesbrough E.)
Marklew, E.
Wilkinson, Ellen


Edwards, Sir C. (Bedwellty)
Mathers, G.
Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)


Fletcher, Lt.-Comdr. R. T. H.
Messer, F.
Windsor, W. (Hull, C.)


Gallacher, W.
Montague, F.
Woods, G. S. (Finsbury)


Gardner, B. W.
Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.)
Young, Sir R. (Newton)


Garro-Jones, G. M.
Paling, W.



Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A.
Parker, H. J. H.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Griffiths, G. A. (Hemsworth)
Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.
Mr. Charleton and Mr. Groves.


Hall, G. H. (Aberdare)
Potts, J.

MEMBER SWORN.

A Member took and subscribed the Oath required by law.

ARMY (ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES).

Estimate presented,—of Charge for financial year 1936 [by Command]; referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed.

CIVIL AND REVENUE DEPARTMENTS (ESTIMATES, 1936).

Estimate presented,—for Civil and Revenue Departments for the year ending 31st March, 1937, with Memorandum [by Command]; Referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed.

CIVIL AND REVENUE DEPART- MENT, 1936 (VOTE ON ACCOUNT).

Estimate presented,—showing the several Services for which a Vote on Account is required for the year ending

31st March, 1937 [by Command]; Re-ferred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Captain Margesson): I beg to move, "That this House do now adjourn."

4.3 p.m.

Mr. LEES-SMITH: We are initiating this Debate because the Report of the Committee of Experts appointed by the Committee of Eighteen was issued last week and it is now open to discussion. I also noticed from an answer given by the Foreign Secretary to-day that the Committee of Eighteen will meet to come to its conclusion about this Report next Monday, so that this is in fact the last opportunity the House will have to discuss an issue the decision upon which next week by the Committee of Eighteen will probably decide whether the League of Nations for the future is to be a thing which we need take account of or not. The Report has now been generally read, and, broadly speaking, I think it will leave most of us with just about the same opinions as we had before.
The Report discusses the possibilities particularly of an oil embargo, combined, however, with an embargo upon tanker shipping for oil. The Committee have come to the conclusion that if the United States will not co-operate in the embargo, then it will make the war for Italy more difficult and more expensive; but if the United States does co-operate —I would point out that they do not assume that the United States will in any way diminish their exports to Italy; they merely assume that the United States will not profiteer by increasing their exports—if the United States were to refrain from profiteering at the expense of the League, then, the Report states, all Italian supplies of oil would be exhausted in about 3½ months, at the present rate of consumption. But I would here state their qualification, that in making that statement they have not been able to make any final estimate of the degree to which Italy could economise by substitutes or by saving in her own internal consumption. That is the estimate, and I am bound to say that after the immense opportunities that Italy has had to accumulate stocks during this period of long delay, the 3½ months seems to me rather a. short allowance for the Committee of Experts to have given.
That is the broad outline of the report, and I wish to state the view that, as a consequence of that report, under either of the conditions they assume, it will be a wise policy for this country to take the lead in proposing an oil embargo when the Committee of Eighteen meets next week. It will be a wise policy under either of the alternatives which the committee discusses. If the United States refuses to co-operate it will still be a wise policy for this reason: Most of the military appreciations of the situation now agree that unless there is surprising, entire disintegration in Ethiopia, there is no longer any prospect of Italy winning this war in one campaign, that if she is ever to win the war at all—it will not be won necessarily when Addis Ababa is invested—she can only win it by a series of campaigns, having the same experience as France and Spain have had in their campaigns in Northern Africa. It is going to be a long war over a number of years.
I notice that a spokesman of the Government in another place last week gave it as his opinion that the sanctions imposed up to date were having a genuine effect, and that the League of Nations would eventually succeed with the present sanctions. But the present sanctions are entirely sanctions directed against Italy's internal life; they are sanctions which cover the Italian people. Oil is the only sanction which is going have a direct effect on the military operations. Therefore, I say that now, for that reason alone, the addition of oil to the other sanctions may be the addition of the most decisive embargo of all.
But a much more important reason for proceeding now is this: Everything shows that only if we proceed now by ourselves, only if we take the decision, only under these conditions is there a hope and prospect of getting the co-operation of the United State. I hope that the Foreign Secretary is not going to say that he will first of all seek to ascertain what the United States will do in an obligation which primarily rests on the League of Nations. The fact is that the whole history of this subject has shown in the last few months that so long as the League, so long as we in Europe particularly, seem determined to take a strong line on sanctions, so long will the opinion of the United States remain


favourable to us. As soon as we began to waver, opinion in the United States cooled off. If we want to win back their support we must now take the initiative ourselves.
I am very anxious to convince the House that this is the best method of approaching the United States. Let me remind the House of what we have seen in the last few months. At the beginning of November there was a general impression and belief everywhere, including this country, that an oil embargo was on the eve of being imposed, and at that time there was no doubt that the opinion of the United States was favourable to co-operating with us—not only the opinion of the public but the opinion of the Administration. Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, stated that it was the view of the Administration that oil ought not to be exported from the United States to Italy. Mr. Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, met the oil companies and told them that if they exported oil they were acting contrary to the policy which the United States wished to pursue. I go further and I say that there is every proof that at that moment the oil companies were ready to fall in with the wishes of the Administration. After all, the oil companies are not in a very strong position in the United States; they cannot afford to antagonise public opinion, and they do not want to do so.
If this is challenged I can give proof from the statement of the Standard Oil Company. The oil companies at that moment were willing to co-operate with the wishes of the United States Government. Then, even before the Hoare-Laval episode, it began to be suggested that we were wavering over this oil sanction. The House will remember the delay, because M. Laval was too occupied in the internal politics of France to go to Geneva and discuss oil sanctions. As soon as that hint of delay and of hesitation appeared, you can read that all the correspondents in the United States, those of the "Times," the "Morning Post" the "Daily Telegraph" and the "Manchester Guardian" —all the authoritative correspondents in the United States sent telegrams which I have here, warning this country that the hesitation over here was leading to the embarrassment of the Administration and the bewilderment of the public.
Finally, when the Hoare-Laval episode took place, they all came to the conclusion that owing to our policy the original sentiment in the United States had been turned into cynicism and disillusion. I am not going to read all the telegrams that came, but I will read a telegram from the "Times" Washington correspondent, because he concludes with the point of view which I am trying to put before the House. He says:
Frankness demands the statement that little is left here of the earlier mood of hopefulness.
He goes on to say—and this is a serious point:
Italy takes from the United States only 6 per cent. of her oil requirements in times of peace. If there were a genuine attempt to prevent her access to the remaining 94 per cent. by other nations, the position of the American Government, which desires to honour the spirit as well as the letter of its neutral duties, would be strengthened.
What then does this mean? It means that Signor Mussolini, by the threats which he directed against this country over three months ago, has scored up to the present an astonishing diplomatic success. He has succeeded in holding up an oil embargo for nearly four months, he has been able in the interval to accumulate immense stocks, which may blunt the edge of that embargo when it is imposed, and he can now watch us arguing as to whether the embargo should ever be imposed at all. And the tragedy of what has occurred is that the dubious factor is now the United States and the fact that the United States, which was in front of us and leading us four months ago, has now become an uncertain factor. I say that that fact itself is the most terrible result and the most terrible indictment of the vacillating ineptitude with which this issue has been handled.
Are we going to continue to deal with this situation in the spirit and by the methods which I have just described One has cause for anxiety, because there was a discussion on this subject in another place last week, and the spokesman of the Government there said that what the Government would do would be to go to Geneva, listen to what the other States had to say, and after that make up their mind. I regard that as a humiliating position for this country to take. Is this country to wait to be led by Rumania, and Holland, and Russia? That is what this spokesman


for the Government up to the present has suggested shall be done, and I say that that is not, apart from the dignity of the matter, a reasonable attitude to take. What is the position? The small nations cannot take the initiative because they are frightened of the larger nations. —[HON. MEMBERS: "Russia."] But if Russia did take the initiative, what would happen It would mean that every dictator in Europe, supported by the Conservative party in this House, would immediately say, "This is merely a, part of the war of Communism against the Fascist State." Hon. Members know they would say it, and they cannot deny it. France has already indicated that she is not going to take a further interest in this matter. We come back, therefore, to the fact that if this country does not take the lead, there will be no lead at all. It comes back to what the Foreign Secretary is going to do when he goes to the Committee of Eighteen next week.
Up to the present I do not think we have any complaint to make about the speeches of the Foreign Secretary, except that we do not quite know to what point they are ever going to lead. Now at any rate the time has come when those speeches will be tested, and I say that, in our view, he ought to go to the Committee of Eighteen, he ought himself to propose the imposition of the oil embargo, and he ought to leave it to any nation which objects to take its responsibility in the face of the world. The moment he does that will be as great a moment as when our Foreign Secretary spoke at Geneva last September. When he does it, let him take the opportunity of appealing to the decency of the United States.—[Laughter.]—I say of appealing to the decent feelings in the United States—not to allow the few dollars for their oil interests to lead them to assist to put out one of the great hopes of the world.
If the Foreign Secretary takes that step, he will find, as a matter of fact, that there are a good many factors which are more favourable now than they were four months ago. The first of these is the change in the attitude of France, which four months ago was a far more intractable proposition than the United States is to-day. I will read a statement

which M. Flandin made—this is a matter of great importance—on the French attitude before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber, which I recognise is not a public statement, but this is the statement summarising it in the "Temps" of 12th February, 12 days ago, and, therefore, we may take it as fairly accurate:
Questioned on the attitude which the Government would adopt if an embargo on oil should be decided at Geneva, M. Flandin pointed out the fact that France was neither a producer nor an exporter of oil, so that sanctions of this kind would not be detrimental to her and that she must conform to the decision taken by the League.
That is a very great advance upon the attitude taken by M. Laval. If the oil embargo is imposed, there is no reason why that should be the only economic sanction to be undertaken. My hon. Friend here, the late Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has been putting questions about the possibility of closing the ports, of sanctionist countries to Italian ships. That is one method, and there are other suggestions of the same kind. We at present impose an embargo on imports from Italy, but we, the League of Nations, the sanctionist nations, still make use of Italian cargoes and passenger ships, of what in economic and Free Trade discussions they call invisible imports. They still make use of those, and by means of those Italy is enabled to obtain cash and foreign exchange just as much as by direct exports. I find that we are exporting for the use of the Italian armies water from Aden, that cotton has gone from Egypt, camels from the Sudan, and goods from British Somaliland. I find the Press Association giving reports of how British Somaliland is becoming prosperous as a consequence of the war with Italy, with picturesque accounts of how caravans full of goods are leisurely proceeding towards the Italian armies in the south of Abyssinia. No, Sir, the oil sanction is not the only one. When it is imposed, there are many other resources of an economic character still at our disposal.
That is the direct argument for action next week, but we all have to deal with the new situation which is developing in Europe. Most of us, practically all of us, have at the Lack of our minds the


problems which will be raised by the rearmament of Germany and the position which will arise when the German military machine is complete. I think that that fact strengthens the reason for supporting the League of Nations and for strengthening the methods of collective security. Nobody has stated this fact more emphatically than the Prime Minister. I will read, from his speech to the House in the last. big Debate on this subject, on the 19th December, some words which he quoted as stating his policy:
The policy of this Government… is… to work through the League of Nations in every way possible… Above all, work for all you are worth for… collective peace."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December, 1935; col. 2036, Vol. 307.]
That is the Prime Minister's general principle. But may I put to him what seems to me to be the simple logic of that principle? The purpose of the League of Nations is to stop war, and it will have no purpose unless it can be a really effective instrument in stopping another war, and particularly another European war. That is why this immense issue that we are now discussing is of such enormous importance. Signor Mussolini is not the only dictator who is watching what action we take at this moment. The week before last, in the discussions here on the question of a Ministry of Defence, speeches were quoted from Dr. Goebbels, General Goering, and Herr Hitler, all of them speeches of a most menacing description —speeches which may lead to serious results if they mean what they say. The simple logic of the situation seems to me to be that, if those speeches mean anything, and if you wish in future to stop General Goering or Dr. Goebbels or Herr Hitler, you have got to begin by stopping Mussolini now.
How can you do it by collective security? How can you work, as the Prime Minister says, through collective security? That is the principle. It has been repeated by the Foreign Secretary at Question Time to-day. What is the use of collective security worked by a League of Nations which is supplying oil to work the military machine of the aggressor State? The Prime Minister has laid down in general terms a principle which I accept, and which the nation accepts, and the surprising fact has been that the people as a whole seem

to have realised the implications of his doctrines more clearly than the Prime Minister himself. He has been accused, by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, of dualism, and, indeed, he has himself said that he is a dualist. By dualism we mean the process of laying down a doctrine and then always being in two minds as to whether you are going to carry it out. It is that kind of dualism of which he seems to us to be a practitioner, because all the time he seems to be half afraid of what is going to happen if the policy of sanctions, which he asked the country to support, is eventually able to succeed.
I appreciate the problem which the Government have to meet. It is this: The Government, particularly at the Stresa Conference, built up a combination of this country, France and Italy, within the League of Nations, which might have led to an almost irresistible coalition against an aggressor State. That was the hope, and perhaps the Government still entertain that hope. But I think they must face this fact, that a situation has now arisen in which, for the moment at any rate, you have to choose between the friendship of Signor Mussolini and the abandonment and killing of the League of Nations and of the possibilities of collective security. That is the dilemma, and, faced by that dilemma, the choice of the Government ought to be plain. Signor Mussolini has all the time emphasised the fact that this is not a conflict between him and the League of Nations, but that it is a conflict between him and Great Britain, and under these conditions I do not think it is reasonable to expect him to have such friendly feelings, whatever happens to this country, as to be a reliable ally in case a crisis comes.
I am dealing with this problem seriously, because it is the problem which the Government are facing, and this, I believe, is the line which the Government are pursuing and which is leading them to this vacillating and humiliating policy. If you do that, you have to consider not only Italy, but what the effect is going to be upon all the surrounding nations. The nations around Germany are watching what is happening. Look at their plight; look at the terrible choice which they have to make, between coming


to an understanding with Germany—a rearmed Germany using threats and intimidation to create the understanding—and, on the other hand, entrusting their whole existence to the League of Nations, upon which this country invites them to rely. The late Foreign Minister—and a fairly strong one—of one of these nations was in London a short time ago, and, in conversation with the late Foreign Secretary of this country, he said that, so far as he could see, the chief difference between the fate of Abyssinia and of China under the League of Nations, led by this country, was that Abyssinia had been more successful in defending herself. This oil embargo has become the symbol and the test of the sincerity of this country and the League, and the reason why we say, "You must now impose it," is that, so long as you delay it, you cannot avoid the fact that you are part of the Italian military operations. We therefore demand that you shall now state that you are going to cease to assist Italy any longer.
There is one further point with which I will deal, because it appeared to be in the Prime Minister's mind during the last Debate. He seemed to be disappointed that the League of Nations had not given results. How can the League of Nations give results if you refuse to use it? This Abyssinian dispute was brought before the League of Nations. Abyssinia appealed to the League of Nations, under Articles X and XI, in January of last year. She was told to go away and talk it over with Italy; she was told to negotiate with Italy privately. She appealed again in April, and again she was put off; and, just about the time that she appealed, I noticed that the present Lord President of the Council took the opportunity to make a broadcast speech in London, in which at that moment, after the Abyssinian dispute had been on for three months, he thanked Signor Mussolini for the wonderful skill and helpfulness with which he had presided over the Stresa Conference.
As a matter of fact, whenever the League of Nations has been appealed to, it has responded. It responded when it was appealed to with regard to assisting the Mediterranean Fleet. It responded to the speech of the late Foreign Secretary at Geneva in September, and it responded in such a. fashion that the

League of Nations, which a, year ago was scarcely taken into account in any serious discussion, has now, as a consequence of that one speech from a British Foreign Secretary and the reply of the League of Nations, become almost the leading feature in the European scene. I am convinced that the Government will find that the simplest policy is the best. Let them try the League of Nations out thoroughly and completely to the end in this interval. That is the policy which the Prime Minister asked the country to authorise him to carry out, and, in now insisting that he shall act upon that authority, we are the spokesmen of the quiet masses of the nation.

4.44 p.m.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Eden): I must first thank the House and the Opposition for the arrangement by which they have made it possible to discuss this afternoon our foreign problems in their broader aspects. It is clearly more convenient for us to do that than if we were cribbed, cabined and confined within the narrow compass of a Supplementary Estimate, and I propose to avail myself of the liberty which has thus been given to me. The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has surveyed the international field and has spoken with considerable vehemence and with an emphatic certainty which I envy him. He gave us very freely of his advice, and of course we are grateful for it, but as I listened to the confident decisiveness of that advice I wondered sometimes whether his might not be the quick decision of one who sees half the truth.
I want to divide what I want to say to-day into three parts I want to deal first with the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia, and the question of sanctions. I want then to say a word or two about certain subjects not directly related to this dispute, and finally to make some observations about the international situation as a whole. The right hon. Gentleman's main charge against His Majesty's Government and against the League was one of dilatoriness in our handling of this dispute. That charge always takes this farm. If the League has acted promptly, it has of course nothing to do with His Majesty's Government. If it has been slow, it is always entirely our fault. I am quite prepared to accept those assumptions, because they


make the ordinary part of the ammunition of an Opposition in debate, but I want to put to the House what I believe to be a reasoned answer to the right hon. Gentleman's arguments. The first one was that we were slow in the months from January to May before fighting broke out. What would he have had us do? We took every step by negotiation and conciliation that was in our power. What would he have us do? Apply sanctions before war broke out? We could not do that within the terms of the Covenant itself. What the right hon. Gentleman is asking is that the nations should have done something which in fact they are not under any obligation to do. Anyone who has had experience of the last few months will know well enough that it is not very easy to induce everyone to fulfil the obligations that are upon them. How hopeless would have been the task of anyone attempting to induce nations to undertake obligations which are not theirs under the terms of the Covenant itself. So much for dilatoriness before war broke out.
As for dilatoriness when the war had broken out, within 10 days of the outbreak of war Italy had been declared the aggressor by a number of States on the Council. That decision had been ratified and approved by 50 States who are members of the Assembly, and a Committee had been set up which proposed four measures to be applied against Italy. I must stress that what is remarkable in that record is its rapidity rather than its dilatoriness. Those four measures, which were proposed on 19th October—war broke out on 3rd October—were an arms embargo, a refusal of credits, a, refusal to supply Italy with certain articles necessary for war purposes and a refusal by the nations of the League to accept Italian goods. That was the record within a fortnight of the declaration of war.
Now I come to the right hon. Gentleman's main criticism. It is the League's dilatoriness in action as exemplified by its attitude towards this problem of oil sanctions. Here again I think the right hon. Gentleman does less than justice to the League. When Italy was pronounced by Members of the League to have violated the Covenant, the question of the application of sanctions became in consequence important. A coordinating committee which was set up, and its sub-

committee, had the unwelcome task of organising these sanctions and they divided possible sanctions into two main categories: first, those sanctions which could be applied and could be made effective by the action of members of the League alone; secondly, sanctions which must depend for their efficacy upon the co-operation of other States not members of the League. It has always seemed to me that that was a most judicious distinction. So far the League has been concerned with sanctions which could be made effective by the League alone.
The right hon. Gentleman semed to wish to give the impression that those sanctions were proving ineffective. That, I must say, is not our information. I do not know what his justification was but clearly the financial sanctions and the refusal of the League to accept Italian exports could not be immediately effective. That I admit. Their object was gradually to reduce the purchasing power of the aggressor State. Normally imports into any country are paid for by one of three methods—by exports, visible or invisible, by capital transactions, or by gold. The sanctions which the League imposed very largely eliminate, so far as League action can do it, the first two methods of payment, and I would remind the House that the normal exports of Italy to the nations of the League amount to 70 per cent. of her export trade. It will be seen, therefore, that the power of the aggressor to purchase must in consequence be very seriously reduced. A nation in such a position can, of course, continue to purchase in gold as long as its reserves of gold and foreign exchange allow it, but in such conditions the reserves of any nation must be steadily depleted. There would then come a time when the power to purchase was exhausted altogether. In those circumstances it is surely clear, from the efforts that have been made in Italy to collect gold, that the significance of existing sanctions is fully realised there. The effect of these sanctions which have been imposed is in fact continuous and cumulative and it must obviously have an important influence in achieving what is the main objective of the League, a cessation of hostilities. Therefore the point that I wish to make is that members of the League have already put into force certain economic sanctions over the operation of which they have complete control.
A further step is being examined and the League is considering a sanction involving a commodity the supply of which is to a great extent in the hands of a non-member of the League. As the right hon. Gentleman spoke, I rather gained the impression that he thought that in recent months, whereas this country and other League countries were continuing to increase or to maintain their sales of oil to Italy and Italian colonies, the sales of the United States were going down. Actually, of course, it is the contrary that is the fact and, if the right hon. Gentleman would look at the table of figures which is issued with the very informative report of the League Experts Committee, he will see this. Taking the figures from January to September, 1935, the exports from Persia, which is where the only British company concerned operates, he will find that they were 13 per cent. of Italy's total taking. From October to December they had fallen to 4.4 per cent., a very small percentage in Italy's total taking. On the other hand, whereas the United States percentage from January to September last year was, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly said, 6.3 per cent., that percentage had risen in the October to December quarter to 17.8 per cent.
I wish to say a word or two about this oil sanction. There has come to be attached to the oil sanction in certain quarters something of a symbolic quality. It is urged that to put it on is right or wrong according to the point of view, quite irrespective of its efficacy. I regard that as the language of exaggeration. To my mind an oil sanction is a sanction like any other and must be judged by the same criterion, whether its imposition will help to stop the war, for that is the object which every nation at Geneva has in front of it. It is in that spirit that we must examine it. It is in that spirit that the Government will examine it and come to their decision.
I can say no more about that question to-day since the Governments have not completed their examination of the Experts' Report and their decision has, therefore, not yet been taken. I have no doubt that the Governments members of the League are all now studying closely the implications of this report, and the House will appreciate that there are some of them who may very well claim that

they have a greater direct interest in this matter than we have. In any event this report will shortly be discussed at Geneva. The sooner, in the judgment of the Government, it is discussed the better, and the sooner the decision is arrived at the better. We have done what we could to expedite the meeting of the committee, which will take place next Monday. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government have departed neither from their original decision of principle regarding the oil sanction, a decision which was taken last November, nor from their resolve to take their full part with others in such collective action as the League may decide upon. Moreover, I can assure the House that it remains the policy of His Majesty's Government to maintain steady collective resistance to aggression and that they will be guided in their task by the spirit of the Covenant itself. There will be neither weakness nor wavering in this course until peace is signed.
I have referred to the distinction between those sanctions which League members alone can make effective and those which can only be made partially effective through the action of the League. I believe this distinction is important because it is symbolic of the League's position as a whole. Since its inception 17 years ago, it has been the experience of many to pass through three phases in their attitude to the League. In its earliest years there were many who thought that it could achieve everything. Then came a phase when many thought that it could achieve nothing. Now we are in a third and a more realistic phase. We believe that it can achieve much but that its influence must inevitably be limited by the fact that its authority is not universal. It is well that we should recognise this, for we should otherwise pile up for ourselves grave disappointment. The fact, however, that the League is not omnipotent should not make us weaken in our support. Though it cannot achieve everything, it can achieve much. In the last 12 months it has grown in authority and prestige, and. with prestige comes power. There are still those who regard the League as dangerous, but there is no one who follows foreign affairs who to-day regards it as negligible.
I turn to another aspect of the fighting in Africa. I want to say a word on the subject of conciliation. We none of


us think of the League only in its negative aspect as a policeman. There is also the constructive aspect—that of a conciliator and a peacemaker. I am sure that I am expressing the general view of the House and of the country in saying that we all desire the speediest and most satisfactory settlement of this dispute. In this connection, the House will recall that last September a sub-committee of the Council of the League known as the Committee of Five examined the basis of a settlement which might be considered acceptable to all members of the League. That report has since been made public. Unfortunately, however, its terms were not at that time accepted by the Italian Government, but in the view of His Majesty's Government that report still represents the basis upon which any further attempts at conciliation should be made.
I say this at the present moment because I think it important that we should make it clear what kind of objective the League should, in our judgment, have in mind even while it persists with sanctions. Sanctions, unwelcome as they are to us all, are never anything more than the means to an end. In this case, the end is a settlement in accordance with League principles which will establish normal relations between neighbours on a lasting basis. I hope, therefore, that this report of the Committee of Five will be neither forgotten nor set aside. In the view of His Majesty's Government, the proper place for a resumption of any peace discussion is at Geneva, where the atmosphere is always favourable for members of the League who wish to avail themselves of the machinery which is there at their disposal.
I wish this afternoon, before it is my duty to return to Geneva to resume the discussion of further sanctions, to say, and to say, I trust, with the full approval of this House, clearly and unequivocally, that His Majesty's Government and this country, while taking their full part with others in the imposition of sanctions, desire first and foremost to see the reestablishment of a just peace between Italy and Abyssinia. If both sides to this dispute would even now accept the good offices of the League, of which they are both members, I am sure that there would be no hesitation among their fellow members in agreeing that the machinery of the Committee of Five is

still available. That is all I wish to say about the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia.
I turn to one or two other matters. about which I should like to say a word to the House. The first is the reform of the League, about which much has been written and spoken in the last few weeks. It is indeed possible—we can all do it—to find fault with the working of the Covenant as it stands and with the working of the League machinery in general, and it is still easier to point out that the League suffers owing to the absence from its membership of certain important Powers. Yet it is interesting to note that the critics of the Covenant are' almost always divided into two camps. There are those who want to strengthen Article 16, because they say that it does not work rapidly enough or effectively enough, and there are those who want to take Article 16 out of the Covenant altogether. I would only observe that I do not believe that it would be very much easier to reconcile those two points of view to-day than it was when the Covenant was originally drafted but I am not unduly depressed by these reflections. What in fact matters is not so much the wording of the Covenant as the will of the nations to work it. As that will is strengthened, so will reform become easier of negotiation and its necessary implications take shape from our experience. In the meanwhile I would only observe that some of the would-be reformers of the League seem to me scarcely distinguishable from those who would reform it out of existence altogether. The present, at least, is certainly not the time to undertake the amendment of the Covenant, and His Majesty's Government have no intention of making proposals to that effect.
The other matter to which I want to make reference is the question of access to Colonial raw materials, which were recently discussed in this House. I must make it clear that His Majesty's Government have in no way withdrawn from the proposal of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) on this subject. They are perfectly willing at any time to enter into an examination of this subject, and they think that such an examination could usefully be held at Geneva. The appropriate moment, however, for such an examination must


clearly depend on many factors, including the attitude of other Powers towards the proposals. Useful though we believe 'such an examination would be, I think that the House would be mistaken if we were to imagine that from a pursuit of it we should discover some magic touchstone for all our ills. Clearly, that is not so. The international situation is much more complex than that, but this problem may be an element in our difficulties, and therefore I repeat, that His Majesty's Government are willing at any time to enter into an examination in an attempt to solve it.
The other subject about which I would say a word is Egypt. As hon. Members are aware, His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt have agreed to enter upon preliminary conversations with a view to negotiations for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. These preliminary conversations, which will deal with the subjects which caused most difficulty when negotiations were last held between the two Governments in 1930, will be opened on 2nd March, and, after a brief interval, will be resumed on or about 9th March. His Majesty's Government sincerely hope that the discussions will prove a prelude to a successful treaty negotiation. They enter them in a spirit of cordial good will and collaboration, and with every intention that, as far as their efforts can make for success, the conversations shall succeed. They are confident that they will be met in a similar spirit by the Egyptian Government and delegation.
I would like before I close to speak to the House for a few moments upon the international situation as a whole. It will be idle to deny that there is in all parts of the House, anxiety as to the future, and it would be equally idle to deny that that is an anxiety which we must all share on the Government Bench —an anxiety which is not minimised though it is mitigated by the reflection that the course which this country pursues in the next year or two may well be a decisive factor on events. It is no great tribute to the collective wisdom of the world that now, 18 years after the close of the War—a war which those of us who were of age to fight in it were assured was a war to end war—we find ourselves confronted with the same problems, dreadfully similar in character

and in portent with those of the years before 1914. It seems that in addition to the ordeal of the War itself, a war generation has thrust upon it the task of finding sufficient wisdom to prevent a recurrence on an even greater scale of the suffering which it endured. Indeed this is clearly statesmanship's most urgent task. How is it to be accomplished'? Not, I am convinced, without the full and active co-operation of this country—a co-operation which can best be exercised and probably only be effectively established through the machinery of the League and of collective security.
This country is firmly attached to that policy because it believes it to be the policy most likely to ensure the maintenance of peace. Nor is there anything in that conviction incompatible with our own national interests, for the League is an attempt to establish an international order, and an international order is a national interest. Yet—and this is the consideration which the House has to bear in mind—if this country is to play its full part in a system of collective security, two conditions are indispensable. First, that the system should be truly collective and so powerful as to deter any would-be aggressor, whether from within or from without and, secondly, that this country should be strong and determined enough in policy and in arms to play its full part therein.
It fell to my lot for three years to work at the Disarmament Conference. They were years of disappointment and disillusion, yet I do not believe that the work that was done there was all wasted, and the time may come when we shall yet be able to achieve important results in that sphere. But so long as there is no general disarmament, there can be no question of Great Britain continuing to practice unilateral disarmament. When I view the future of foreign policy I can see several different lines along which events may develop, but, whichever course events may take, the one element which appears as essential for every course is that Great Britain must be strong. I regard this as an essential for any foreign policy which we can pursue with any hope of success in the near future. What is more, it is only by this method, I am convinced, that we shall ever obtain an arms agreement at all. If the House will recall, the most successful example of arms


negotiation known to history was the Washington Treaty negotiated at the time when Britain was not weak but strong. For the moment it is clear that to reach the disarmament which we all wish to pursue—[Interruption.] Well, it has to be faced by the House.

Mr. GALLACHER: What we got in 1914.

Mr. EDEN: It is the kernel of the problem which confronts us, and we have seriously to face the facts. For the moment it is clear that if you want to get disarmament you will only be able to get it through the increased power and authority of the League, and that power and that authority of the League must depend in a considerable measure, if we have any regard at all to the events of the last few months, upon the armed strength of our own country.
Personally, I do not disguise from the House that I deeply regret that increased expenditure upon armaments by this country should have become inevitable. It is an unproductive form of expenditure, but there is this measure of comfort that re-armament to strengthen collective security is the cheapest form of re-armament. It is cheaper than re-armament within the pre-war system of alliances, and it is infinitely cheaper than rearmament in isolation. Collective security is cheaper than either of the other two methods, but it is still expensive. There has still to be re-armament. Why? This is the fact that we have to face. Because of the lack of confidence in the good will of nations and because of the obsession of fear. Here, then, lies the political task of the League and of the Government of our country. Fear of unprovoked aggression can only be eliminated, and it must be eliminated, by the gradual strengthening of collective security until every nation is convinced that in no circumstances can aggression be made to pay.
It is essential that in re-affirming our attachment to the League and to collective security we should distinguish clearly between that policy and encirclement. While His Majesty's Government will take their full share in the policy of collective security they will have neither lot nor part in encirclement. The distinction is surely clear. Our final objective must be a world-wide system of collective security

which embraces all the nations, and the authority of which is unchallenged and unchallengeable. We are far from that objective at present. We can only hope to realise it by at one and the same time strengthening the authority of the existing system and facilitating by agreements based on a wide understanding the cooperation of other nations in our work. In a true system of collective security the door must always be wide open for the entry of others.
Europe has to choose to-day and in the next few years between co-operation and disintegration. If we are to realise the former it will be necessary for each of us to approach our problems not only firm in our own convictions but with a wide spirit of comprehension. In that respect I believe that our own country has a special responsibility. Our economic and financial recovery in recent years has been notable, and by this country's readiness and her power she can take the lead in maintaining the authority of the League and in inspiring others to work for its full development, so that it may meet the international needs of our times. That is not an easy course, but no easy course is possible for us if we are to play our part in an endeavour to avert the recurrence of a world war. The chance of averting such a catastrophe is slender unless we play our part to the full.
Moreover, democracy is on trial. Are we to fail because of an unwillingness to face new conditions Let us not be afraid of living up to the traditions of the past. Time was when this country first gave to the world Parliamentary government. It is in this same tradition that His Majesty's Government intend to play their part at Geneva in an attempt to build up a new world order. The most pressing and the most immediate task of our country is to bring back some measure of confidence to Europe and, though I can only speak now, as the House will appreciate, in general terms, it is to that task that we are now applying ourselves in detail. If we are to succeed we shall have to bring others along with us, but we shall not be able to do that unless other nations are convinced of our sincerity, and our strength, and unless we can gain their confidence. This, in turn, we can only do if we pursue a consistent and constructive policy. I believe that such a policy can be devised and


followed with persistence on the lines I have indicated. It is in that conviction that I enter upon my task, and I shall labour at it, I trust, with the confidence of all sections of opinion in this House.

5.23 p.m.

Major Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: It is my privilege to be able to extend to the right hon. Gentleman an expression of our gratitude and admiration for his clear and masterly survey of the whole field of foreign affairs in the compass of a comparatively short speech. In perhaps the most important passage of his speech he dealt with the general principles upon which his foreign policy will be based and that will, of course, demand our most careful study and reflection. Broadly speaking, the general lines of policy which he laid down are those which I believe, as he hoped in the concluding passage of his speech, will command the general support of public opinion in the country. There are, however, one or two features of his speech which I would venture to stress. He spoke of the vital importance if we are to avert the immeasurable catastrophe of war of building up a system of collective security which will guarantee the rule of law in international disputes, and said that we have to make our contribution to that system. I do not believe that in any parts of the House, except perhaps in one small quarter, any objection will be taken to that general proposition; but it is apparent that we shall have to do something more than that. It is true that we have to build up a system of collective security, but we must make it clear that within the League of Nations, for those nations that come into the League and submit to the rule of law and contribute to the system of collective security, there must be some means whereby they can obtain satisfaction for their legitimate grievances, and some means whereby the play of political and economic forces of the world can be peacefully adjusted.
In an earlier part of his speech the right hon. Gentleman referred to the fact that the Government, as it undertook through the mouth of his predecessor at Geneva in September, are willing to engage in discussions with other countries about access to raw materials. I hope the Government will not confine their policy in that direction too narrowly. Markets are as important as

raw materials, and if we are to solve the great question of migration and the economic suffocation from which many countries are suffering, we shall have to take a wider view of the task than merely that of facilitating access to raw materials. The right hon. Gentleman made an interesting reference to Egypt, which will receive our careful attention, but as I do not wish to delay the House too long, because we have set a strict limit on the continuance of this Debate and there are many hon. Members who wish to speak, I shall confine myself to the main subject of the Debate, and that is the question of the Italian-Abyssinian dispute.
On this question the right hon. Gentleman said that there would be neither weakness nor wavering in the Government's course until peace is restored. In the frequent debates on foreign affairs during the past three months the Government have taken up a great deal of the time available in protesting the consistency of the policy which they claim to have been pursuing during the past three or four years. The passage which I have quoted from the right hon. Gentleman's speech looks as if he, too, was concerned with claiming consistency in the policy which he is following. These claims are so demonstrably contrary to the facts which are of common knowledge as to make the public doubt the sincerity of the Government in the course they now claim to be pursuing. I would say, let the right hon. Gentleman, who is now entering on his new office with the good will of his fellow Members in all parts of the House, with the support of a great deal of public opinion outside which is unattached to any party, abandon the unnecessary, futile, superfluous course of claiming consistency for the Government's policy. I can call as witness to their inconsistency a distinguished foreign witness such as Dr. Benes. The facts are within the knowledge of the House. The right hon. Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) from his point of view, and the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) from his, have pointed out the innumerable vacillations of the Government. Let the Government concentrate and let the right hon. Gentleman concentrate on convincing the House and the country by action of their inflexible determination in pursuing a


League policy, and, in particular, in upholding the rule of law in the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. It is there that the Government's declarations have been weak.
They have said in the past, as the right hon. Gentleman has said to-day, a good deal about the importance of the issue which is now joined between Italy and the League of Nations, but it is in action and in pledges of action that the declarations of the Government have been weak and that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was weakest to-day. The League of Nations is now joined in an historic struggle with an aggressor State, a life-and-death struggle. Let us make no mistake about that. The Chancellor of the Exchequer so described it himself in a speech in this House in December. Signor Mussolini has declared that war imposes a seal of nobility on those people who have the virtue to face it and that he does not believe in the possiblity or the utility of perpetual peace. There is no possible compromise there. He and others of like mind must be convinced that the League of Nations means to stamp out war as a crime against civilisation. It is a life-and-death struggle for the League.
The Prime Minister in his speeches, to which we have been listening during recent months, while expressing in one vein his wish to strengthen collective security talks in another and more detached vein about the possibility of failure and how in that event we shall have to build a new League of Nations on the ruins of the old. That was not the way in which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) spoke to the country in the darkest days of the War. He did not say in March, 1918, that if the Allies failed we should just have to make the best of a bad job. The greatest of the right hon. Gentleman's many contributions to victory in the Great War was the faith, the moral energy, with which he inspired the country, and if we are to substitute law for anarchy in the world, peace and trade for strife and armaments, we need no less faith and vigour, no less firmness and determination in leadership in the present emergency than we needed in the War.
As to the gravity of the emergency I agree with the Foreign Secretary. It

admits of no doubt or question. A great and formidable nation in Europe is arming on a, scale and at a rate which is unprecedented in peace time, is wrapping its preparations in secrecy and is declining to accept the obligations of the Covenant. Nor is the danger confined to Europe. In two other Continents great Powers are already invading the territory of their neighbours in defiance of their written obligations. Indeed, but for the lessons of the last War the nation might have been willing to arm to ensure victory in the next; but we know now that victory in war is an illusion. The issue is not between victory and defeat, but, as the right hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) said in a speech a few weeks ago in this House, between world peace and destruction. The Foreign Secretary in the first speech he made as Foreign Secretary in his own constituency a week or two ago, said:
A major war in Europe must bring the collapse of civilisation in its wake.
Two hundred million pounds, 400,000,000, or even £500,000,000 spent on armaments will avail us nothing to avert that catastrophe unless it be as a contribution to a collective system of security against aggression, to make the collective system so strong that no aggressor will venture to challenge it, and to make it abundantly apparent that aggression in the modern world will not be allowed to pay. The right hon. Gentleman's predecessor at the Foreign Office said:
If the League does fail the world at large, and Europe in particular, will be faced with a period of almost unrelieved danger and gloom.
Let us then abandon idle talk about the possibility of the League's failure and about putting our shoulders to the wheel and building up a new League, for if the forces of aggression and anarchy break through the defences of the League, civilisation will be engulfed and there will be no time to build up a new League of Nations.
The war between Italy and Abyssinia, as the right hon. Gentleman said a, few weeks ago in this House, is a vital test of the efficacy of the League and of the loyalty of its members to the Covenant. Have the present sanctions prevented the despatch of a single Italian soldier or


tank or gun, or of a single shell or aeroplane to destroy the independence of Abyssinia and the lives of Abyssinian soldiers, women and children, and Red Cross workers? The right hon. Gentleman has given us no information about the working of sanctions. Could not he, or some other Member of the Government in a later speech, convey this information to the House? The right hon. Member who opened the Debate made a strong speech on this point, and said that in his view sanctions up to the moment had not been effective. The Foreign Secretary said that his information was different. Will the Foreign Secretary tell us what is his information, so that we can judge as to the effectiveness of sanctions and how far they have been successful in preventing or hampering the purchase of munitions and warlike stores by Italy for the war in which she is engaged?
I heard the right hon. Gentleman's broadcast speech from Geneva when sanctions were imposed. I was at a meeting of peace workers in Scotland, and we were thrilled by his words. He said:
We cannot afford to daily, for at this moment men are being killed and homes are being shattered.
We have dallied for five months and more men are being killed and more homes are being shattered now than was the case then.
Action must be swift, and action must be effective, if the League is to achieve the end for which it is set up. We have undertaken solemn obligations and from these solemn obligations we shall not shrink.
But the Government did shrink in December, and are shrinking still, from making their policy swift in action and effective. Four months have passed and all that the right hon. Gentleman can say of these sanctions, of that action which he promised would be swift and effective, is that it must ultimately have an important effect—those were his words this evening—on the course of the war. Just before Christmas the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the League must either take action or come to an end, and that it must proceed to every extremity. But it has not yet imposed the oil, coal, iron or steel sanctions, which they agreed, in principle last November to impose. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary asked for justification for the

charge of dilatoriness. Surely we want no stronger justification than that, for, indeed, these are the sanctions, these iron, coal, steel and oil sanctions, for which there is the greatest justification because they would be directed not mainly against the economic and social life of Italy, and because their weight would mainly fall upon the operations of the Italian Army in Abyssinia. Instead, the Government have allowed themselves to be bluffed out of an oil sanction by Mussolini. That statement is no exaggeration. It is proved by the letter which the right hon. Mernber for Chelsea recently addressed to his supporters in his constituency. Referring to the period of his resignation he said:
Within a few days it was necessary to decide whether or not we would agree to an oil embargo against Italy, and we knew from many sources that an oil embargo might lead to some warlike act by Italy, such as an attack on Malta or Egypt.
It is clear from that that we were bluffed out of an agreement with the proposal for an oil sanction by Signor Mussolini. Surely it is apparent that sanctions must be futile if an aggressor can select his own sanctions and it those which an aggressor thinks too effective are to be barred. If these were the limits of the Government's sanctions policy they should never have embarked upon it. Once embarked upon it they cannot let it fail; otherwise the League perishes and our hopes of peace perish with it.
In his speech the right hon. Gentleman very rightly stressed the importance of the principle of collective action. Of the arguments used by his predecessor at the Foreign Office in favour of the Paris peace proposals, the one which left the greatest impression on the House and on the country was that not a man nor a gun had been moved by any other Power but Britain to guard against the eventuality of an attack by Italy upon one of the Powers imposing sanctions. Then it transpired that these other countries had never been asked to collaborate with us until the day before that speech was made, or, at any rate, a few days before, but as soon as they were invited to join in resisting interference with sanctions they promptly agreed, and now an effective understanding upon the measures to deal with such an eventuality has been reached between ourselves and France and four other Mediterranean Powers. It was not the other Powers


who were to blame for lack of co-operation, but our own Government, who neglected to ask for it. I think we are agreed that it was not the other Powers who refused to support us in the event of an Italian attack upon us because we were maintaining sanctions, because until a few days before that speech was made we had not asked for their support; but when we asked for it it was promptly promised.

Major-General Sir ALFRED KNOX: Can the right hon. and gallant Member tell me if any of these other nations have as yet moved a single man or a single ship or a single gun?

Sir A. SINDLAIR: No, fortunately it has not been necessary; but all these nations have men and ships and aeroplanes on the spot which can be brought promptly into action if required.
Now I come to the question whether we are going to invite other Powers to impose additional and effective sanctions. France is willing to act. That was made abundantly clear by the right hon. Member who opened the Debate. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary at the beginning of his speech made a debating point when he said that in the course of our Debates on this question it was the fashion of the Opposition to say that when the League of Nations has acted promptly it had nothing to do with the British Government, and that when it has not acted promptly it has been the fault of the British Government. I do not think that is true. I have never failed, in speaking on this subject in the House or in the country, to pay a real tribute of admiration and respect to his predecessor for his speech at Geneva and to the right hon. Gentleman himself.
Do not let the right hon. Gentleman under-estimate the sincerity of his opponents. We are willing and anxious to help him in his task, but we do ask that he should give us firm and effective leadership, and that the whole weight and power of Britain should be used in this emergency. And it is right that the British Government should give a lead. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman of the words spoken by his predecessor in October last:
Let me say definitely and frankly to the House that the representatives of Great Britain and the representatives of the British Empire can never take a secondary part in any great international discussion.

The representatives of a great Empire cannot abdicate their responsibilities or disguise their views."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd October, 1935; col. 22, Vol. 305.]
It is leadership that we expect the right lion. Gentleman to give at Geneva—passive acquiescence will not avail—or he will add his name to those of Mr. Garvin and Lady Houston as spectators in the theatre of life. There are two British statesmen who in recent years have earned striking soubriquets from world opinion. There is the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs who throughout the world has been acclaimed as "the man who won the War," and there is the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who has earned the very honourable soubriquet "that terrible young man who wants peace so much." That is a proud title, but, if I may say so with respect, that "terrible young man" has been a little less conspicuous in his utterances since Christmas than before Christmas. I hope he will be in action at Geneva next week, for faith, courage and leadership alone can save the League and secure peace.
Now, the most important of the additional sanctions which ought promptly to be imposed is the oil sanction. The right hon. Gentleman said that we were attaching too much importance to the oil sanction, and that we ought to consider the question of efficacy rather than to regard that sanction as a flag or a symbol. But it is my submission to the House that there is a strong case for imposing that sanction now on the ground that it and certain other sanctions to which I shall refer are necessary in order that the authority of the League of Nations shall prevail in this dispute. The report of the experts discusses the problem of oil sanctions on the basis of two alternative hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the United States of America agree to confine their oil exports to Italy to the amount exported before the Italo-Abyssinian war began. The experts make it clear that on that hypothesis the Italian stock of oil would be exhausted in three or four months. The alternative hypothesis is that the United States of America will do nothing to stop American exports of oil to Italy. Even on that hypothesis the experts make it clear that the imposition of an oil and tanker embargo, on the lines which they suggest, by all States members of the League,


would make the Italian conduct of the war more costly and more difficult. I believe that to be true, because it would be some time before Italy could adapt her arrangements to the new conditions, and much of her tanker tonnage is now being used for water storage and for other purposes. Therefore, even without any participation from the United States of America, the oil and tanker embargo would be a material addition to the existing sanctions, and consequently it ought to be imposed now.
For my part, I believe that the forces in the United States of America working for an embargo on oil exports to Italy would be strong enough to influence American policy, if the League is strong enough to act alone. To seek American help beforehand would be useless, but I do not believe that the United States of America would allow exports of oil to Italy to continue on a vast scale from the United States if it were clearly seen that the direct effect of those exports was to help the conduct of the war by Italy, and largely to neutralise the efforts and sacrifices of the members of the League. It is naturally impossible to say how far the pressure of public opinion in the United States of America would be effective, but there can be little doubt that it would succeed in checking to some extent the export of oil, especially as Mr. Rockefeller, the chief of the oil magnates in the United States of America, is a strong supporter of the League. Consequently, the case for the imposition of the oil sanction without a prior assurance of American support can be firmly based on the Experts' Report.
Nor should the Government stop there. They should insist on the imposition of coal, iron and steel sanctions, and they should press for the furthest advance—for example, the closing of ports to Italian shipping, which would make it increasingly difficult for the Italian Government to obtain foreign exchange with which to purchase oil and other military supplies—to which their fellow members will agree in the direction of that complete severance of economic relations with Italy which is enjoined upon all members of the League by the Covenant which they have signed. It is not sanctions that have failed, but the courage and resolution of the Governments in applying them comprehensively and effectively.
I am indeed glad that the right hon. Gentleman has made it clear that His Majesty's Government will pursue every possible method of bringing about an early peace, although quite frankly I do not much like the report of the Committee of Five. Nevertheless, if, starting from that point of departure, a satisfactory settlement can be hammered out, I wish the Government success; but no settlement which will really be in accordance with genuine League principles, and will make it clear to the world that aggression will not pay, is possible without further measures of constraint upon Italy. In the concluding passage of his speech, the right hon. Gentleman said that for the success o his policy, Great Britain must be strong. What we are concerned about on this side of the House is whether the huge sums of money which we are asked to vote for what the right hon. Gentleman frankly admitted to be unproductive expenditure will be used for asserting the rule of law and for strengthening the authority of the League of Nations. It is here that we feel some disquiet about the present situation, for the present situation is that the forces at the disposal of the League are vastly superior to those at the disposal of Italy. Indeed, the Government have always asserted that even if we stood alone—as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chelsea said in his resignation speech—we need have no doubt about the outcome of any struggle which the Italian Government might be mad enough to force upon us. If, therefore, the Government is unable or unwilling to contemplate, and to co-operate in, the most drastic action to uphold the authority of the League and to assert the rule of law in this dispute, what guarantee have we that any addition to our present forces will be used for the service of the League and for the assertion of the rule of law? For whatever may be the cat se of the Government's unwillingness take, or to take the lead in proposing, those further steps which are necessary to curb Italian aggression, it is admittedly not lack of adequate armaments.
For five months Italy has successfully defied 50 nations. The war goes on its frightful course. All the time there is the danger that it will spread. At any moment a spark from the Abyssinian blaze may fall among inflammable


material in foreign countries or in Colonial territories. Sanctions are the only means of stopping this war and of averting a still greater catastrophe. If the Government wants to persuade us that the purpose of its armaments policy is to buttress the League of Nations and to support the rule of law, let it show a firm resolve to stop the war and call upon its fellow members of the League, who have never yet failed to follow a clear lead against aggression, to impose those sanctions which will make impossible the indefinite continuance of Italian military operations in Abyssinia.

5.57 p.m.

Mr. AMERY: I should like in the first instance to join my right hon. Friend opposite in congratulating the Foreign Secretary on his maiden speech. There were two points in that speech with which I found myself wholeheartedly in agreement. The first was when the right hon. Gentleman said that whatever foreign policy we pursue, it can be successful only if Britain is strong. The second point was when he made it clear that the Government are still anxious to find a settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute by conciliation. My right hon. Friend indicated that the basis of such a settlement must be sought in the somewhat elastic provisions of the recommendations of the Committee of Five. That is as it may be, but his statement clearly involved a rejection of that demand for the punishment of Italy which I find made in so many quarters in this House and outside. The settlement must be based on the merits of the facts and not distorted by the retrospective consideration as to who was to blame in starting the conflict.
In dealing with the Abyssinian issue, I would like to say a word or two about a certain report which has been made public in the Italian Press. That report clearly makes nonsense of the suggestion originally emphasised so strongly in Italy that we were really acting hypocritically and that our main motive was a concern for our economic or strategic interests. What else the Italians can make of the report I really cannot imagine. But I think that we here at least are entitled to ask whether it was wise, seeing that no direct British interest was involved, for us to take so active and so vehement an initiative against Italy in an interpretation of our duties under the Covenant

of the League which for 10 years we had repudiated in substance, although not in form, and which was emphatically repudiated in this House as recently as 11th March last both by the Prime Minister and by my right hon. Friend the Member for West. Birmingham (Sir Austen Chamberlain). On that occasion I am afraid I wearied the House with a long exposition of the consistent attitude taken by this Government and all British Governments for 10 years against their present reading of their duty under Article 16 of the Covenant. On this occasion I shall not weary the House on that matter; if any hon. Member is interested he can read my speech of 23rd October on the subject. But I would say now that when we look at the troubled face of the world to-day, when we consider the conflicts of interests, ideals and ambitions which animate the Great Powers; when we look at the temper in which many great nations approach these issues, and when, on the other hand, we reflect on the inherent weakness of our scattered territories and on the added weakness resulting from the short-sighted neglect of our defences in recent years; when we remember the precious inheritance of the tradition of British freedom embodied in our British Commonwealth; then I, at least, am of opinion that the vigilant stewardship of British interests, of British security, of our own British peace, is more than a sufficient task to occupy all the time, thought and energy of British statesmanship.
As for this purloined document, I do not know whether it is going to be made public here, but it was evidently nothing more than a careful, dispassionate, expert examination of what would be the results of an Italian occupation of Abyssinia. We may leave it at that. Its publication does, however, suggest a further question. Was there no similar expert inquiry, equally careful and dispassionate, no less free from any suspicion of being influenced by the exigencies of domestic politics, devoted to examining the possible and probable consequences of the policy to which we did commit ourselves, the policy of sanctions applied under the Covenant of the League? It would be very interesting to know what the experts would have said last June, if asked the question put by my right lion. Friend opposite just now: Can sanctions be made effective unless you are prepared


to face the risk of war? That is the question which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had, previously, repeatedly and emphatically answered in the negative. It would be very interesting to know what our experts said in June last, and not what they are thinking now, about the oil sanction.
It would be still more interesting to know what was the view of our naval experts on the effect of Italian hostility upon our future naval position in the Mediterranean and in the Far East. Again, one would like to know what was the view of our Foreign Office experts beforehand upon the probability, nay more the certainty, of breaking up the Stresa front and throwing France into the arms of Russia. It is the report of that inquiry that it would be interesting to know. If the Prime Minister's lips could be unsealed on that question, we should all be immensely enlightened. Or, can it be possible that there never was such an inquiry; that on the major issue raised by sanctions we just drifted along from one step to another, and are perhaps drifting still? I do not know.
There is one thing, to go back to the beginning of that policy, which seems to have been overlooked entirely both by the Mover of the Adjournment Motion and my right hon. Friend opposite in their reproaches to the Government for not having imposed the oil sanction last November, and by the Foreign Secretary in his defence. It is that the Government were limited in their actions by the most definite and specific pledges given to this House in October last. Let me remind the House that the Prime Minister in his speech on 23rd October, 1935, said that the Government never had war in their mind. He drew no distinction between an isolated war and a collective war. He made it clear that the Government were opposed to any measure of sanctions which could bring about war. My right hon. Friend, the then Foreign Secretary, made that point emphatically clear in passage after passage of his speech, of which I only read one:
No wise man will wish to throw a spark into this inflammable material by threats which cannot be collectively carried out or if they were carried out"—
that is, collectively—
would turn the Abyssinian into a European war."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd October. 1935; col. 31, Vol. 305.]

The Government were explicitly pledged not to take any action that would provoke war. As my right hon. Friend opposite has very truly pointed out, in this matter it takes two sides to keep the peace, and if your policy of sanctions is limited to being peaceful, it will still depend on the other side how far that policy can be carried. The fact is that you can only carry through a policy of sanctions if you are prepared to face war, and the Government were not only not prepared to face war, but were definitely pledged not to do so.

Mr. MANDER: May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that on several occasions, the late Foreign Secretary said that the Government were prepared, in the matter of sanctions, to go, collectively, as far as any other country, without any limit?

Mr. AMERY: I admit that there was a certain "dualism," to quote the right hon. Member who moved the Adjournment. The Government gave specific pledges on which, alone, some of us were prepared to support them at the Election and on which they got millions of votes, but they also said things which encouraged the sanctionists to believe that the Government might go as far as any other country was willing to go. That sort of ambiguity can be sustained in an Election. It cannot be sustained when you are brought face to face with a concrete issue. Within a week or two of the Election, the Government were brought up against the fact that Signor Mussolini said he would go to war if the oil sanction were imposed. I believe it was on 22nd November that he made that definite statement through his Ambassador in Paris to M. Laval. If the Government were to be true to their pledge not to push things to the extremity of war, only two courses were open to them. My right hon. Friend opposite suggested that Italy was only bluffing.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Hear, hear.

Mr. AMERY: If she was, the Government ought to have gone straight ahead with the oil sanction.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Hear, hear.

Mr. AMERY: But the Government, in possession of all the facts, did not think so. It requires no unsealing of the Prime Minister's lips to tell us that. The


action of the Government speaks for itself. The speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) after his resignation shows that this Government, and the other Governments, were convinced that Italy was not bluffing and that, at that moment at any rate, Signor Mussolini regarded the oil sanction as so fatal a menace that he was prepared to take the most desperate action rather than submit to it.

Miss RATHBONE: Would the right hon. Gentleman kindly give us chapter and verse for the statement, that Mussolini definitely made that statement through his Ambassador in Paris? We have heard rumours but has the right hon. Gentleman any specific information to that effect?

Mr. AMERY: I have no public documents but I have it on the information of friends of mine in France. At any rate, the action of the Government showed what they thought, and the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea showed what he thought about it. In any case if Italy was not bluffing, and if the Government were to fulfil their pledge, there were only two courses open to them. Ono alternative, and I believe the wisest as well as the most straightforward, would have been to come to this House and to say that, in view of all their pledges, they could not either propose or support the imposition of a sanction on oil because it would mean war. The other alternative, which they chose, was to try to postpone the oil sanction by initiating negotiations for peace. Obviously they could only be initiated if there was some chance of Italy looking at the proposed terms. It is clear to-day that Italy was prepared to look at them. No doubt, Signor Mussolini would have made a tactical error if he had effusively welcomed the proposals, but it was known at the time and it was the condition under which M. Laval agreed to the terms, that he was not indisposed to accept them. Since then, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hitchin (Sir A. Wilson) asked him whether these proposals, had they been approved, would have been regarded as a suitable basis for negotiation. Signor Mussolini answered:
Yes, I had already drafted a cautious formal acceptance as a basis for negotiation and the Council of Ministers which would have been asked to approve of it,

was sitting when the news came that you gentlemen in London, who praised Sir Samuel Hoare so highly in September had dismissed him with ignominy on 19th December.
More than that, if we look at these proposals on their merits, and not from the point of view of trying to punish Italy, they were essentially reasonable. Except for one small bit of the province of Tigre, which Italy used to occupy before Adowa, there was not a square mile of territory or any element of population to be handed over to Italian occupation or control which had not been conquered by the Abyssinians within the last 50 years, and which was not inhabited by non-Abyssinian peoples for whom, undoubtedly, a change from Abyssinian misgovernment to the rule of a civilised Power, would have been a merciful deliverance.

Sir A. SINCLAIR: Had the territory to which my right hon. Friend refers as having come so recently under the control of the Abyssinian Government, come under the control of that Government before or since Abyssinia entered the League of Nations, when we were obliged to uphold the integrity of Abyssinian territory as a member of the League.

Mr. AMERY: I am not discussing the question of our action in the League of Nations. I have already devoted a speech to that subject. I am discussing the merits of the case. Whether Abyssinia was in the League of Nations or not, these populations did not benefit from any improvement in Abyssinian Government. For them, at any rate, I repeat, it would have been a merciful deliverance to have been freed from Abyssinian control. As for the Abyssinians themselves, only by being freed from the impossible task of trying to hold down their vast Empire, would they ever have been able to reform themselves. Nor were these terms inconsistent in general principle with the findings of that same Committee of Five to which the Foreign Secretary referred just now. If they had been, I do not think my right hon. Friend would have accepted them as he and the rest of the Government did accept them.
They did involve, I admit, a very marked change of attitude on the part of the Government, and it required considerable skill, both judicious and


firm handling to deal with the position. I dare say there are many hon. Members here who know how to sail a boat. They know what a gybe is. It is a manoeuvre that in a strong wind requires no little nerve and determination. Incompetent or irresolute handling of the tiller may easily lead to that most unpleasant of all experiences—a double gybe—when the boom swings right over one way and back again. I have seen such a proceeding result in an important member of the crew being sent flying overboard. I have known it strain the whole fabric of a vessel from main mast to keel. I believe that if the Government had had the courage of their short-lived first convictions and stuck to the policy of the Laval-Hoare Agreement, they would have carried it through in this House. Nobody who was here when the late Foreign Secretary ended his statement can doubt that. There might have been clamour in the country, but I believe that with every week that passed the position of the Government would have been stronger. As it was, they gybed back again in a panic. Unfortunately, the wind is still in the same quarter. The wind is still on the wrong side of their sail, and sooner or later they will be forced to gybe over once more. Only, when they do, I am afraid they will not again secure such good terms either for Abyssinia or for the League as could have been secured last December. We must remember that in December oil sanctions spelt a terrible menace to Signor Mussolini, a menace to avoid which he was prepared to make some substantial concession. Now we know, and he knows, that the oil sanction is likely to be as futile as the whole of the rest of the policy of trying to wound without being prepared to strike.

Mr. ANEURIN BEVAN: What is the alternative?

Mr. AMERY: It would have been never to have embarked on this policy, or having done so to extricate ourselves from it now as best we can. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary did not seem very confident that anything will come of oil sanctions. Even if they are imposed as a symbol, it will indeed be a tinkling cymbal and have no more effect, except a general embarrassment of the situation, than the sanctions which have already been imposed. The question we

are entitled to ask in the House is how long are we going on with this policy? How long are Welsh miners or Newfoundland fishermen to go workless in the dubious hope that they may inflict discomfort on the Italian poor? My right hon. Friend opposite pointed out that sanctions so far have not prevented the war or stopped a soldier, tank or gun going to Abyssinia. Are we to continue in the hope that eventually the pressure of discomfort may bring about a change of Government in Italy? If we fail in that, are sanctions to become a permanent institution? Are we to go on for years and years, under the somewhat dubious legal interpretation that all this is done under the Treaty of Versailles Act, to be guilty of a penal offence if we sip an Italian vermouth?
I should like to remind the House that this policy of sanctions is not altogether new. It was tried once before. It was tried by the great Napoleon against this country, arid it failed. It failed in the first instance because the ingenuity of private interests found innumerable ways of getting round it. There were 100,000 smugglers then, and I am not sure there are not 100,000 smugglers now getting to work for Italy. Do not let us forget to what that policy led. It led to Napoleon's committing one blunder after another, ending with the crowning folly of his Russian campaign. I wonder whither our lesser Napoleons at Geneva are going to lead us.
That brings me to the general foreign situation. I doubt whether that situation had ever been better than it was a year ago. In part owing to our own efforts, Italy and France had come together to form the nucleus of co-operation of western and southern Europe for the maintenance of peace. That was an effective barrier against German aggression. But it left Germany's eastern flank open, and she hid no reason to fear that in a dispute with Russia she would be attacked in the rear. To-day we have broken up the Stresa front, and in consequence we have inevitably driven France into the arms of Russia.—[Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."]—It is a mistake to let our domestic prejudices govern our foreign policy. Through our actions in recent months and our new interpretation of our obligations under the Covenant, we are, in the wake of France, committing ourselves to Russia. My


right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said he would have neither part nor lot in a policy of encirclement. That is a very fine phrase, but what is happening to-clay is inevitably re-awakening in Germany that obsession of encirclement which led her to the mad enterprise of 1914.
I do not believe that Germany, unless we tempt her by being defenceless, cherishes any particularly hostile designs against either this country or France. Once, however, Germany is convinced that she is ringed round by foes, she will certainly strike in whatever direction her technical advisers tell her she can secure the quickest and most far-reaching results. In these days of air warfare that means she will strike at us. It is we who are recreating the German menace to Western Europe in a far more formidable shape than it took 20 years ago. We are also creating another menace for this country and for our Dominions in the Far East. We are being increasingly committed by our new reading of the Covenant, and by our actions, to the support of Russia against Japan in the Far East. What advice have our experts given us as to the situation that we shall have to face with half our Navy in home waters locked up for fear of Germany, with a war in the Far East and with a revengeful and resentful Italy on our lines of communication?
I have listened to all that has been said of the League of Nations, but what is the use of deluding ourselves with the pretence that an omnipotent League is engaged in chastising one aggressor as an example and a warning to others? The situation with which we are really confronted to-day is that we are dealing with a League which no longer includes even a bare majority of the great Powers, a League which is little more than an Anglo-Franco-Russian Alliance with an obsequious but very ineffective claque of minor Powers; and we are drifting into a position in which that League will find itself increasingly confronted by a no less formidable combination of great Powers like Germany, Japan, Italy and any lesser States which may join them in the hopes of revenge or loot. If that new balance of power brings us to another Armageddon, it is not on France this time but on this country and on our distant Dominions that the brunt of the struggle will fall. Is that what we really want? If it is not,

then let us retrace our footsteps before it is too late. Let us extricate ourselves from this blind alley of sanctions and see whether even now we cannot find some way of bringing together the two combatants on some solution which responds to the merits of the case and is not based on the hopeless idea that Italy is to be punished for having opened the problem by violent methods.
Let us get away from the arid pedantry which would deal with great international issues on the principles of a stipendiary magistrate's court and would fine a great nation 40s. and costs for having started a public brawl. Let us see whether even now we cannot do something to renew our old, and, I venture to say, precious friendship with the warm-hearted, gifted Italian nation, a friendship which was cemented anew by the blood of the best of both of us on the battlefields where we saved European freedom. Let us abandon the futile notion that a league of three major Powers with its hangers-on can coerce the world to good behaviour and that universal peace can be preserved by universalising every war. Let us try, on the contrary, to bring back to the League the nations that are now outside it by reforming its constitution, by making clear that the League does not exist for war but for conciliation and better understanding between nations, and that it neither claims nor pretends to be a world justice of the peace nor a world policeman. Let us think more of our own interests and of our heavy responsibilities here at home and overseas. Let us think more of that security which we have neglected far too much. It is high time we did.

6.28 p.m.

Captain McEWEN: I do not intend to follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery). After all, he speaks from the same side of the House as myself, and while I am far from going to the lengths to which he consistently goes, and while we all listened with attention to a point of view put with such force and ability as he always puts it, yet on this occasion I am more concerned with what has been said from the opposite side of the House, and in particular by the right hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate. He appeared to suffer from that obsession, from which all hon. Gentlemen opposite suffer, of


the Abyssinian dispute coupled with oil sanctions. It seems to me that the important thing at the present time is to maintain a sense of perspective. The Abyssinian dispute, important as it is from a great many aspects, is, after all, only an incident within a framework of a vastly wider panorama. I do not think we ought to let our eyes be blinded by it, or to forget that there are other and potentially infinitely graver issues to which it seems probable our attention may very shortly be called.
I would prefer to regard this Abyssinian question from the point of view which was ably expressed in the past week by my hon. Friend the Member for West Leicester (Mr. Nicolson) when he said that he regarded it not as a test of future intentions but as a lesson for future guidance. Another consideration which occurs to me is that the frontiers of civilisation are at present extraordinarily restricted, including as they do —at least, this is my own interpretation—little more than this country and France. If that be the case, then upon those two countries rests an extremely onerous and, indeed, a twofold responsibility: In the first place to defend those frontiers; and in the second place, in due time, to extend them. All the more reason, therefore, I submit, that in taking any steps in the present dispute to end it or to mitigate its effects we should take extraordinary care that nothing we do jeopardises that deposit of civilisation of which we are the sole and, indeed, the last defenders and guarantors.
A word with regard to sanctions. It is difficult, it will be admitted, to assess the effects which the sanctions which have already been imposed have had or are having in Italy at the present time, but I submit that in the light of the information which is now at our disposal the chances of an embargo upon oil having any serious deterrent effect on the war within a measurable period are very nebulous. Nor do I see any reason to agree with the right hon. and gallant Member for Caithness (Sir A. Sinclair), who said that it was likely, indeed probable, that. the United States would work in with us over this particular question. I do not see any reason to suppose that from anything which has emanated from that quarter or which has been reported.
There is one point which I would place before those hon. Members who are of opinion that we should reverse our policy entirely now, and that is that at the time of the Hoare-Laval peace proposals our reversal of policy did to a certain extent, possibly even to a greater extent than many of us realise, commit us to a policy, and I quote here the significant phrase used by the "Times" newspaper the day following, "to the attaining of peace by force of sanctions." I think it is true that we were on that occasion committed to that policy, and I think that has to be borne in mind.
Personally, I have always regarded the whole policy of sanctions with anxiety not unmixed with misgiving, particularly in view, of course, of the immaturity of the development of the League at this time, and, also, the unsatisfactory nature of this particular test case. But it is equally plain that you cannot and ought not at this moment to show any disintegration of the front which has been assumed in the face of aggression. I do not think, for reasons which I have already given, that the imposition of oil sanctions would add anything to the situation as it stands, but we can hardly at present retreat from the position we have already taken up, and not, in fact, before any aggression from whatever quarter it may come.
It is not enough to know, as we are assured by a certain Noble Lord who has just returned from having an interview with Herr Hitler, that Germany, for instance, has no aggressive intentions towards this country. We want to be assured, rather, in view of her very disquieting increases in armaments, that she has peaceful intentions towards all countries. Nor is it enough to say that, because Germany is strong and formidable, therefore it is the duty of our statesmen, in the event of any conflict arising, to see that we come in on her side. That, I submit, is a particularly spineless argument. If Germany is out to support the same things that we are out to support, namely, the liberty of the subject and the maintenance of peace in the world, then whether she be weak or strong matters not a bit, we shall be with her; and I may add it is for her to reassure us on those points; but to suggest that we should throw in our lot with a country which cares nothing for either of those things merely because she


is formidable and strong is precisely one of those disintegrating factors to which I have already referred and which I greatly deplore.
In conclusion, what would seem to be the requirements of the moment, as I see them, are, in the first place, that we should always keep in mind, in any steps we may take in connection with the Abyssinian crisis, that the main objective and the paramount objective is the preservation at all costs of no less a matter than Western and Christian civilisation. When I say "at all costs" I would go so far as to say even if it were to mean the putting of Article 16 into cold storage. In the second place, we ought to be prepared to take any collective and unanimous action, within reason, at Geneva to put an end to this dispute which is going on. In adding the qualification "within reason" I would only point to the suggestion, which is not unfrequently made, of closing by force the Suez Canal as being a course which I should regard as being eminently outside of reason. The third point is that we should continue to act on the basis of the closest possible co-operation with France, because, failing such co-operation, the League of Nations itself ceases to exist. All of which, I am well aware, is to ask and to expect a great deal; but such is my belief in the ability and the wisdom of the right hon. Gentleman in whose hands the direction of foreign affairs now is that I cannot think it is asking or expecting a whit too much.

6.39 p.m.

Mr. A. HENDERSON: The hon. and gallant Member for Berwick and Haddington (Captain McEwen) referred to the frontiers of France and Great Britain as the frontiers of civilisation. That is the sort of statement which arouses in the minds of people who belong to other nations a resentment which leads them to express themselves in criticism of our nation as being composed of gentlemen like the hon. and gallant Member, who regard themselves as superior to everyone else.

Captain McEWEN: The persons to whom the hon. Member refers may have their own ideals of civilisation. I was merely stating mine.

Mr. HENDERSON: It was an extraordinary statement for the hon. and gallant Member to make, having regard

to the fact that I could mention a dozen other nations whose civilisation is equal to that which exists in our own country. The right hon. Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), in his somewhat gloomy speech, made an appeal for sympathy with Italy in its present position, and made rather a sneering reference to what he called "the stipendiary's court." I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that the unfortunate people who have to take their troubles before a stipendiary magistrate are very much concerned with justice as it may be administered in that court. It may be that the philosophy of the right hon. Gentleman leads him to lay greater value on the rule of force than on the rule of law, but that point of view might have had greater effect in this country if his speech had been made 20 or 30 years ago. When the right hon. Gentleman tells us that he approves of the peace terms that were discussed between the late Foreign Secretary and M. Laval I think he is ruling out justice so far as the Abyssinian people are concerned, because although the analogy drawn may be with that of a stipendiary's court the unfortunate inhabitants of Abyssinia are just as anxious to safeguard their economic, political and physical security as is the right hon. Gentleman or any other person in this country.
May I say to the Foreign Secretary how disappointed some of us are with his speech to-night? In company with many others I have come to regard the right hon. Gentleman as one of the keenest advocates of the peace system in this or any other country, and I am sure that having regard to his own experiences in the War—and I had to spend nearly five years, the best years of my life, in the Army—he and I are both anxious to prevent any repetition of those terrible War years. That is the reason, I take it, why we are both, with others, so anxious to see established an alternative to the system that operated prior to 1914, and the only system that I, at any rate, can see as an alternative is the collective peace system. I believe the right hon. Gentleman is just as sincere as any of us in his support of that system, but, of course, we are entitled to judge Governments as well as individuals by their actions, and we do remember—I do not believe it has been contradicted—that Signor Mussolini himself has said that he


warned the British Government in January of last year of his intentions with regard to Abyssinia. That was stated in an interview published in the "Morning Post," and so far as I know it has never been denied.

Mr. EDEN: There is not a word of truth in that statement.

Mr. HENDERSON: It was reported to be an interview—of course I cannot guarantee its authenticity—with Signor Mussolini, and it was printed and published in the "Morning Post." I am told by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) that it was issued by the Italian Embassy itself. Whether that is so or not I must accept, or course, the right hon. Gentleman's statement that our Foreign Office were never informed of Signor Mussolini's intentions. But we are discussing the policy of the right hon. Gentleman with regard to sanctions. This war has been going on for five months. It is true, as the right hon. Gentleman indicated, that within two weeks of the time when Signor Mussolini's troops entered Abyssinia four sanctions were undertaken by the League. I need not repeat them. The most important of them was, perhaps, the prohibition of the export of armaments and munitions of war.
To-night we are discussing the fifth sanction, five months after the beginning of the war. I was hoping that the right hon. Gentleman would tell the House that our Government were going to give a lead to the League and to implement the Covenant, with which the right hon. Gentleman is in agreement, and especially Article XVI of it. I am going to take the trouble to refresh the memory of the right hon. Gentleman as to the provisions of Article XVI. They are as follows:
Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII or XV,"—
and there is no doubt that that applies to Italy—
It shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake"—
and here are the material words"—
immediately"—
and not six months or six years afterwards—

to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State.
I am sure the right hon. Gentleman would agree that we are a great distance from carrying out the requirements of that Article. All that we have done is to cut off the supply of munitions and financial credits, imports into this country and other League countries from Italy and the export to Italy of a certain number of commodities required for war purposes. Our Ambassador is still in Rome. We have broken off intercourse with that country, with which we still carry on our trade relations so far as other commodities are concerned, and one of which we are discussing. Coal, iron and steel and a hundred and one other commodities are still being exported to Italy by the various countries of the world, most of whom agreed to support the implications of the Covenant.
It may be said that it is impossible to do otherwise, because the plans that are necessary in order to carry out Article XVI are not in operation. The Committee of Experts have been engaged, I do not know for how many weeks, six or eight, in working out the details of the oil sanctions. Why is it not till three or four months after the war has broken out and after Italy has committed an act of aggression, that instructions are given to the experts of the League of Nations to prepare a plan for the enforcement of an oil sanction? The League has been in existence for 18 or 19 years, yet it is only in 1935 or 1936 that an attempt is made to prepare what I may call League strategy with regard to the enforcement of economic and financial sanctions.
It is not that the point has not been raised before. In the Geneva Protocol, which was unanimously accepted by the League Assembly in 1924—and destroyed by the Tory Government in March, 1925—Article 12 deemed twat sanctions were to operate in the event of the Protocol being put into operation, find Article 17, which was agreed to in 1924, provides for the formation of plane of economic and financial co-operation for the application of economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor State, and these plans were to be communicated by the members of the League to other States.


If those plans had been prepared during the 12 years which have elapsed since the Protocol was accepted in 1924, immediately Italy was declared to be an aggressor, a country guilty of a breach of the Covenant of the League of Nations, they could have been taken out of file archives of the League of Nations and put into effective operation. Is it any exaggeration if, as we are told by the right hon. Gentleman to-night, the more or less insignificant sanctions which have been put into operation have been to some extent effective, to ask what would have been the effect if the complete plans had been put into operation?
The Foreign Secretary says that we have had difficulty in persuading the various Member States to carry out their promise. Why? Because we are going round in a vicious circle. You will never get Member States to accept their full responsibilities under the League Covenant until you have established a system of security. At the present moment the situation between Italy and Abyssinia is a testing time, if ever we are to establish a general League system of security. I beg the right hon. Gentleman to face the dangers of the situation. I would not disagree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook that there are dangers attendant upon the course which we are following with regard to sanctions. It would be foolish to deny that that is so, but we must face the alternatives which are before us.
We can go back to the pre-war situation of a, strong Britain, which the right hon. Gentleman wants, with the balance of power, the system of alliances, or what is, I believe, his own policy of isolation, all of which have been tried and found wanting, and as a result of which millions of young men had to shed their blood in what they thought was to lead to the establishment of a system to prevent war. We have tried that system, and it has failed, but we have not as yet tried the collective peace system in its entirety. We have not even tried the policy of sanctions in its entirety. We have simply tinkered about, afraid for one reason or another to take risks. All the time we have this great Power, Italy, with all the agents of science and with its tanks and aeroplanes and machine guns—and the right hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do

what it means to have those weapons employed against you—and on the other side you have millions of savages and semi-barbarian soldiers, armed with guns and rifles, many of which were manufactured 40 years ago.
All that the Abyssinians are asking for is to be left alone. I do not suggest that everything that takes place in Abyssinia would meet with the approval of Members on this side of the House; personally, I am not so much interested in Abyssinia, in that sense, as I am in the establishment of an international system which would make it too hot for any nation which broke the rules of international law, as contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. If we fail at this juncture, and if Italy is allowed to conquer Abyssinia without the League of Nations being powerful enough, or willing, to defend the Abyssinians, the League of Nations will be destroyed for the rest of our lives. It is the testing time, and we ask the Government. We do not seek to bring up the past too much. We know that the Government have assumed a somewhat zigzag course with regard to the League of Nations and we still remember that only 12 or 14 months ago the Prime Minister said that the collective peace system was impracticable. To-day the Government say that they take their stand by the League of Nations with all its responsibilities and obligations.
The Foreign Secretary stated his belief in the necessity for a, strong Britain, but it is not as necessary for us to have the same strength of armaments when there is a League of Nations as in 1914 when there was no League of Nations. Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 10 of the Protocol were both attempts at establishing a, general system of protective security. They pre-supposed that arms would be reduced and limited on a pool basis. Sooner or later we shall have to come back to the Protocol of 1924, because sooner or later we shall have an international system and an international rule of law for the settlement of all disputes by determination of the international court, or arbitration.
The Protocol was not to come into operation until there had been a Disarmament Conference, which was to commence its deliberations in June, 1925.


The Disarmament Conference began its deliberations in 1932. I am quite prepared to pay tribute to the work of the right hon. Gentleman and of the present Home Secretary, and I shall not put the whole of the blame for the failure of the Disarmament Conference upon the British Government, but I will give them a considerable share of responsibility. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me when I say that the Disarmament Conference foundered, if it did founder, on the question of security, and that we shall never get complete disarmament until each nation is satisfied, particularly the small nations who cannot rely upon their own strong arm, that the international system will give them the security for which, heretofore, they have had to rely upon the strength of their armies and navies.
If that be so, it is in the interest of all of us, and of civilisation, to build up an effective international system based on security and accompanied by universal, mot unilateral, disarmament. If we are to achieve those objectives in the immediate future, we must, if necessary, increase our pressure upon Italy until she has been made to realise that she will not be allowed to dismember Abyssinia, that the security of Abyssinia. as a. Member of the League of Nations is as important to us and to the other Members of the League as it is to Abyssinia, and that we shall leave no possible act undone to enable us to achieve that result.

7.0 p.m.

Mr. BOOTHBY: The speech of the hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) will have met with the approval, I am sure, of Members on all sides of the House. If I have any criticism to make of it I would say that his timing was perhaps a little optimistic. I do not think we shall see universal disarmament for a year or two, although I agree that we should do our best together to achieve it as soon as possible. The speech of the Foreign Secretary was unexceptionable. I do not think that any hon. Member on any side of the House would disagree with any of the sentiments that he expressed. The only disappointment to some of us was that when he came to enunciating a constructive policy he did not say anything very clear or very definite. He was very vague. It

was, I think, the vagueness of our policy before the War that largely helped to bring about our entry into it. Whatever else we do at present, we should endeavour to avoid vagueness of any sort. We should make our policy crystal clear, so that not only our people at home but every nation should understand what we were about and how we intended to carry our policy through.
I do not think the right hon. Gentleman quite realises the shocks that this House and the county have had during the past few weeks. They have. had two major shocks to which he made no reference. The first was when the Prime Minister admitted that the Government had been completely misinformed about the extent of German rearmament. That was disquieting, because some of us who had only a superficial knowledge of Germany realised fully a good deal of what was going on in tile way of rearmament, much more than the Government, with all the resources of the secret service and the information that was available to them through the diplomatic service, seemed to know. The right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) gave facts and figures to the Government with regard to German rearmament which were emphatically denied by the Prime Minister, but that subsequently proved to be a gross under-estimate of the facts.
The Government cannot be surprised that this was disturbing to Members in all parts of the House, and made us uneasy. Then there came a second shock, to me still inexplicable, the precipitate double reversal of foreign policy within about, three weeks. The Foreign Secretary said there would be no weakness and no wavering in regard to our foreign policy in support of the League. He might really have said "No more weakness" and "No more wavering," because the policy which had been enunciated so clearly by the late Foreign Secretary was directly reversed. This is the point that I think should be brought out. When he was cross-examined by hon. Members in this House with regard to that reversal of policy, the Prime Minister said that his lips were sealed, but that if they were unsealed he would guarantee that not one Member of this House would vote against him. The Government must sooner or later make reply to this point.
The policy has since then been completely reversed. The Hoare-Laval proposals have been repudiated, and the Foreign Secretary of the time has resigned. We have gone back to where we were. If there were tremendous, overwhelming, secret. reasons which forced us to change our foreign policy, have they also disappeared in the interim, or have we gone back to that foreign policy at dire peril to ourselves? What were those reasons which underlay the Prime Minister's remarks? That is what we have a right and a duty to ask in this House. Was it fresh information regarding German re-armament, or was it unexpected information about the vulnerability of our Fleet? At that time the Fleet had been in the Eastern Mediterranean for several months. Had some information been brought to the Prime Minister which caused him to become extremely anxious about the safety of the Fleet? Or was it merely a debating point? It would be a profound relief to the House to know that it was. They might think that it was a slightly unfair one, but I think that every hon. Member would be delighted to know that the Prime Minister had made it merely to shut us up for the time being.
Until his lips are unsealed, I want to know whether the causes which brought the Prime Minister to make that remarkable statement are still operating, and whether, therefore, to go back to the policy we had previously adopted has been achieved only at the cost of great danger to the State? My right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) made a forcible speech on this subject the other day, and the Government have so far made no attempt to meet the charges he made, or to reply to the arguments he put forward. I feel that although it is not a very pleasant thing to do, some hon. Members have a duty to ask explicitly for some explanation from the Government, and to ask for some reassurance that whatever else the reason may be, our security and safety are not in great jeopardy at the present time?
Those two shocks threw the Governments of Europe into great confusion. Many Governments had thought that at last they knew where Britain stood. They thought that we had adopted a foreign

policy and would go through with it. Many Governments of different complexion in Europe said that it was the best chance and the best hope for peace that there had been since the War. This double twist in our foreign policy threw them into great confusion. It also threw our own people into great confusion. Nobody on this side of the House would deny that armaments policy and foreign policy are inextricably bound together. We were promised, as part of the foreign policy we had taken up, air parity with Germany by next year. We know now for certain that we cannot get that, whatever happens. We were also promised by the then Foreign Secretary a policy of steady and collective resistance to aggression through the League of Nations. That policy was suddenly overthrown for reasons we do not know and do not understand. It is difficult to over-estimate the danger of these sudden changes in British foreign policy to the cause of peace in Europe. European Governments think that we are continually shifting our policy to suit our own interests. At the moment when we had begun to persuade them that we were pursuing a steady and fixed policy in the interests of Europe, we did it again. The speech of the Foreign Secretary did not do so much as I had hoped it would to remove that impression, and it is because it was not a clear and concrete statement that I and other hon. Members on this side are disappointed.
In the decade between 1922 and 1932 it was possible to drift along at home and abroad without doing much good but without doing much harm. To-day that is no longer possible. Serious events impose themselves on all Governments, and particularly on the British Government, day by day. Many hon. Members feel that it is necessary in the existing circumstances to define objectives in home policy and foreign policy, and then to pursue them remorselessly. I would like to know when the Government think we shall be able to redeem the pledge given that we shall achieve parity in the air with the nearest European Power within striking distance.
There is another point upon which I would like some information. It has struck me as very curious that every Power in Europe, including Italy, should know the exact strength of our Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and that the


only people from whom that information is withheld should be the people of this country. Why have the Government approached the Press and asked them not to publish information available in every other country regarding the strength and disposition of the Fleet? If the Italians know it I think that we might know it also.
With regard to the question of an oil sanction, there are varying opinions in this House. Some ardent spirits would impose the oil sanction at once, and would have us take the lead in every direction; and others think that we should back out, not only on the oil sanction but on every other sanction as gracefully and as quickly as possible. Hon. Members on both sides of the House are agreed however that we must act together, and there has been every excuse in the past for not having taken up the oil sanction because we know that the French Government was most reluctant to have anything to do with it. There is reason to suppose that the attitude of the French Government is now changed. Speaking for myself, all I can say is that if that is the case, and we should get something like unanimity at Geneva in regard to the oil sanction, I believe that we should play the hand out. We have put our hands to sanctions. We have put our hands to the League policy. If we can get agreement to an oil sanction I am convinced that we ought to plough the furrow through to the end, with courage and conviction, and I believe the Government would carry the majority of the country with them.

Lieut.-Commander AGNEW: Does the hon. Member mean that we should play the hand out even if the United States will not co-operate?

Mr. BOOTHBY: My answer to that would be that I believe the Experts Committee has reported that even if the United States did not co-operate and we applied an oil sanction, it would make oil more expensive and more difficult for the Italians to get, and I think there is a great deal to be said for the policy of going through with the hand even without the co-operation of the United States. I think the Government and the House must consider the great strain that is being imposed on our Fleet, which is

lying month after month in the Mediterranean under practically warlike conditions. We cannot go on for ever holding the whole thing on our shoulders. If you have embarked on a policy, my feeling is that you should go through with it as quickly and as strongly as possible so as to achieve peace as soon as you can. I want to ask also whether the Government have considered in relation to their policy the implications of the Franco-Soviet Pact. My record on the matter of Soviet Russia is well known. I do not think it is a bad one. I have always advocated the greatest friendship between this country and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. But a change almost in a week from a policy of scarcely-veiled hostility to one of virtual alliance is a very sharp change. I, myself, believe that the Soviet Government are absolutely sincere in their desire for peace, but our Government must realise that this Franco-Soviet Pact does put an end to any ideas they may have had of a purely Western defensive pact, and commits them more than ever to a League policy as opposed to an Alliance policy.
Some of us were a little disappointed when the right hon. Gentleman said that the Government were not going to forward any plans or suggestions at all in future for any revision of the machinery of the League or the Covenant of the League. If we are going to tie ourselves, as I think we should, for the future and absolutely bind ourselves to the League of Nations, then we ought to see that the League of Nations can function effectively and is made into the best possible machinery that can he devised, and to bolt and bar the door now to any future revision, either of the machinery that exists at Geneva or of the Covenant itself, is a mistake.
The main thing that we cannot have any more vagueness in our foreign policy. We cannot have any more sharp changes. We must, in present conditions, have a consistent and clearly thought-out foreign policy, which should be resolutely pursued, and to which our armament policy should be closely related. To do this we must have adequate direction at the summit and adequate machinery of government. Recently there have been unmistakable signs of an absence of direction and a complete breakdown of the machinery of government, and I believe that this House not only has a duty but is quite


determined as a House, regardless of party, to see that direction is restored and that the machinery of government, particularly in relation to foreign affairs and defence, is made good.

7.17 p.m.

Mr. PILKINGTON: I want to call attention to a very remarkable prophecy which was made, now nearly 10 years ago. It was made by a man who at that time was, I think, almost universally, regarded as being perhaps the greatest figure thrown up by the upheaval of the world war. That man was Signor Mussolini. The prophecy was made at a time when he seemed to be almost unique among dictators, in that he had not made war in pursuit of that illusion which in France they call gloire but which was once translated by one of our Prime Ministers as "All my eye and Betty Martin." It was also made in the days before the gods had apparently decided that Signor Mussolini must be destroyed, and had brought about that mental frame of mind which, according to the Romans of classical times, was a necessary preliminary to destruction.
This was the prophecy which Signor Mussolini made. He said that the crucial point in European history would come in the years 1935–40 and that then the destiny of Europe would be decided. He followed this prophecy up at the beginning of 1933 by an exhortation to the League to reform itself, and by a similar exhortation at the beginning of 1934, saying that unless it did so, it would be unable to fulfil its obligations and exercise the functions expected of it. At that time nobody, I think, let alone Mussolini himself, ever visualised that he himself would bring his prophecy to realisation and that he would play the part not of hero, but, alas, of villain. Since the War we have seen the struggle of two rival ideas, and we are now at the climax of that struggle. On the one hand, there is the idea of Fascism—a tense and jealous nationalism, with the government coercing all thought and all effort in the country towards making the particular nation top-dog. On the other hand, you have the idea of co-operation. To-day in this country one section of the Press is enthusiastically in support of this idea; another section violently condemns it; and a third section sits, I think, rather delicately upon the fence,

if not as to the idea, then at any rate as to its implications; because the implications of co-operation must mean that for common gain there has to be individual sacrifice. The Government can have no doubt, however, where the majority of public opinion in this country lies, after the events of last December. Certainly there can be no future for the British Empire that is not transient apart from this idea of co-operation, as expressed in collective security. You have only to look at the map. And you may perhaps recall the words of the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) a few years ago, when he said that the British Empire was the biggest block of undefended plunder in all history.
The climax of the struggle of these two ideas has brought us to the present situation, and what do we find? As the result of the effort to work a post-war system with pre-war mentalities, we find ourselves in a position where Fascism or nationalism, or whatever the different countries like to call it, is in the ascendancy. We have to-day all the paraphernalia of 1914—only more so. We have all the ingredients for such an orgy for the war god that the War of 1914–18 wil seem but an hors d'oeuvre. Every year Europe is being sucked faster and faster into this maelstrom of destruction. Year by year, if not month by month, nations are spending millions of pounds—which they have not got—budgets are being unbalanced, currencies are being manipulated, and the poor people of Berlin have to go without butter, all for the sake of the nations rearming themselves out of fear. We have only to look at the course of last year. At the beginning of 1935 Russia suddenly announced an increase of 300,000 men in her army, bringing the total up to over 900,000, this country announced a programme of armament expansion, France doubled her service with the colours, Germany, most spectacularly of all, suddenly announced the formation of an army of half a million men. And by the end of the year Italy had 1,000,000 men under arms. This year is yet young, and yet already Russia has announced an army of 1,300,000 men.
Is there any escape from this coil of death in which we find ourselves? Is there any way by which we can break out from this vicious circle of mounting fear? I believe that two opportunities have


already passed. We bad the opportunity of 1919, and we had the opportunity when the spirit of Locarno was a reality and not a mockery. I believe that when this Abyssinian affair is over, we shall have yet a third opportunity, however fleeting it may be, and if we fail to use this opportunity, the price we shall pay will be hideous indeed. For the moment, I think, from the speech of the late Foreign Secretary at Geneva in September, we have the leadership of the world in our hands. That leadership must be active, and not passive. It is up to us to take the initiative. May I, in all humility, suggest one or two possible lines of action for consideration? In the first instance we have discussed to some extent this afternoon the question of an oil embargo, but whether or not the oil embargo is enforced, it seems to me that the thing at stake is the principle, and the principle is this: We cannot for one moment afford to allow potential aggressors in Europe to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the League is baulking its responsibility. Three months ago we heard we could not proceed because certain precautions had not been taken. Those precautions have now been taken, and still nothing has been done. There are some lion. Members in this House, and there are some organs of publicity which have an absolute terror of this country being involved in war. I would ask whether this country, the country of Chatham, of Palmerston, and a hundred others, is afraid, and is going to draw back from any obligations to which it has given its word, because another country hints or even threatens war. May I add a rider to this: Italy has 850 first-line aeroplanes. This country and the Mediterranean Powers together have a total of 4,830. That, I think, is a thing to remember.
A second line of action is this: while we must rearm, and we must rearm because we must gain a position of some equality with our neighbours, should not the Government or the "Minister of Thought," or a committee, be thinking out some plan, some amendment of the Covenant, some development or re-adjustment, so that we can have an international system more fitted to the circumstances in which we are now? Surely we must hammer out some plan by which we can live as an alternative to this

frenzied preparation for death, which at present is darkening the face of Europe.
In this connection, we have so much wasted talent in this House. Could we not use one of our elder statesmen, because we have some, and revert possibly to the idea of a travelling ambassador, and now, before it is too late, send the best men we have around the capitals of Europe in an endeavour to get the cooperation of the rulers of Europe? Let him have such instructions that there may be no repetition of the events of last December, but let him be backed by all the authority of the Government and all the public support of this country, because if the present rulers of Europe, including our own Government, cannot save themselves in the deluge, then when they fall the Government that will take their place will not be the hon. Members sitting in that quarter of the House, but a Government which will speak with the voice of Moscow, I mean the Communist Moscow and not so much the political Moscow and with the voice of the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher). I have made some suggestions, and I would ask that they, or better ones, should he considered—not so much that the obstacles to them should be considered, but ways of overcoming the obstacles, because we are already in the second of those five crucial years, and we have no time to lose. I thank the House for the courtesy which it has, as usual, extended to a new Member addressing is for the first time.

7.31 p.m.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: I thought that the Conservative party had taken to recruiting its junior ranks entirely from Fascists or Fossils, and I have been delighted to hear one recruit who, I feel, lived up to the reputation of this House and at the same tine put a new view clearly and forcibly before us. I would add that he has put a point of view which cannot be shown too often at this moment. Why is every nation in the world piling up armaments at the present time, not only in this country, but in every small country In Europe, South America and throughout the world? Why has everybody gone mad on spending on armaments money which they have not got, on starving their populations, smashing their currencies. putting an end to trade, and expendirg all their energies on building up these gigantic armaments Everybody knows the answer.


It is because everybody is afraid. Therefore, it is to the Foreign Office that we must look for illumination and for hope. We have not had much illumination today, but we have had, perhaps, a little more hope than some of us expected.
Everyone is afraid; everyone is going straight downhill to ruin; and why? What as they afraid of? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) is not here at the moment, but I can assure him and the other defenders of Signor Mussolini in this House that we in this country are not in the least afraid of Mussolini. I do not think that anyone in this country was afraid of, or was bluffed by that talk of war. What many of us were afraid of, indeed, was that, if we persisted in this policy of squeezing Italy into good behaviour, Mussolini would lose his job and perhaps his life. I think that the idea which has been spread about is that, if Mussolini goes, Communism will arise in Italy; that is simply madness. Italy is a land of small peasant proprietors, who are not in the least suitable material for Communist expansion. But undoubtedly there is a danger in British policy to the permanence of Mussolini, and, if you want to preserve him rather than to secure European safety, then continue to criticise the Government's policy with Mr. Garvin. But if you look at the real fear, at what every nation in Europe is afraid of, and in Asia, too, for that matter, it is Hitler's Germany and nothing else. It is absolutely necessary that this should be said openly. It does not make the danger worse that all should recognise what we fear. The danger is less if the country realises what the danger is.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook spoke with the voice of 100 years ago. Nothing would ever convince him that circumstances have changed. But, fortunately, the Government themselves have realised both the danger and the fact that circumstances have changed. They have realised the foundation fact that, if we are to face this real danger successfully, it must be faced in co-operation with all the other peoples who are in equal danger, and that is the basis of the change of policy of the Government with respect to the League of Nations. We are not considering whether Mussolini will go or whether he will stop, or what will

happen in Italy, or even in Abyssinia; we are considering simply whether we can, in time, strengthen the League of Nations so that it shall be a firm and irresistible bar to war. If we fail in Abyssinia, what hope is there of Denmark saving Schleswig; what hope is there for Memel, or Danzig, or Holland, or Latvia, or for freedom anywhere r If we fail in Abyssinia, the League may just as well put up its shutters, because every nation will have to go back to those defensive and offensive alliances, interested bargaining bodies, encircling Germany, partitioning Austria, and breeding that hell from which the League alone can save us. That is why the country is feeling so heavily on this question. Hon. and right hon. Members opposite will recollect the condition of affairs last November, and it is as bad to-day. In the country there is persistent anxiety that the Government should be clear where British policy must tend in the interests of safety.
I do not remember, since the War, ever being nervous of what would happen to Great Britain, or nervous of what would happen to every one of us; but now there is that danger. The Fleet has become valueless; the sea has become an added danger, because you cannot even hear the aeroplanes coming; and the only hope is the League. The Cabinet, I may add, are only just finding that out. If the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook really persuades our emissary at Geneva to stop sanctions on oil, to prevent sanctions on Italian shipping, to frustrate all those further steps which must be taken if we are going to vindicate the League—if that is going to be done, it is not only that England will be disgraced, not only that peace will be endangered, but that all hope of corporate action will come to an end. About 100 years ago an excellent American came to this country, named Emerson. He is forgotten nowadays, but when he came—

Mr. RICHARD LAW: No; he is not forgotten.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: I thought he was forgotten by the youth of this country. When he came here, just about 100 years ago, he made a famous speech in Manchester, to which I should like to call the attention of the House, because


what he said then is extremely appropriate at the present moment. He said:
That which lures a solitary American with the wish to see England is the moral peculiarity of the Saxon race—its commanding sense of right and wrong, the love and devotion to that.
When I heard the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs say to-day that he would be glad to effect a peaceful settlement in Abyssinia on such lines, I felt that that was treachery towards that good opinion of Emerson's. We really must decide these questions by what is right and what is wrong. If the League of Nations is going to start compromising with the criminal, if it is going to start rewarding him for breaking the law, then the League must fail. If you fail in that way with Mussolini, how can you expect to succeed with Hitler f Therefore, I would sap that what we are discussing to-night in regard to the matter of sanctions is not in the least a. question of expediency; it must be looked at from the point of view of whether we are doing right to use our immense power to stop what we think is wrong. It may be risky—every good action is risky; doing the right thing in any circumstances is always unpleasant. [HON. MEMBERS "Oh."]—or, at any rate, until one has got salvation.
Here is a clear issue, which the great body of the English people have generally decided in the same way. The mass do not know much about these questions, but they have sense to see which is the right policy from the moral point of view, and which is the wrong, and no amount of advocacy of expediency will ever wash out that conscience. It came to the top last year, both in the League of Nations Ballot and in the November bouleversement. You have there that infallible evidence of an English Nonconformist conscience which is the backbone of our national character, and which might perfectly well be made the backbone of a new Covenant of the world at Geneva. We have here a chance of doing something for the world and for freedom which England has never had a chance of doing before, and it all depends upon facing risks. It is our duty. Emerson went on, on that occasion, to say about England:
I see her not dispirited, not weak, but well remembering that she has seen dark

days before; indeed, with a kind of instinct that she sees a little better on a cloudy day, and that in storm of battle and calamity she has a secret vigour and a pulse like a cannon. I see her in her old age"—
this was 100 years ago—
not decrepit, but young and still daring to believe in her power o: endurance and expansion.
To. my mind this peace, this Pax Britannica, can, through the League of Nations, spread throughout the world. It is just that sort of expansion. which is not Imperialist, but which is in the true sense of the term the welfare of mankind and to the glory of God.

7.43 p.m.

Colonel GRETTON: We have just listened to a fervid and moving peroration from the right lion. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood). It is a very fine thing to sacrifice all for right, but the difficulty is to find out what is the right thing to do, and really, in matters of statesmanship and of the safety of nations and of mankind, we ought to consider something in addition to fervour and enthusiasm; we ought to look where we are going. The question before us is what is to be clone in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. The Government have said on many occasions that their foreign policy is based on the League of Nations—a statement that sent a cold shudder down the spines of many of us, and not without some justification. The League of Nations was set up avowedly to preserve peace, but it did nothing when Japan proceeded to dismember the northern part of China and to annex to herself those. parts which she desired. It looked on indifferently. We made protests and refused to acknowledge the new State, at great cost to ourselves and considerable danger to our trade. Subsequently the Italian-Abyssinian dispute has arisen. We were asked by Italy last Januar; what we would do about it and what our views were. While the Government hesitated six months, the Italian Government acted and proceeded to take such steps as it thought wise to move troops, aeroplanes, stores and tanks to Abyssinia, and commenced hostilities.
Our Government went to the League of Nations and, after long consultations and examinations, decided that Article 16 and sanctions must be set in Motion. Have


those sanctions which are already in operation been successful or complete, or have they produced any serious results'' Of course they have not. One nation after another has said, "We cannot enforce these sanctions fully. We must be excused in this and in that." The sanctions are not being carried out in their entirety even by members of the League. There are other nations which have left the League which are not attempting to carry out these sanctions, and no one can blame them. Who can blame Germany for sending all that Italy requires of her through Switzerland? Switzerland is bound to keep the routes open by treaty. No one can blame it. A pretty bill we are running up for the sake of the League of Nations without any effect upon the progress of hostilities but causing exasperation and enragement of Italian opinion, and the humiliation of ourselves, as leading the League of Nations, in the eyes of the African peoples. It would be unwise to go any further in this matter. Are we justified in risking everything in a matter which has been a failure? After reading the White Paper published by the Government have we any reason to think that the oil sanction will be more complete and more successful or more immediate in bringing hostilities to a close than those sanctions which have already been adopted? Far from it.
What reason is there to think that the United States Government have changed their traditional policy, which is to keep out of foreign entanglements, to maintain the freedom of the seas and freedom to trade with neutrals or with any country that they choose? We cannot expect any sacrifice on their part. It would be a chimera. We are being pressed to set up this oil sanction, and we are told that Mussolini will do nothing and that his warnings have all been bluff. What right have they to say that? What proof have they? Are they going to risk peace and war upon a loose opinion? There is no doubt that the oil sanction is going much nearer to the danger of war than the other sanctions. We have been warned over and over again. I have always looked upon the League of Nations as an institution to make peace, and not war. It is not in a condition to make war, nor can it enforce these sanctions, nor can it enforce its will on the world until it contains all the great nations of the world acting together.
The League of Nations is a League of some of the nations. It is incomplete and lacking in power as long as it fails to contain three of the most powerful, most heavily armed and most virile nations in the world. We must look facts in the face. The League is not strong enough. We are not strong enough. We were not sent to the House to egg the Government on to war with Italy or to run the risk of war. The position of the Government is somewhat inconsistent. They say, very truly, that we require strengthening in armaments. Our disarmament policy has led us to the verge of danger, yet in this disarmed state they urge us to run the risk of an unnecessary and a dangerous war. Are there any indications that France would go to war with Italy to save the League of Nations? Far from it. There is no sign whatever among the great mass of the people of a desire to plunge into war. We should be left very much alone.
I trust that the Government will not venture on the oil sanction. It is not their business to run the risk of bringing Europe, possibly the whole world, into a new war. We had far better look after our own business. The right hon. Gentleman who spoke last and others have said that the real storm centre is not Italy and Abyssinia, but the rearmament of Germany. We have quite enough there to occupy our attention without weakening other nations and offending and driving away from us potential allies in the day when the storm may burst. We ought to turn our attention to rearming to snaking up for lost time and making ourselves strong to play our part worthily in the world whatever may come.

7.45 p.m.

Mr. PARKER: I rise to ask the Foreign Secretary not merely to enforce the oil sanction, but to see that existing sanctions are fully enforced. I have received information from a member of a firm in the City that sanctions are not being fully enforced. There are various loopholes. This is a letter sent to an English importing firm from an agent in Novarra:
By the present I beg to submit to you an offer on account of my friend Mr. Dionigi Resinelli—Bellizona. This firm has its business in Bellizona in Switzerland and handles among other things Parmesan cheese, of which they carry a stock of several thousand. They are in a position of ship-


ping Parmesans to England and would like you to take up their agency for the sale of that article now that importation from Italy is not allowed owing to sanctions. For your knowledge, any article of Italian production which being reworked abroad for an extent of 25 per cent. of its value can be imported into England. This firm is in the right position for as they bring regularly in Switzerland new cheese in order to have them ripened, and this cheese being worked for at least one year and a half, they have in hand cheese which have cost them more than 25 per cent. over the value when these cheese were imported. What I say here is the reality and Swiss authorities would not deliver documents referring that if this would not be the case.
I should be pleased to hand this or any other document to the Foreign Secretary and, if he wishes to take steps in the matter, he could do so.
The last speaker said we should drop the whole of the sanctions policy. He appears not to realise the danger to Europe from Hitler. This German-Fascist dictatorship, it seems to me, is the greatest danger at present to the peace of Europe. Anyone who has travelled through Germany in recent years must have been struck by the immense amount of rearmament that has taken place. It has also been stated that we should realise that Fascist dictatorships are the great danger to peace. If that is so, we should do our utmost to see that those two great dangers to peace, Hitler and Mussolini, are removed from power as soon as possible. I am not advocating a preventive war against either, but we should do nothing at all to encourage or support the distatorships, but should do all in our power to bring about their downfall as soon as possible.
I mean by that that we should not assist them in any way to remain in power. We should not give them trade or financial facilities of any kind. It means that the Bank of England and the joint stock banks should fall into line with the general foreign policy of the Government. It means that Mr. Montagu Norman should not give any further loans to the German Government or to the German Central Bank. In November, 1934, the Bank of England made a loan of £400,000 to the German Central Bank, nominally for a reduction of commercial

debts in Great Britain. Actually what happened was that Germany was able to raise loans in other countries to finance rearmament. We believe that that should not have been done. We believe that the Bank of England should not pursue a different foreign policy from that of the Government. We believe that the financial institutions of the country should follow the directions of the Foreign Office. 'We believe that the Foreign Secretary shad in the last resort control the action of the Bank of England and the joint stock banks and see that nothing is done to strengthen the dictatorships in Italy or Germany. That is absolutely essential. We have been told by Members supporting the Government that collective security and rearmament are desirable, and what we on this side want to know is the exact connection between the two. We in the Labour party believe that this country should be sufficiently armed to make its contribution to a system of collective security, but we have not seen on the part of the Government any attempt to work out a really detailed system of collective security.

Major BRAITHWAITE: Can the hon. Gentleman say what is necessary for collective security to-day?

Mr. PARKER: We do not believe that you can say exactly what armaments are necessary until you have worked out what should be our share in collective security. An attempt should be made to make collective security a reality and to find out what should be oar share. When that is done we on our part should be prepared to supply our share of the security.

Mr. BAXTER: Ma v it not be too late by that time?

Mr. PARKER: Had the Government followed that policy during the last six months, it would have been possible today to have had a clearer idea of what our share in collective security should be, and then we could have been prepared to support our share of that security. Hon. Members opposite claimed that rearmament is necessary, but if any measure of re-armament is necessary we on this side of the House would like to be absolutely sure that there is to be no log-rolling in connection with it. The only way to make that absolutely certain


would be to say that no Member of this House or of another place should own any shares in any armament firm. When contracts were given by any of the Services for the re-armament programme, all shares belonging to any Members of this House or to Members of another place should be transferred to the Government, and the price paid for them should be that which prevailed three months before the contract was given. If that were done, it would be impossible for Members of this House or of another place to profit in armaments, and the country would be prepared to say, "You are honest in your policy when you advocate re-armament," and a. great deal of the opposition would disappear. I do not mean to say in making that statement, that we should not oppose re-armament even in those circumstances, but steps of that kind should be taken if we are to see the re-armament programme carried out without log-rolling and undue profiteering.

8.4 p.m.

Mr. HANNAH: I feel as much as anybody that the criticisms against the League have been entirely justified. We realise that it has failed to a very great extent, and yet I cannot help feeling that it is the one hope of the world. It is impossible not to reflect to a certain extent what would have been the result if Julius Caesar and the founders of the Roman Empire or the founders of the Great Empire of China, the two great forces in East and West, which for so long maintained the general peace, had been subjected to questioning in this House. We must realise that everything grows very slowly indeed. We cannot expect the Government for a moment to treat the League as if it were already a living force. It must, gradually and very slowly, work out its own salvation and give the world a new hope and nations a new point of view.
I cannot help feeling that the tragedy of Abyssinia, is really extraordinarily unfortunate, inasmuch as that nation has become a symbol to so many people, both in Africa and in Asia, of the Old Empires that existed in days gone by contemporary with Egypt of old. Hitherto European conquest of the world has to some extent been justified. We went into India at the time of great anarchy when the fall of the Mogul Empire made some

other administrative force absolutely necessary. The French went into Algeria on account of the disgraceful piracy to which the Algerians had given themselves up for several centuries. But here in Abyssinia there is no such excuse. Abyssinia is an enlightened Empire, and the Emperor is a man who, seriously and really, is trying to bring new ideas and new civilisation to an ancient people. Therefore, it is impossible not to feel deep sympathy with the Abyssinians, and with considerable indignation, and, at the same time, a certain amount of sympathy, with Italy. After all, so very many of the pioneers in the great voyages of the Renaissance were themselves Italians, and yet because Italy politically did not exist she had no share whatever in acquiring realms beyond the sea. It is rather a striking fact that Italy was a nation in the 6th century in the days of Theodoric the Goth and not again till the time of Victor Emmanuel in the 19th century.
I welcomed the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, and nothing with more enthusiasm than his statement that we should have nothing to do with alliances. It is our duty, as far as we possibly can, to make the League of Nations a reality. We must try in every way we can. We must not expect it to be a rapid process. Yet it is the only ideal of universal peace that the world possesses. It is the only hope of a better international situation. But I feel the very strongest regret that so much has been said about one nation in Europe being particularly our enemy. Let us realise what tremendous provocation Germany has had. Hitler was born not in Berlin, nor in Austria, nor in Germany at all, but at Versailles. When we realise the way in which the German population, almost everywhere, but especially towards the East, spreads so far over the German frontiers, we must agree that Germany has a case.
But what I specially want to emphasise, as a former resident in the Far East, is the clear fact that we dare not make a binding alliance with those two countries who have recently established a pact which—it is no good denying it—is directed against no single nation so much as Germany. Supposing we were allied with France and Russia, and, God forbid, that war broke out, there would be a tremendous danger that Germany and


Japan would get together. Already Europe is full of rumours that they have some sort of a, pact. If we joined such a pact as that of France and Russia, we should be a liability and not an asset. It would take the whole forces of our Empire, and any new re-armament we could get together, to defend our Pacific possessions.
I am sure that Members of the Labour party will feel the force of this when it is realised that the coasts of those parts of our Empire which have gone in for new experiments such as hon. Members on those benches want to try here, would not be safe. I do not accuse Japan of fortifying her mandated islands, but, at the same time, there can be no doubt that she would be able, if she were at war with this nation, to threaten the very coasts of Australia and New Zealand themselves. The British Empire would be a serious liability and no asset whatever to any anti-German alliance. I do not think that any military man would question that point of view, and to me it seems, in all solemnity, the most important fact in our foreign relations at the present time.
I shall conclude by giving a very hearty appreciation of the right hon. Gentleman opposite who opened this Debate. I feel particularly grateful to him because I believe that it was a speech made by him in the Bilston Town Hall which, more than anything else, sent me to this House. He said that our policy ought to be to close the Suez Canal against the fleet of Italy. Everywhere I naturally drew the attention of the electors to the fact that that would mean war, and I ask hon. Members on the other side, "Are they willing that these sanctions should lead us into war"? Let them answer that question clearly and definitely. If sanctions can be worked out in a way which, gradually, will bring Italy to reason, let us have them by all means, but if sanctions mean war, we should have nothing to do with them.

8.11 p.m.

Mr. MANDER: If there are supporters of the Government who are in very strong opposition to the policy of the Government, it is not because there has been any change, but because they have been encouraged by a certain amount of indecision in the policy of the Government

recently to come out, speak out and be more vocal than on ocher occasions. In particular the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) will find himself the most popular man in Italy to-morrow. His policy all along has been perfectly sincere and straightforward, but in violent opposition to the policy of His Majesty's Government. He said one thing, however, which struck me. It is no good having a policy, he said, in which you are
willing to wound Anil yet afraid to strike.
I entirely agree. I think that the better way of putting it in the present circumstances, is that it is no good having a policy in which you are willing to wound and yet afraid to hit back. That is the situation in which we find ourselves today. If we are to have sanctions at all, we have to be prepared to hit back if anyone should attack us because of it.
The Foreign Secretary made a very interesting and instructive speech to-day. He covered a deal of ground, and I was very glad to note that he said that the policy of the Government in support of the League was to be unchanged. I presume he means from the period of the General Election, and that we were continuing on those lines. There was one thing he did not say which I should have been glad to have heard him mention. I wish that he had been able to say that the policy of world leadership at Geneva, so admirably conducted by himself and other members of the Government at Geneva in the autumn, was to be continued. I was very much afraid from certain remarks in his speech that we were no longer to take an active and leading role, which is our due right, and in which he himself has served us admirably. I hope that others will say that I have misunderstood his attitude there, but I cannot help feeling, in common with other Members of the House, a certain disappointment in the speech which he made to-day. He was unable to make any very clear, definite statement or give any lead in regard to our attitude on sanctions. It may be that that will be resolved next week. It will be the testing time at Geneva on Monday, and all his friends and admirers—and there are none greater than hon. Members on these benches—will look forward with eager anticipation to the way in which he will conduct the affairs of this country.
I was very glad to find myself in complete agreement with what he said with regard to the reform of the League of Nations. I cannot help feeling that, while in the future certain changes, undoubtedly, will have to be introduced, what you want now is, the will to use the machinery which now exists. Given that will, you can perfectly well carry out all the tasks that fall upon the League. The reasons for to-day's Debate were alluded to very well in the last sentence of a leading article in the "Times" of 18th February:
The Supplementary Estimates may be regarded as part of the price Great Britain is paying, and paying ungrudgingly, to make I he collective system a reality.
I hope that it is going to be a reality. That is a point about which some of us are still feeling doubtful. The Government started well. By their initiative in the autumn they rallied the whole of the opinion in this country to their side, as was shown by the overwhelming majority at the General Election, and they secured the support of the peace-loving nations of the world. The criticism that I would make on the sending of the British Fleet and other forces at the beginning of the war to the Mediterranean is this: The Government have stressed the point that everything they do shall be collective. They are not prepared to act alone but they are prepared to do anything that other nations will join in doing. The movements of the British Fleet and other forces were taken, as I understand, entirely on our own initiative. They were not part of the collective system, and in that sense they were different from the declared policy of the Government. Why did not the Government go to the Council of the League and tell them that they proposed sending those forces there, and get their agreement to their going there on behalf of the collective system?

Vice-Admiral TAYLOR: Can the hon. Member state whether any other nation was prepared to take any preparatory action in regard to its forces?

Mr. MANDER: I imagine that they were. When they were asked by the Government at a later stage they said they were prepared. Even if they were not, it was clearly the duty of the Government to find out what they were prepared to dc in the first instance.

Vice-Admiral TAYLOR: Did they actually do so?

Mr. MANDER: I cannot enter into an argument with my hon. and gallant Friend. I cannot help feeling that it was a very regrettable incident that the British Ambassador was sent on more than one occasion to see Mussolini in Rome and explain to him that the British Fleet was not there in connection with sanctions, or collective security, or the League, put purely because of Italian propaganda and the sending of Italian troops into Libya. Why was it necessary to go to the Italian dictator and apologise for the presence of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean? If it was necessary to say anything at all, I would rather that the Ambassador had said: "The British Fleet is there for action if necessary. Whatever your threats or talk may mean, it will be there to play its part in the collective system of the League of Nations." Then followed the lamentable episode of the Hoare-Laval negotiations. Since then progress has been disappointingly slow. The Foreign Secretary said that sanctions must be swift and effective, but it would be very difficult for us to see any sign of speed or effectiveness during the last two or three months. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman of certain words that he used on 4th September at the League Council:
If in the judgment of world opinion the League fails in this dispute, its authority for the future will be grievously shaken and its influence seriously impaired. The collapse of the League and of the new conception of international order for which it stands would be a world calamity.
That was a very admirable statement. What is the position to-day? I will give one quotation which I am afraid is an indication of what other nations are thinking. It is a dispatch from the "Times" correspondent at Warsaw, on 9th February, referring to the visit of General Goering to that country:
The view taken by many here that the League is unable to deal effectively with Italy is likely to lead, in the opinion of competent observers here, to a further strengthening of Polish-German relations and to what would he more important—the support of Polish public opinion for a Polish pact of friendship with Germany. It is significant in this connection that the Press of the Right Opposition is already suggesting that the failure to apply oil sanctions means that the League is incapable of decisive action for settling all international conflicts,' and then proceeds to the conclusion


that if the nations of the League would look for security, they must seek protection elsewhere.' 
It is a very serious situation if that is the view that is being taken by a country like Poland, which is now hovering between one system and another, prepared to go in with the League if it is a reality and, if not, prepared to go into the German sphere of influence.
It is vital that the League should triumph in the present contest, and triumph soon. I do not think that it will be any deterrent to Hitler if the League 12 months, or two or three years hence, is able to bring this conflict to an end. That will mean something very like the defeat of the League. Of what are the Government afraid? It is said that they are afraid of public opinion, and afraid of opinion in the House of Commons. If they have the courage to pursue a clear and consistent line, they will have the overwhelming majority of the House of Commons and the country behind them, but if they wobble again, that support will melt away and they will find themselves in no clear and stable position in regard to their League policy. I hope that they will continue pressure progressively, that they will use all the force necessary to obtain their objective and will adopt the police method of using the minimum force that is necessary but all the force that is necessary for attaining their object.
We have heard a great deal about oil sanctions to-day. I hope that next week the Foreign Secretary will urge, as he has urged before, that these sanctions should be applied whatever the reaction on America may be. I should have thought that it was inconceivable when a country has been found an aggressor by the League of Nations and designated an aggressor by the President of the United States that public opinion would tolerate a situation in which the whole of our peace work was being undone by oil profiteers in America. Even if that be so, let the world know it and see where the responsibility lies. I should like to read a resolution which was passed yesterday by the International Federation of League of Nations Societies at Geneva. The second resolution was as follows:
That the Committee of Eighteen be asked to vote immediately the oil embargo and, if necessary, further sanctions, such

as the closing of the ports of League Members to Italian ships, the prohibition of trade between League States and Italian Somaliland and Eritrea, and the closing of League ports to ships of neutral powers carrying goods to Italian Somaliland and Eritrea.
It may be said that that is dangerous. Surely, if directly a bully starts shouting at us we are going to run away, it will be much more dignified if we had never put ourselves in a position to be bullied. Now that arrangements have been made in the Mediterranean with other Powers there for collective action if we are attacked, there is no excuse whatever for not going boldly forward with this policy.
If we come to a state of affairs when the League looks like being defeated, when sanctions have no effect, there is only one way left. It would be effective to-morrow if it were applied, and that is by cutting communications between Italy and Africa and preventing Italian ships and munitions of war going steadily forward to carry out their diabolical work in Abyssinia. The issue is a simple one. We have to take all risks to make the aggressor bow the knee to the collective system. If we do not do that, we are not faced with a risk but with the certainty of heading straight for eternity. [Interruption.] That word was not misplaced, because it does happen that it means eternity for hundreds and thousands of our fellow-citizens throughout the world. I hope the Government will be encouraged to go forward and carry out the work which the electors at the General Election sent them here to do.

8.27 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir ARNOLD WILSON: I want to address myself to what the Foreign Secretary said at the commencement of the Debate rather than to the very bellicose speech to which we have just listened from the honourable and normally peaceful Member for Wolverhampton, East (Mr. Mander). I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on his references to rearmament. I have been much in Europe during the past two years and I am certain that whatever direction our foreign policy may take far stronger armaments are necessary for this country. As I listened to speeches by hon. Members opposite this evening I was reminded of a passage in the first part of Shakespeare's King Henry VI:


No treachery; but want of men and money.
Amongst the soldiers this is muttered,
That here you maintain several factions,
And whilst a field should be dispatch'd and fought,
You are disputing of your generals:
One would have ling'ring wars with little cost;
Another would fly swift, but wanteth wings;
A third man thinks, without expense at all,
By guileful fair words peace may be obtain'd.
Awake, awake, English nobility!
Let not sloth dim your honours, new-begot;
Cropp'd are the flower-de-luces in your arms;
Of England's coat one half is cut away.
We have to restore our coat to its relative pre-war size. The right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) gave us a quotation from Emerson. Let me give him another quotation from the same source:
Englishmen and Americans cant more than any other nation.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has said that those who are critical of the policy pursued in the last six months either believe that we should make drastic use of Article 16 or that Article 16 ought never to have been in the Covenant at all; and he said, to my regret, that His Majesty's Government have not under consideration any modification of the Covenant. I can understand any Government, particularly at this time, hesitating before contemplating any change of a Treaty arrived at at such cost and pains, but I submit that there are good reasons why Article 16 should never have been employed.
I do not wish to condone the action of Italy, and I should have been glad to have seen our Ambassador withdrawn and such moral pressure exerted as we can apply to any nation once it has been declared an aggressor by the League, whether we agree with that decision or not. Let me recall to hon. Members the circumstances in which the Covenant became part of our law. In the House, on 21st July, 1919, between four o'clock in the evening and four o'clock in the morning, two Bills were passed, one dealing with the Anglo-French (Defence of France) Treaty and the other with the Treaty of Peace (of Versailles) Bill. The

first Bill specifically provided that failing ratification by America it would be null and void. The second Bill dealt with the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant. Had any hon. Member asked the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), who was then Prime Minister, what would happen in the event of America refusing to ratify the Covenant, his answer would have been that the contingency was so remote that it need not be considered, but that if that contingency should arise our attitude in regard to Article 16 would of course have to be reconsidered.
Everyone recognises that sanctions to be effective must be applied completely and immediately, otherwise they are bound to be dangerous. There is no provision in Article 16 for piecemeal application. If sanctions are not applied in full they are bound to become progressively less effective, because new trade channels will be found to replace the old, as is now happening. We should never have applied Article 16. It is dead, as the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) recognised in 1925, when the Treaty of Locarno was under discussion, and it has been recognised as dead in speeches by Members of different Cabinets in successive Governments.

Sir A. SINCLAIR: The hon. and gallant Member is surely misrepresenting the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain), who certainly did not regard Article 16 as dead. He has strongly supported the application of Article 16.

Sir A. WILSON: In 1925 he regarded it as moribund, and it has been regarded as obsolescent ever' since. Once America dropped out, the compulsory powers of the Covenant, to my mind, fell to the ground. We have heard much this evening about the importance of applying immediate compulsion: it is claimed that we are bound by our bond to apply Article 16. If I thought that we were bound by honour and our bond to apply Article 16 I should not be making this speech this evening. I carry my mind back to 4th August, 1914. I have looked up the speech which Sir Edward Grey made on that occasion, and I ask leave to read a short quotation which Sir Edward Grey made, and with which he expressed his full approval, from a speech which was made by Mr. Gladstone on 10th August, 1870:


I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen. such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact. and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd August, 1914; col. 1819; Vol. 65.]

Mr. KIRBY: Is the hon. Member aware that that speech was made 66 years ago?

Miss RATHBONE: If the hon. and gallant Member does not consider that we are bound under the Covenant, does he not consider we were hound from 5th November, when we declared Italy to be the aggressor? Are we not bound by the assurances we gave to Abyssinia? Does the hon. Member think that, having led Abyssinia into the war, we should now leave her in the lurch?

Sir A. WILSON: I am glad to have the recognition of at least one hon. Member that we did lead Abyssinia into the war. I am bound to remind the hon. Member for Everton (Mr. Kirby) that the quotation I read was made with the full approval of Sir Edward Grey on 4th August, 1914.

Mr. KIRBY: The hon. Member stated that he was quoting something said by Gladstone in 1870.

Sir A. WILSON: The quotation was made with the full approval of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, who will go down in history as a man who was the foremost in keeping the bond of this country when he thought that the interests of the country required it.

Mr. KIRBY: Surely the hon. Member is aware that conditions have changed since 1870, when that speech was made.

Sir A. WILSON: I have already answered that point.

Miss RATHBONE: You have not answered my point.

Sir A. WILSON: I deny altogther that we were compelled by our bond or our honour to apply sanctions in November, after the League of Nations made its declaration. There is nothing whatever in Article 16 which tells to take action unless everybody else does so. Sanctions have failed—they have failed in the case of Italy and they will fail elsewhere. Sanctions have done nothing to save the unfortunate Abyssinians. Had this House not rejected with contumely the statesmanlike proposals made by the former Foreign Secretary and M. Laval, some 5,000 to 10,000 Abyssinian lives would have been saved. For this loss of lives we have to thank those who, like the hon. Lady the Member for the English Universities (Miss Rathbone), were so anxious to punish the aggressor that they completely forgot to remember the interests of the unfortunate Abyssinians—non Amharic subjects of the Negus.
Far more is involved than mere legality and the mere quotation of one document against another. In the words of Disraeli in this House on 9th February, 1876:
The government of the world is not a mere alteration between abstract right and overwhelming force. The world is governed by conciliation, compromise, influence, varied interests, the recognition of the rights of others coupled with the assertion of one's own; and in addition, a general conviction resulting from explanation and good understanding, that it is to the interest of all parties that matters should be conducted in a satisfactory and peaceful manner.
What we must seek is peace, and in order to obtain peace this country, Italy, Abyssinia and other countries must retreat from the positions which they have taken up and which they cannot maintain with success. Italy and Germany are suffering from a sense of profound injustice, and mere restraint or threats of force in fact of a legitimate grievance are as vain in international as in internal affairs. In I his House we seek to remedy a grievance. Even if it be unreasonable, we try to recognise it and to deal with it, because it is as real a thing as any set of facts. We must recognise the reality of the grievances of the


under-privileged nations and deal with them no less willingly than we recognise and deal with the grievances of underprivileged people in this country and elsewhere.
It is a loathsome business to sit here and argue while a war is going on—a war which might have been avoided had the world at large been more reasonable. But we are threatened with a far greater catastrophe unless we realise that words and more words will not suffice and that we must get round the table, meet Germany, Italy, and in the case of Abyssinia recognise that the interests of the Abyssinian people are by no means identical with those of the Government of the Negus or with the views put forward on its behalf. All that I have heard directly from men who have spent many months in some cases, and many years in other cases, in Abyssinia, is to the effect that the interests of the people of Abyssinia will not be met by a mere restoration of the status quo.
There have been horrible doings in Abyssinia. The Government of Abyssinia is bound to disintegrate. A restoration of the status quo in Abyssinia will entail fresh miseries for the unfortunate tribesmen unless the League of Nations is prepared to take that country in hand and to apply sanctions against the Government of Abyssinia no less firmly, should it prove recalcitrant, than we are prepared to apply them against Italy. The Government of Abyssinia is not a civilised Government. It is useless for us to imagine that they are philanthropists, and that all the wrong is on the side of Italy. I have no reason to doubt the truth of what has been told me over and over again, that the Abyssinians in the areas which Italian troops have occupied regard the Italians as liberators. [Laughter.] I am quite accustomed to laughter, but what I have said I have had on the first-hand authority of English men and women, and I have no reason whatever to doubt the truth of it. The one thing which the non-Amharic races do not want to see back is the Abyssinian Government. They have suffered terribly during the last 50 years, since they were conquered by the ruling race. They do not want to see the Abyssinian Government return; that has to be recognised as a factor in the situation.
I am not standing up for Italy. As I said at the beginning of my speech, I

should be glad to have seen our Ambassador withdrawn and our moral disapproval energetically expressed; but to apply ineffective sanctions, to risk the peace of Europe for the sake of a Colonial war and now to pretend that Abyssinia will require other Government than it has had for the last 50 years, is to blind ourselves to the realities of a situation which is already sufficiently distressing, and which might have been ended had not this House rejected the statesmanlike proposals of the former Foreign Secretary and M. Laval.

8.44 p.m.

Mr. ATTLEE: I listened with great interest to the remarks of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Hitchin (Sir A. Wilson). In the course of speaking in the country I have often explained to my audiences the nature of an anarchist. I have pointed out that they are quite wrong in thinking that an anarchist is a man wearing a red tie and having a bomb in his pocket, but that generally he is wearing a black coat and is to be found sitting on the Benches of the Conservative party in this House. The hon. and gallant Member for Hitchin is an admirable example of an anarchist. He does not believe in any rule of law, but thinks that the strong should take what they can. He expresses sympathy with certain grievances, and when he finds there is a grievance he says, "Well, the people who have a grievance should take action." I wonder that he does not apply that principle at home. I wonder if he found a sweating employer, would he encourage the workers concerned to take action?

Sir A. WILSON: Yes, Sir.

Mr. ATTLEE: Then I can only say that he appears to have been remarkably supine all his life in that respect. I do not intend, however, to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman because, after all, the majority in this House are, at least, supposed not to be anarchists but to believe in the rule of law in international and home affairs. Nor shall I follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery). His is a perfectly consistent position. He does not believe in the rule of law in international affairs, and he resents the fact that this country should find itself on the side of law and order and acting with the police force. His remedy for that state of


things, however, is very simple. He would merely turn the police force into a gang by inviting all the gangsters into it and, by the simple process of changing its aims and objects, everybody would be made happy ever after.
One recognises that that kind of view is taken by certain supporters of the Government in this House, but I think few of them carry it out so completely as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook. As I say, I do not intend to follow it, and indeed I do not think it worth replying to, because we have had centuries of that kind of doctrine and we know where it leads. It leads to war and slaughter. The views put forward by the right hon. Gentleman are precisely the kind of views which were put forward by the Central Powers in 1914. The right hon. Gentleman's outlook is very little different from that of the rulers of Germany in 1914 or the rulers of Germany to-day.
I would rather turn to the speech of the Foreign Secretary with which, I am bound to say, I was profoundly disappointed. There was only one definite statement throughout that speech, and it was the definite statement that the Government had not yet made up their mind on the oil sanction. I wonder whether the Under-Secretary, when he replies, would give us a little more light on what is moving in the mind of the Government. What is delaying the making up of their mind on the oil sanction? It is four months since it was agreed to in principle. What are the difficulties? We are told that the difficulties which have arisen are because of the fact that we are working with an imperfect instrument in the League of Nations. The League of Nations is au imperfect instrument but it can be worked if people have the mind to work it. I was surprised that we had not something from the Foreign Secretary in the way of excuse for the long delay because I thought that one thing was common to everybody who considered this question, namely, that we all want to bring this war to an end as soon as possible. People are being killed in Abyssinia, and a condition of war like the present is dangerous, and becomes more dangerous to the peace of the world the longer it continues.
I thought also that the right hon. Gentleman would have told us something about the reason for the extra expenditure which we are to discuss later this evening. One suggested reason for the delay is that we were afraid of action by Italy. I am very much puzzled about that suggestion because, when this matter of sanctions was first discussed, the then Foreign Secretary the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) rejected the idea that there was any serious danger of an attack on this country. Speaking on 22nd October he scouted the idea that there could be any danger of an attack. He said it would be the act of a madman. On 17th December our Fleet was moved. The Prime Minister was not afraid then, because he told us that the Fleet was being moved to the Mediterranean in pursuance of the ordinary autumn manoeuvres. We may take it therefore that any expenditure in the White Paper arose after 17th December. But before then the Foreign Secretary had become scared. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chelsea made a speech in this House and we Lad later the speech of the Prime Minister threatening terrible revelations, and a great many people thought that all this was because, if the oil sanctions were enforced, there was danger of action by Italy. I hope we shall get a clear story about the moving of the Fleet, as to what these threats amounted to, and as to what was the real collective action taken by the League. We have been told that it was true collective action, but a true collective system does not mean relying in case of attack by an aggressor upon one or two Powers. It involves the whole League. If this danger was threatened, then it was a matter which concerned the whole League. As I said, I am surprised that we had not a word about that from the Foreign Secretary.
Then there is the question of the delay. There was much delay as a result of the abortive Hoare-Laval negotiations. Now we come to within a few days of the Foreign 'Secretary's departure for Geneva to take part in the discussion of this vital question of the imposition of the oil sanction, and he has not yet got his instructions. It would be interesting to know whether this Government ever give their Foreign Minister any instructions. The last time I spoke on foreign affairs,


I asked the Foreign Minister whether instructions had been given to the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor when he went to Paris, and I got no reply. Now, apparently, the Foreign Secretary of today has to wait until the last moment before he gets any instructions on the oil sanction because the Government have not made up their minds on this question. I suggest that that is playing with the House and with the country on this question.
The discussions on this subject, here and in another place, have been noteworthy because of the consensus of opinion among people of the most varied points of view that, the real trouble about this Government is not that its policy has been this or that, but that it has never followed any consistent policy at all. We got no consistent policy from the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon. He asked what was the object of sanctions, what was the end at which we were aiming, and said the end was the settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. We want that, but the vital end to be aimed at is the establishment of collective security. The right hon. Gentleman talked a lot about the need for this in a troubled world, but he left out the real issue, because while protesting how vitally important it was to have collective security, he did not say how it was going to be operated in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian question. The whole question is whether the aggressor can be prevented from profiting by his aggression. That is what the whole world is watching. That is what the other States in the League are watching.
Then the right hon. Gentleman suggests to us that perhaps they will manage to settle the matter by the recommendations of the Committee of Five. The recommendations of that committee were made before Italy went to war with Abyssinia. They involved very large concessions on the part of Abyssinia,— almost the abrogation of sovereignty over a very large field. After Italy had made war on Abyssinia, after she had been dedazed the aggressor, and after the imposition of sanctions, it is suggested that she might get these terms. There is no word about Abyssinia or about the unprovoked attack on Abyssinia. Suppose that that does happen. What is the effect of it going to be on the other States in

the League? I must almost apologise for mentioning the fact that there are a number of States besides the two or three big ones in the League and the two or three big ones outside. All these little States are treated as if they were of no importance. They are vitally important. If we are considering a question of law and order and of the protection of the people of this country, we are not considering so much the great ones of the land, who can usually look after themselves; it is the great mass of small people, the poor people and the quiet people who have to be looked after by law and order.
What does the kind of settlement suggested mean in terms of Europe? It means that the aggressor has only to rattle his sabre sufficiently loudly to get all he wants with the sanction of the League. It will mean, I suppose, a retrocession to Germany of Eupen and Malmedy with the blessing of the League, the return of Slovakia to Hungary with the blessing of the League, or of German Bohemia or Memel to Germany. I suppose in the end we shall not be obliged to have a war and that the threat of war will be enough. That is the vital question that faces us and the League. This matter of Italy and Abyssinia is of importance in itself, but everyone recognises that behind that question looms a much larger subject. The whole question, not merely with regard to aggression in Africa, but with regard to aggression in Asia or Europe, or anywhere in the world, is whether the aggressor is to get away with it. If we are going to return to this idea of buying off the aggressor by concessions at the expense of the victim—and that is what the Foreign Secretary indicated to-night—we are merely getting back to the Hoare-Laval agreement on slightly different terms.

Mr. EDEN: There is, of course, no surrender of territory at all in the proposals of the Committee of Five.

Miss RATHBONE: Will the right hon. Gentleman remind us 'what those proposals were?

Mr. ATTLEE: I have them here. There is to be control in drawing up the budget, the collection of taxes, the


establishment of tariffs, justice, education, public health, foreign trade, public works, post and telegraphs, the maintenance of order in frontier territories, and so forth. All that is to be carried out by the League. There is also to be a, contribution for territorial adjustments of one kind and another. This whole business is undertaken with the idea that Abyssinia is to be controlled and Italy is to have a, full share in it. It does not amount to much more than going back to the old treaties and the dividing up between imperialist powers. We are really returning to the old idea of buying off the aggressor.
It is really useless for the right hon. Gentleman to suggest that the postponement of oil sanctions has been due to the need for inquiry or to the question of the United States of America coming in. The real cause of the delay in oil sanctions is well known. It was the reluctance of two leading States in the League to impose oil sanctions because they had been following a policy of alliances at Stresa. The Government were not whole-heartedly for the League. They were always playing with the League. Everything goes to show that the United States Government and the United States people were ready. at a time when the League had reached the height of its reputation and had begun to deal with this subject, to collaborate with Europe. It may be much more difficult now, but I think it is possible. American public opinion sustained a serious shock at the Laval-Hoare agreement. There is no doubt that those who wished America to take her fair share in the League were shocked by that agreement, but even so, is it any reason why the rest of the League should not put on oil sanctions? I can never see why, if one people will not obey the law, all the rest of the people should not. We are, as a, matter of fact, bound by the Covenant; it may be said that it is a mistake to be in it and that we ought to get out of it, but at the present moment we are bound by it. It seems to me that through all this matter there has been a lack of a lead by our Government. I am not suggesting that our Government should do anything single-handed. We do not want them to do that. It is no good, however, suggesting that they should sit by and wait for a lead by other

States. This country has its obligations because of its position, and we know that when this country does take a lead other States of the League follow.
I do not want to deal at any length with the question of the purloined document, but I am rather surprised at the suggestion that at such an early stage in the dispute Italy asked us what our interests were in Abyssinia and that we thereupon set up a committee to examine the question. I should have thought the answer would have been, "In this matter we are solely concerned with the position of the League; we have, therefore, no imperial interests concerning us at all." The fact that the question was asked seems to me to suggest at once that the Government from that time on might have seen that there was no question of the Wal-Wal dispute; but that it was a matter in which Italy quite clearly was seeking to carve out an empire in Abyssinia; and the question was asked to find out whether we should object or not. Our complaint against the Government is not that they should have imposed sanctions in January—they could not have done it then—but that they should have made a perfectly plain statement of where this country stood. It is here that I agree with some of those who take a totally different view on this subject from mine, namely, that it is imperative that whatever this country does it should make its position clear. It was one of the mistakes before the Great War that the position of this country was not absolutely clear.
The Foreign Secretary told us that the international situation is like that of 1914. That is a very grave statement. He went on to say that democracy was on its trial. I think it is capitalism and Imperialism that are on trial. The right hon. Gentleman then proceeded to lay down certain conditions. He said we wanted truly collective action. I agree with truly collective action, but truly collective action does not mean subordinating everything to acting with one State. Truly collective action means acting throughout with the League, and that is what the Government have not consistently done. From time to time they have taken action on their own. We on this side stand for collective action. The other condition, he said, was that we should be strong. I agree that we want this country strong, but what does


the right hon. Gentleman mean by strength? He used that argument to push the Government's arms policy.
The chief element of strength in the League is unity. The League would be strong if it were properly united. This country will be strong if it is united, but we are not going to get a united country on any policy that is constantly shilly-shallying between a League policy and an Imperialist policy. We have to-day the League very prominent in his speech, but not prominent in action. The right hon. Gentleman appealed for confidence. A great many people in this country had confidence in the right hon. Gentleman. I am afraid their confidence in him will be a great deal less after his speech this afternoon. I seem to see the old Adam in Eden. Have we got to set adrift yet another Foreign Secretary before we can get a policy that really carries out the will of the people of this country, or is it the case that whoever we get as Foreign Secretary we cannot get a straight policy from this Government?
I would warn the Government. They say that we are living in very dangerous limes, and that is true. They want, no doubt, to get a united country in dealing with foreign affairs, but they must realise that they will not get a united country with a policy of blowing hot and cold on League affairs. Here is a clear test, the question of sanctions. We on this side believe that this war need never have arisen if the Government had stood firmly by the League from the start. We believe that this war would have been ended long ago if the Government had put on sanctions from the start—I do not say "the Government," but if they had moved the League to put on sanctions. I am well aware that there were difficulties with another prominent member of the League. I believe those difficulties are less to-day than they were, but I am sure that if our Government had taken a firm line the other countries of the League would have fallen in. I believe there would have been support from the United States of America, and I believe it might immeasurably have strengthened the whole collective security system.
The real failure of statesmanship on the part of this Government is that they did not realise that what was required to-day in a dangerous world was a strong League, a League so strong that an aggressor would not attack it; that they

had this opportunity in the difficulties which arose between Italy and Abyssinia, but after knitting the League together they frittered away that chance because they blew hot and cold in matters of League policy. Now they come to us again with the one policy which seems to emerge from the last Election, and that is re-armament. We are told we must have more arms. That case has got to be made. It has not yet been made. But whatever arms are required they must be such as are needed only for the League policy, and the first condition for any assent to more arms is that the Government shall be following a League policy, and the speech of the right hon. Gentleman has not convinced me that the Government have even yet learned their lesson. I thought they might have learned the lesson of what this country really feels, but I do not think they have. I say most emphatically, speaking on behalf of this party, that we shall be no party to piling up armaments and following a policy either of Imperialism or of alliances, but only collective security through the League.

9.11 p.m.

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Viscount Cranborne): It is said that all debates on foreign politics in this House are important, but I think that the Debate which is coming to an end has had rather a special importance. It has been important, partly, from the moment at which it is held, and it has been important, too, for what has been said in it, for I suppose there has never been a time when it was more important that every view and every aspect of opinion in the nation should be ventilated in this House. In one way, at any rate, to the Government, it has been a satisfactory day. There has appeared, on the whole, no cleavage as to the main lines of British foreign policy. I suppose I ought to make an exception for my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery). He appeared still to fancy isolation, but I am afraid I thought, and I suspect the House thought, that he was in himself a lamentable example of the depressing effects of isolation. I think he made the gloomiest speech we have any of us ever heard, and I strongly suggest to him, if he is here, that he should move straight into the camp of collective security, which would cheer him up. In


addition there was my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hitchin (Sir A. Wilson). He said that Article 16 was dead. He said it was dead in 1925 and therefore is still dead. It reminded me a little of a remark I once heard by a delegate, not a British delegate, at Geneva. He said: "This was true 25 years ago, it must be true now." Of course, that it not so; and if Article 16 was dead in 1925 it certainly is not dead now. It has never been more alive, and it is getting more alive every day that we live. Save for these two unfortunate exceptions, if there have been any differences of opinion they have been rather as to the way the main policy should be carried out than over the policy itself.
In his speech earlier in the Debate my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary covered, I think, the main field of foreign affairs. He spoke, first of all, of the very melancholy dispute between Italy and Abyssinia, and said that His Majesty's Government desired above all things a settlement of it and, if possible, a settlement by conciliation, because after all, conciliation is the main task of the League of Nations. I am certain that there is nobody in any quarter of the House who would not agree with that sentiment. Then he emphasised the role which we as a nation play in it. He said, what we all know, that we have no national or Imperial interest in it, and this is confirmed by the Maffey Report, which for reasons best known to themselves the Italian Press have seen fit to publish. The publication of any confidential document is always a matter of concern to the Government affected, and my right hon. Friend has said that he is taking all appropriate measures to deal with the matter, but so far as the document itself is concerned we need have no regrets. The world now knows, if it did not know it before, that what Great Britain has said in public is what she thinks in private. For this unsolicited, and one may say probably unintentional, testimonial we owe the Italian Press our most heartfelt thanks.
The criticisms, such as they were, of the policy of the Government with regard to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, were of two kinds. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir A. Sinclair) said that sanctions, so far as he knew, were not

being effective, but my right hon. Friend, in his speech, had already disputed that assertion. Apparently my right hon. Friend has not succeeded in persuading the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, and I can only again repeat what my right hon. Friend said, which was that economic sanctions are inevitably not immediate in their effect but are bound to be progressive. All I can cell the right hon. Gentleman is that all reports which we have from Italy show that sanctions are becoming increasingly effective, and that many of her exports are greatly affected. Any reduction in Italian exports must reduce the buying power of the Italian nation. That affects not only materials of war but oil and other material as well. As the House already knows, the Italian Government have found it convenient to cease to publish the report of their gold reserve. That is a somewhat symptomatic thing. Nobody would cease to do it unless they thought that it would not do their people much good to see it. They have even gone to the extent of collecting wedding rings. That is a sad position for a great nation.
Another criticism of the policy of the Government was mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook. He, and those who think like him, take the view that our support of the Covenant in this dispute has cost this country too dear. The argument is that sanctions have been put on which have cost money to this country, that every year there will be a new dispute, every year sanctions will be put on and that no nation, however rich and prosperous, can stand that. If any of us believed that sanctions would always need to be put on every year, we should be despondent about the future. The essential task of the League of Nations on this occasion, which makes this occasion so important, is to establish, not that sanctions must always be applied, but that they can and will be applied if necessary.
I would emphasise that sanctions are not intended, in their essence, to be a punishment to the aggressor. They are intended as a deterrent. It is no good having a deterrent unless you use it at least once successfully. It would be useless to tell a boy that you would beat him if he broke the rules of the school, and to go on telling him but never beating him. But if you beat him once, not only he, but all his little friends would think


twice before they broke the rules of the school again. It is exactly the same with this question. It is essential that any sanctions applied by the League should be effective, either actively, or effective from a psychological point of view. I agree with hon. Members that the psychological and moral view is very important. If the sanctions were not effective in any way, either actually or psychologically, they would do more harm than good, because they would give the impression to the aggressor that the League had shot its bolt. That is an aspect of all new sanctions which the Committee of Eighteen will have to bear in mind, and the Government will have to bear in mind, and it applies also to the oil sanction. As my right hon. Friend said, that is a practical sanction and, as with any other sanction, the aim is to see whether morally, and in a concrete manner, that sanction is to be effective.
In regard to one matter the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Keighley (Mr. Lees-Smith) misled the House a little, but I am sure quite unintentionally. He and many other people, both in this House and in the country, have given an impression that the Oil Report said that the oil embargo, even without the assistance of the United States of America, would make the import of oil more difficult and expensive. That is not what the report said. What the report said is:
If such an embargo were applied by tile States Members of the Co-ordination Committee alone, the only effect which it could have on Italy would be to render the purchase of petroleum more difficult and expensive.
That is the only effect it could possibly have, and it is not certain that it would have that effect at all. [Interruption.] I have the impression from the expression on the face of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Keighley that he regards that as rather a quibble. Suppose I said that the change in the world situation could have the effect of opening the eyes of the Labour party to the necessity for modern armaments or increased armaments. That would be quite different from saying that it would have that effect. It could have that effect, but I very much doubt whether it will.
I have given the authoritative reading of that passage, but it does not prove either one side or the other. It might possibly have the effect, and it might possibly not. I do not quote it because

I want the House to think that it will be the governing factor in making the League not put on oil sanctions. I am only quoting it as showing that it is among the many factors, and to show also how very difficult and complex this question is. As the Foreign Secretary has already said, the decision on this question will be reached as soon as possible. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) complained that no decision has yet been reached. I would point out that this very important report has been in the hands of the Government for only five days, and that neither we nor any other Government can get an opinion in so short a time.
Certain other points which have been made in the course of the Debate I propose to deal with briefly. The hon. Member for Kingswinford (Mr. A. Henderson) asked why Article 16 had not been applied as it was meant to be applied. It has been applied as the League meant it to be applied. The hon. Member will remember that Article 16 has been interpreted by what is known as the Resolution of 1921, which says that all economic measures should be progressive. It is on that Resolution that the League has been working, and intends to continue working.

Mr. A. HENDERSON: I take it that the Noble Lord does not mean to suggest to the House that the Resolution of 1921, to which he has just referred, to the effect that economic sanctions are to be applied progressively, necessarily means that six months after the war has started we should be in the position we are in to-day?

Viscount. CRANBORNE: It means exactly what it says. It means that they will be progressive, and they have been progressive and progressively effective.

Mr. BEVAN: Let us hope that Abyssinia will hold out long enough.

Viscount CRANBORNE: The right hon. Member for Limehouse spoke of the Fleet. He said that they had never been given any explanation of why we sent the Fleet to the Mediterranean. That action arose directly out of support of the League. What happened in August? There arose in Italy a most violent Press campaign against this country, which itself arose directly from our support of the League


in this dispute. As a result of this campaign and threats to Malta, His Majesty's Government had to take action, and it is quite obvious that we had to take steps to protect the lives and properties of these people for whom we were inevitably responsible in those places. The action that was taken was merely defensive; it was not offensive in any sense whatever. There is nothing in the Covenant to prevent a nation sending a force for such a purpose in the way that we did. There was a further point raised by the right hon. Member for Lime-house. He took exception because my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, in talking about conciliation, said that he thought that the report of the Committee of Five was a fair basis for negotiation between the two countries. Do I understand that the right hon. Gentleman does not approve of the report of the Committee of Five and that he did not approve of it in September last? Did he not then think that it was a fair basis of settlement?

Mr. ATTLEE: The noble Lord will remember that those terms were put forward as a possible basis of settlement before aggression. They are now proposed to be given as a reward for aggression.

Viscount CRANBORNE: Did the right hon. Gentleman think then that they were a fair basis for a just settlement?

Mr. ATTLEE: No, certainly not. I do not think that the aggressor should be rewarded by adjustments in his favour.

Viscount CRANBORNE: There was no question of territorial adjustments in his favour. The Ethiopian did not think it himself. What the Ethiopian Government said was, "The Ethiopian Government observes with satisfaction that this proposal is being made to it, not on behalf of the League, which has no status to propose a territorial change, but solely by France and the United Kingdom, with the single object of contributing to the peaceful settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. The Ethiopian Government repeats its declaration that it is prepared to negotiate a territorial adjustment on the basis of an exchange on terms advantageous to all parties concerned." On that basis they accepted the report of the Committee of Five, so that the right hon. Gentleman, if I may say so, is blacker than the Ethiopian.

Mr. ATTLEE: The Ethiopian Government at that time was threatened with war by Italy. She was willing to accept certain terms then. After her country is devastated and her people killed is she to have exactly the same terms?

Viscount CRANBORNE: I do not believe that that was at all the intention of the League of Nations. The terms were to be the basis of a just and fair settlement. It was never the intention of the League necessarily to punish the aggressor. The object of the League is to restrain the aggressor from her aggressions—if it succeeds in doing that by an exchange of territory to the advantage of both sides all will be satisfied. The reform of the League has been mentioned. The Covenant, it is suggested, is ineffective and must be strengthened. I understood my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) to say that he took the Foreign Secretary to say that he was not in favour of any reform of the Covenant now or ever. That is not what he said. What he said was that he was not in favour of it now. Personally I think that is at is the opinion of most people in the House. I do not agree that the Covenant is an ineffective instrument; I think that it is a most admirable document for the purpose for which it was framed. If it does not do all that it was meant to do that is because all the nations are no; members of the League, so that the League must to a certain extent be limited; but that is no reason for not supportirg it. What is the alternative? Neither in this Debate nor anywhere else has anybody put up a satisfactory alternative.
There are those who, even now, still hanker after isolation. But until somebody can find a method of detaching this island from its foundations and towing it away to a less vulnerable position it seems to me that the policy of isolation is the policy of an ostrich. But, even if that could be done, we would not get away from one great. factor of international affairs, the inter-dependability of nations. Neither is it true that a policy of alliances or a policy of the balance of power would save us. Already that has brought us to the greatest catastrophe in the history of the world. Lastly—and this is the supreme reason for not making any attempt to mitigate our obligations under Covenant, as I understand the right hon. Member for


Sparkbrook would have us do—we are under the most solemn obligation to support the Covenant and what it stands for. We are pledged to support collective security, and that is the basis of peace in the world to-day. The fact that Great Britain's word is her bond is the main basis on which peace and security in Europe rests. One has only to go to Geneva to see this.
No one would deny that the outlook is sombre. Peace for its own sake, as we thought after the War might be the case for a generation, has given place to a feeling of restlessness and insecurity. We alone here in England stand like a rock among shifting sands, and it should be our prime purpose to make that rock as strong and as stable as we can. To my mind that is the supreme, and some people might say the only, justification for a reconsideration of our armaments, which the House will so soon discuss. This is no time to talk of rearmament—there will be a discussion on that subject before long—but perhaps I might be allowed to say one word, not from the angle of national defence, but from the angle of the League and of foreign policy. One is sometimes a little bewildered by the action of a certain section of public opinion on this question. They like the policy of collective security. Indeed, they very often consider that the Government do not go far enough. I understood the hon. Member for Kingswinford to say he thought the Government were afraid for some reason to take risks. He thought we should have gone further. Yet they seem unwilling to make the contribution which alone can make that policy effective.
Very often during the last few years, since I have been in the House, I have heard debates here on questions of domestic policy, and the principle has been enunciated, not only by hon. Members opposite but by hon. Members on this side of the House too, that the rich should pay more towards the services of the community than the poor. In fact, as we all know, they do pay on a different scale, and I think that is quite right, and that we all think it is quite right. For one thing, they can better afford to pay, and, secondly, they have what may be called a larger stake in the country and even more interest in its stability than other people. I would put this point before the House: In this question of

collective security, we in England are all, hon. Members opposite just as much as hon. Members on this side, in the position of the rich. This country is economically and financially far stronger than any other member of the League, and it has far more widespread interests; and we must make a proportionate contribution to collective security if the system is to be worked at all.
Hon. Members opposite, or some of them, may say that they do not feel so rich. The rich never feel so rich as other people think them, and actually the rich do have certain special interests. I do not mean merely their expenditure upon whatever it may be—Rolls Royces or champagne—I mean special interests in maintaining their estates, their private charity, and so on, but very often those interests have to be subordinated to the interests of the community as a whole, and I think that is natural and right. It is exactly the same with nations. If we want this system of collective security to work at all, we must make an adequate contribution; otherwise, warn hon. Members opposite that the system will collapse, and we and everybody else will be buried in the ruins. I believe most fundamentally, and I hope that everybody in the House believes, that if we now support the League with all our might and strength, we shall emerge triumphant from the present dangers, and not only that, but that there is a very fair chance that those dangers will never come to a head at all. But if we do not support the League, if we try to honour our obligations on the cheap, there is nothing ahead of us but catastrophe and disaster.

9.38 p.m.

Mr. McGOVERN: I have listened to this Debate and to a considerable number of speeches, both from the Government and their supporters and from the Opposition, and I declare that I am left thoroughly bewildered as to what the real aim of the discussion was to-day. We started off by the Press in the. country informing us that there was going to be an attack from the Opposition benches on the Government, and that the Government would reply and would state their attitude on the question of oil sanctions. I must confess that I listened to the speech of the Foreign Secretary and that I thought a nine-year-old schoolboy could have made a better speech. We are told that in journalism


there is what is called paste and scissor journalism. I think the right hon. Gentleman is a typewriter and foolscap politician. He came down to this House with a series of Government statements, which he read to the House, all concealed in language such as we might expect from the Lord President of the Council, and I think he attempted to prevent this House and the country getting to know what the mind of the Government was in connection with oil sanctions. As the representative in this House of a, working-class division, I really want to know now what the Government's attitude is to the question of oil sanctions.
They started off on a high moral and lofty tone at Geneva, with the declaration of the late Foreign Secretary that we were going to stand by Abyssinia and see that she did not suffer as a result of the attacks of the hordes of Mussolini, but they have gradually retreated from that position until to-day there is suspicion in this country, and questions are being asked in every part of the land as to where the Government stand in connection both with the League of Nations and the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. The hon. Member for Romford (Mr. Parker) said during the Debate that we had led Abyssinia into the war, making her believe that she would have the assistance of this country and the League of Nations. I saw a declaration by the Emperor during the early moments of the war to the effect that he had faith in the British Empire and in God, or in God and the British Empire. Well, at least one of these has failed him in connection with this military expedition, and while I disagree entirely with placing armed forces of any kind either at the disposal of the League or in combat with the workers of Italy, I could have admired a policy at least of decision from the Government's point of view, if, after having led the Emperor and the Abyssinian people into the war, they had placed a force at their disposal, but they did not do that.
I think I am a most unpractical man in a very practical House. Hon. Members here are all full of practical suggestions as to how this war should be brought to a termination successful to Abyssinia, and others are concerned in case Mussolini should be let down. In a

capitalist war, I am not concerned as to the practical suggestions how to take Mussolini or the Imperialists of this country out of the difficulties in which they find themselves. I have always believed that the League of Nations was just what it is to-day. I say to the Labour Opposition when they demand the application of oil sanctions, or, rather, I should not say the Labour Opposition, but a few Members of the Labour party, because it is noticeable that to-day the voice of Labour in Sco:land has not been heard in this Debate. There is no member of the Labour party in Scotland who. dared to go out in the General Election and stand for a policy of the application. of sanctions. That voice is silent.
The right hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Lees-Smith) and the right hon. Gentleman who concluded the speeches for the Opposition speak for leaders outside this House, but for the rank and file of the Labour party they do not speak at all. The real leaders of the Labour party are those who have been put on to the back benches because they dared to declare a policy of working-class action towards this war, and they have been pushed into the background, while the militaristic section of the Labour party assert themselves. They declare for oil sanctions. I believe that oil sanctions mean war, but they declare that oil sanctions mean peace. Let us take both points of view. At. least they will admit that the application of oil sanctions is a gamble as to whether it will extend the war or lead to peace. If it is a gamble, and the gamble results in this country being forced into war, where do the leaders of the Labour party stand in relation to that? If war takes place, will they don a uniform or take up a rifle, or will their conscientious objections be uppermost when war comes?
I have never been a conscientious objector. I am not a pacifist. I believe that a time could come in working-class history when even the use of force might be required to assert the needs of the working class. But I would never attempt to gamble with the lives of other people, and I would never declare for a policy that I did rot intend to pursue with my own physical power. Therefore I ask, where does the hon. Member for Seaham (Mr. Shinwell) stand? Where does the right Lon. Gentleman the Member for West; Stirlingshire (Mr.


Johnston) stand? Where does the hon. Member for Rotherhithe (Mr. B. Smith) stand? Where is the voice of those Members in the Labour party? Is it stifled? Are they afraid to assert in this House the principles which they have asserted in the country, and which they refused to put before the electors at election time? I say that the policy from that bench is not a working-class policy, it is not a policy endorsed and embraced by the rank and file of the Labour party —the trade unions and the co-operative movement—but is a policy foisted upon them by the elderly statesmen of the Trades Union Congress, who know that they are safe in their own positions and that their own hides are out of the risks of actual warfare.
We are told that it will restrain Mussolini; but might it not, if Mussolini embarked upon or was embroiled in a war with Great Britain, give Hitler the opportunity he seeks to enlarge his boundaries, to acquire new territory Might it not give Japan greater opportunities than she possessed previously Might it not give the armed forces in every country the opportunity to cross their frontiers and deluge the world with blood We regret the Italo-Abyssinian dispute; we regret the fact that war is taking place; but we say that the policy of statesmanship and working-class leadership in this country is not to seek to extend and enlarge that war, but to bring it to the earliest possible close, with the smallest shedding of blood that is possible.
One hon. Member said that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Spark-brook (Mr. Amery) had declared for an isolationist policy. I have nothing in common with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sparkbrook in his policy in politics as far as the capitalist system is concerned, but I say that I would rather have his policy of isolation than the policy of pretence that has been put forward in connection with the League of Nations throughout the world. I am a Socialist. I am opposed to the Government Front Bench, Liberal, so-called Labour, and Conservative. I would not trust them in any working-class dispute or working-class activity as being other than prejudiced against the workers of the country. When I am talked to with regard to the League of Nations and

collective security, there is the League of Nations on that bench. They come from every country in the capitalist world and they congregate round a table at Geneva; and I am expected by so-called Labour leaders to trust these men, whom, in national politics, I would never dream of trusting. I say that the League of Nations has been a sham and a delusion. It has led Abyssinia into the shambles. Instead of Abyssinia being told at the outset to make the best terms she could with Mussolini because we did not intend to support her—that if she went to war she would require to fight that war out, to depend on the ability of her chiefs and of her rank and file, because Britain and the League could do nothing for her, she has been led into this, and thousands upon thousands of Abyssinians are being slaughtered, and Italian workers are also being slaughtered. I place the onus of a large amount of this war on the Government Front Bench, who went out with their high moral declarations that they would apply sanctions in the most ruthless way.
Of those who tell us that there is no prospect of war if oil sanctions are applied, I would ask this question: Where do they get the idea that Mussolini is just going to say to the British nation, "Yes, we were all wrong; after this costly warfare in life, in munitions, in finance, we will withdraw our troops and go back to Italy, a defeated horde, and admit to the Italian people that we were wrong?" If I were in Mussolini's position I should feel compelled by the force of the circumstances around me to make a last bid to save my face, even at the expense of going to war with Britain. Sanctions were applied to Germany for over four years, and the Central Powers were not brought to their knees in that time, with a world against them more completely than Mussolini will ever have it against them.
One Member who spoke from the Opposition benches said that we should appeal to the best elements in America—that we should appeal to those who do not put a few dollars for oil first, but who put high principles first. I have never known the people on that bench to go into a labour dispute and say, for instance, to the coalowners, "We appeal to your high principles, we appeal to you not to think of a few pounds for coal, but to think of the suffering men in the


mines." I say that American capitalism, with its gangsterism, its Tammany Hall, is just as susceptible to the desire for dollars as this country and its capitalist system is to filthy lucre in the shape of pounds or sovereigns. I cannot accept that idea at all. Here is a cutting from a Glasgow paper. I would like to know whether there is any truth in the following statement, which was made in the "Glasgow Evening Times" of Saturday. It is headed:
British Fleet Threatened.
United States Congressman's Revelation.
Explosive Planes from Rome.
The speaker was Mr. M'Swain, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. He said:
'The British Navy made a gesture that it was going to stop Italian transports going through the Suez Canal,' Mr. M'Swain declared. But when the Italian Government announced that 125 pilots had pledged themselves to fly high explosive planes into the ships, the Mediterranean Fleet scattered to the remote regions of that sea?
Whether that statement is true or is an invention, I can quite conceive circumstances of that kind arising. I myself, if I were an Italian capitalist patriot and believed in the war that Mussolini is conducting, believe I should be prepared to take action of that kind against the enemies of my country as represented by Britain. Therefore it is not inconceivable that men are prepared to do and die in the most desperate fashion, as we saw them in the late War on behalf of this country. I myself was opposed to the War.
I will have no part or lot in the application of any sanctions against Italy which will lead to war, because we examine it from this point of view. We are not going to war, because we do not believe in capitalist war and, not going ourselves, we are not prepared, in the House or in the country, to declare for a policy which will lead the youth of the nation on to the battlefield and into death. If the young men of the Labour party believe in that policy, they should join the Army, Navy and Air Force now. They should be there in advance as trained men to take their part. If that policy of the application of oil sanctions is correct, the military Estimates to follow this are logical and ought to be supported by the Labour party because, if collective security is their point of view

and they believe that the Army, Navy and Air Force should be placed at the disposal of the League of Nations, it ought to be a good mechanised army, it ought to be an efficient Air Force and it ought to be a 1936 Navy to take the waters in case of any danger. We say as Socialists, who may he termed outlaws in this House as far as opinion is concerned, in general affairs we can conceive inside the nation of two classes, the working class and the ruling class. In the international field there are differences between the ruling class, but the working class of every nation has only one enemy, the ruling class within its shores. Their job is to conduct their hostile propaganda against the ruling class. If the ruling class get into difficulties, it is our duty to take advantage of those difficulties in order to attempt to overthrow the decaying, disorderly system of capitalism and put a real civilisation in its place.
We cannot advance this policy of sanctions. We condemn it. We will stand on any platform and debate with any Member of the Front Opposition Bench. They are afraid to go to the country and propagate that policy on the platform because they know it would not secure endorsement. When I am told of Hitlerism and Mussolini, I see no difference in capitalism in any part of the world. Hitlerism is simply capitalism in a greater state of decay than you have it in Britain. You have a ootential Hitlerism in this country if your capitalist system collapses. If it collapsed, and there was no real working class lead, it would be Fascism for sure, because there would be no effective voice in f le country to stem the tide against Fascism. When the ruling class, like Mussolini, decide to embark on their campaign it is similar to the beasts in the jungle being driven by the decay of their system to expand their frontiers and to seek new markets in a world crumbling to its foundations. I am told that the beast oil the jungle in its dying moments is more ferocious than at any period of its history. Therefore Mussolini and Hitler, like the beasts of the jungle, ferociously attack everything within their limits in order to prop up their power of capitalism. We may be a small party—only four in the House—but we speak with a more certain voice on working-class doctrines than the larger Labour party. We speak the voice of


the people, and the voice of the people is, No sanctions, no war, down with capitalism and up with the working class.

10.1 p.m.

Mr. MACMILLAN: I hope the significance of this new coalition has not been lost upon the House: We have had a very interesting and important Debate and it has ended typically in a coalition between two forms of anarchic view, the revolutionary and the reactionary. The hon. Member would find a considerable body of support in much of what he has said among the most reactionary elements of the House, but among the more moderate and more reasonable part of the House I believe the Debate has shown that the House, like the country, stands behind the Government in the policy of supporting the League and only asks of the Government that it should give continued and growing strength to its support of the League. It is true that anarchists, whether revolutionary or reactionary, stand to gain from disorder, but in these terrible days, when the minds of people in every part of the country are deeply concerned with the trend of foreign affairs, I believe this Debate will have shown, what is far more important than the views of extremist sections either of the Right or of the Left, that the House as a whole stands behind the Government in its support of the League. The House as a whole only fears that the Government will not be powerful enough in the support of the principles to which it has put its hands.
The hon. Member who has just spoken ended with some very good similes about the beasts of the jungle. In this great Debate the question at stake is whether the law of the jungle is to remain the permanent law of the world or whether in some way those moderate and reasonable people within the nation, and those reasonable nations within the whole community of nations, can make their power felt or whether we are all to fall victims, either in national or in international affairs, to the revolutionaries on either side. I trust that the Debate will show to the country and the House the great mass of opinion that stands behind the Government and asks only for a continuance and a strengthening of the policy which the Government have taken on these matters.

10.5 p.m.

Mr. WISE: Nothing could have got me to my feet at this hour except the speech of the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Macmillan), and I think that I am performing a duty to a large number of Members who think as I do in not allowing to go unchallenged so monstrous a travesty of the opinion of this Committee as that which the hon. Member has just given. It is true that we may be effecting a strange coalition —the extreme left and the extreme right. It has happened before now, and I suggest to the House that there is a possible reason for that—that the extreme left and the extreme right are the only parties which, in fact, care for the lives of the people they have to govern. I suggest further to the Committee that our coalition is a more honourable and a more patriotic one than the coalition of the hon. Member with the benches immediately on his right. It is this policy which many of us, with the hon. Member for Shettleston (Mr. McGovern), view with considerable apprehension. We want to know whither we are going. To-night we are not being told. We know the danger which we are being compelled to face in Europe. We know the danger of the commitment under the Covenant, with the possibility of our forces being dispersed in the far corners of the world when they are most needed at one particular point. We are shortly going to adopt the extra expenditure which that dispersal has occasioned, and we can see from this wonderful example of the enforcement of the sanctions to-day how open the road has been left to those forces which are threatening Western civilisation now.
Suppose that the Italo-Abyssinian war had taken place in three years' time, when Germany rearmament is complete, what would the position of Western Europe have been if the British Fleet had been immobilised on the Suez Canal, one of the dangers which we have to fear? We have driven Italy out of the possible adventures of the West against the barbarian who is still rampant in the centre of Europe. In the place of Italy we have drawn in the doubtful allegiance and possibly the doubtful military value of Russia. It was hailed as a great triumph when Russia came into the League. There are some of us who feel that it was very nearly the death-blow of


the League of Nations, and that it is possible that one day the Governments of Germany and of Russia may wake up and find that their system of government is identically the same, that the methods by which they administer are very little different, and that the difference between the concentration camp and the labour camp is one of geography. When that realisation comes, the West will be completely on the defensive against the anti-religion which is spreading over all countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
When that time comes we shall have to fall back on those friends which are left to us, in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Scandinavia. We shall need all the strength which we can put into the field to hold that strip against the forces which will be brought against it. It is idle to think that the present system of collective security will provide any defence for that Western system. Nobody who has visited Central Europe can possibly say that there is the slightest chance of any of those nations going to war to defend Schlesweig-Holstein, if Germany wishes to take it, and there is very little chance of any of the Western nations going to war to save Czechoslovakia and the sooner we face this fact the better. We have to realise that, in the fight between light and darkness, light is the frontier which has to be defended by everything at our disposal, and that the only free nations in the world are the nations which we have to defend. Later on it may be that the example of those free nations may be so desirable that their systems of government may spread even into the dark places of the earth. The time is not yet, and the time for a dispersal of our forces is not yet. I submit that at all costs not one soldier or one ship should be committed to anything except the defence of our own shores and of Western civilisation.

10.1 p.m.

Mr. GALLACHER: I am going to take only a few minutes of the time of the House, but in view of the fact that there has been so much mention made of the working class I want to declare that the working class of this country is absolutely opposed to Italy being supplied with guns, bombs, poison gas, or with any kind of weapon that would enable her to destroy the people of Abyssinia. I declare here that the Government are not

prepared to operate the policy of sanctions. I heard the predecessor of the present Foreign Secretary say in this House that he was oppressed by a great fear—the fear of war in Europe. There is not one of you oppressed by a great fear of a war in Europe. You are oppressed by the great fear that Italy will be defeated and that Fascism and Italy and reaction in Europe. will be overthrown. There is no coalition between any revolutionary and the reactionaries of the right.

Mr. STEPHEN: Hear, hear!

Mr. GALLACHER: But you are not on our side at the present moment. I want to declare in the name of the working class of this country that I will go to any section of working-class people, to any trade union in this country, or to any body of co-operators, I will go anywhere, to any industrial district, and get support for the proposition "Stop the flow of oil, and you will stop the flow of blood." What are we told? Apply oil sanctions and Mussolini will become desperate and start a war in Europe. Are we children? [Interruption.] Some of you have come into the wrong place; the infant class is somewhere else. It is said "Stop the supply of oil and it will become impossible for Mussolini to carry on the war in Abyssinia." When it becomes impossible for Mussolini to carry on the war in Abyssinia, he will become so desperate that he will start a war in Europe. I take my stand with hon. and right hon. Members on these benches in demanding that the Government take their stand by the League of Nations for collective peace and security. Let the Foreign Secretary tell us whether, if 50 nations are pledged to peace and security, hon. Members will need more armaments or can they do with less? If you have 50 nations, with Britain, France, Russia, and all the other nations united genuinely and honestly for peace—[interruption.] If you want to play the fool please do so in your own house. You know the advice which was given to Polonius. There are a whole bunch of Poloniuses sitting over there.
Fifty nations, with Britain, France and Russia at the centre, and all the other nations of the League gathered along with them, have sufficient financial and economic power to make it impossible for Germany, Japan or Italy, or


any other country, to start or carry on an aggressive war. It is Britain that is holding them back. Let the Foreign Secretary face up to the situation. If he would declare that Britain is for uniting the other nations of Europe in the collective peace system and for reducing the necessity of increasing armaments he would be doing the greatest service to the people of this country and a great service to humanity. I stand along with; hon. and right hon. Members on these benches in demanding that the Government should end the double game that it is playing and play a single game for the League of Nations and collective security.

Captain MARGESSON: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY.

Considered in Committee.

[Captain BOURNE in the Chair.]

NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1935

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That an additional number, not exceeding 3,500 Officers, Seamen, Boys and Royal Marines, be employed for the Sea Service, borne on the books of His Majesty's Ships, at the Royal Marine Divisions and at Royal Air Force Establishments for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936, beyond the number already provided in the Navy Estimates for the year.

10.16 p.m.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Lord Stanley): The time has now come to leave the wide open spaces of a general debate on foreign affairs for what my right hon. Friend has called the narrow confinement of a Supplementary Estimate. We have had a very full debate, in which some hon. and right hon. Members have presented the views of their parties, others represented the views of a small group and others represented the views of nobody but themselves. As a result of having had this general debate we feel that the confinement to a detailed Supplementary Estimate is not very irksome and we are ready to get down to the financial details which follow upon our foreign policy. Nor do I think that the

Debate on the details need be of a very protracted nature, because the expenditure—

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: I think the Noble Lord is anticipating the Main Supplementary Estimate. We are on Vote A, which is strictly limited to the number of men.

Lord STANLEY: I thought that in the preliminary remarks I might explain to the Committee the reason why we want this extra number of men.

Mr. A. V. ALEXANDER: On a point of Order. We are starting this Naval Debate at a very late hour, and I agree with the Noble Lord that we do not want to make it unnecessarily protracted. Therefore, I wonder whether in the circumstances you would allow us to have a general discussion upon the whole of the items in the Supplementary Estimates in order that the representative of the Admiralty may reply upon the whole of the discussion, and then the votes can be taken.

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: If that is the general wish of the Committee I should be perfectly willing to agree to that course, but it must be understood that if there is a general discussion on Vote A there must not be repetition when I put the Financial Supplementary Estimate.

Lord STANLEY: I thank you for the permission that you have given, and I thank the right hon. Gentleman opposite for the assistance he has given to me, because the arguments for this increase in numbers and for the additional expenditure which arises on the subsequent Estimate are exactly the same.

Mr. STEPHEN: An opportunity, I take it, will be given to vote against each of the Votes?

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: Obviously, as each Vote must be put separately.

Lord STANLEY: As I was saying, there need be no prolonged discussion because many of the contents of the Supplementary Estimate have been foreshadowed by official pronouncements and others have been the subject of intelligent anticipation. If hon. Members will turn to the Paper they will find the Estimate set out in some detail, and perhaps it will be more convenient if I base my


explanation of them on the explanatory memorandum. The expenditure falls under four heads. The first head calls for no comment at all. It merely carries out the decision of the Government to restore the remainder of the cuts in pay, at a cost to the Navy Vote of £354,500. This will, I am sure, meet with the approval of the Committee. It proves, if any proof is necessary, the successful work done by the National Government in the last Parliament. The fourth item does not need much explanation. It refers to an expenditure of £100,000 on normal services, and is due mainly to a greater punctuality in executing orders than had been anticipated. Anyone who knows anything about Estimates knows that there are bound to be variations in a Vote of this size, and when the total of the Navy Estimates is £60.000,000 hon. Members will agree that the margin of error has not been very great.
Now I come to the first item of real importance, the additional destroyer flotilla. In December I informed the House that we intended to ask for the money to discharge this item, and, therefore, the Committee may perhaps like a short explanation as to the reason for the change in policy. In accordance with Admiralty policy of a steady replacement of over-age tonnage the original naval construction programme for 1935 contained a provision for one flotilla of destroyers which was intended to be a repeat order of the 1934 type—namely, destroyers of 1,350 tons. The Admiralty, however, viewed with concern the building of large destroyers by foreign nations and have had under review the desirability of building corresponding vessels for ourselves. The position today is that France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States have all got destroyers ranging from 1,600 tons to over 2,000 tons, the latter of which arc approaching the Cruiser Category.
In view of these figures, it was decided that the 1935 programme should be amended to enable a start to be made in building destroyers of a larger type. It was then decided to limit the number of the new destroyers to seven, which would have made the cost exactly the same, the cost of the seven larger destroyers being the same as the cost of nine of the smaller type. That decision was taken too late for the Estimates

which were presented to Parliament in the Autumn. It was therefore intended to announce this amended programme later in the year, but when, in the Autumn it was decided that the rate of destroyer construction was to be expedited, the designs of the new large type were not ready, and it was thought that the most effective way of hastening the 1935 programme was to place a repeat order for the nine vessels of the same class as in the 1934 programme which had been originally provided.
In this Supplementary Estimate we are now asking for the money to build, in addition, seven vessels of the larger type. These destroyers will be known as the "Tribal" class. Usually no information is given with regard to the size and displacement of vessels until the keel is actually laid, but this is an exceptional case, and I see no reason why the Committee should not know that their displacement is to be 1.850 tons. This, as the Committee know, is in strict conformity with the terms of the London Naval Treaty. It is not the present intention to build any large number of these larger destroyers, and the number will be kept strictly within the terms of that treaty.
We then come to the second item, which is one of the greatest interest to the Committee and the country at the present moment. We are not concerned now with the reasons for the altered disposition of the Fleet. That was discussed during the general Debate, and I think the reasons were given at some length by my Noble Friend who wound up the discussion. We are now discussing the cost which has to be met on account of the altered disposition of the Fleet and various contingent measures. These changes entailed, first of all, a very considerable burden on our existing drafting arrangements, and we are tonight seeking authority to increase the number of Vote A by 3,500 men. This includes 350 officers. The men are being obtained in the main by the voluntary continuance in the service of men who would otherwise have been discharged on completion of engagements, by the entry of men who have recently left on discharge with a pension or on completion of engagements, by men from the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and by the recruitment of a certain number of Maltese


and Somalis. These men have been engaged for periods varying from one to five years, and it was not felt to be justified that they should be asked to abandon their civil careers without a guarantee of at least one year's naval employment. It is, however, no disadvantage to us that some of these entries may remain in the Fleet after the emergency passes. After the beginning of the financial year 1936, they will be included in the normal provision for the Fleet, resulting in the postponement of the entry of a corresponding number of recruits. It also gives the Fleet advantage of having a higher proportion of highly-trained ratings and of placing the strain of expanding numbers more gradually on the training establishments.
The present position of the Fleet in the Mediterranean has also necessitated a limited number of auxiliary vessels for local defence duties. We have, therefore, purchased 20 trawlers and commissioned them as ships of the Royal Navy. The new trawlers will serve as replacement for older trawlers, now under strength, and two trawlers of the normal 1935 building programme have accordingly been cancelled. These trawlers, I should like to assure the Committee, represent no ultimate increase of naval expenditure but merely anticipate a programme which would otherwise have been spread over a number of years. The Committee will be able to see for themselves that other measures have been taken, within the scope of this Estimate, to ensure the adequate defence of the Fleet in the Mediterranean. It will also be seen that reference is made in the explanatory memorandum to the purchase of six motor torpedo boats. These are of the description, colloquially known as mosquito craft which were of considerable use during the War. It was felt that, if we were to be abreast of modern developments in these fast motor boats, some of the new type should be procured for experimental purposes. Accordingly, a trial order has been placed for six of these motor torpedo boats.
There are, I think, only two other points to which I need call the attention of the Committee. The first is the revised statement dealing with the programme of shipbuilding which will be found on page 11. It will be seen that there has been a very considerable increase in the

Cost of this programme. This is in view of the additions to the 1935 new construction programme which I have just recapitulated, earlier placings of orders for the 1935 destroyers, and the slight acceleration of existing programmes. I should like to make it clear to the Committee that this entails no addition to the total sum to be spent on this programme which has already been approved by the House. It simply means that a larger proportion of the payment falls due during the current year and it will also affect the Estimates for 1936, but it will make no difference at all to the ultimate cost and the amount which the taxpayer has to find.
Lastly, having in view the necessity of making good the deficiencies both in personnel and material, early steps had to be taken to secure land and start on the necessary building, so that we should get the full advantage from any innovation which we may make in the Estimates to be presented this year. As will be seen from the list of new works to be found on page 8 a considerable number of new works has been started that had not been anticipated when the original Estimates were presented. Most important is the start that has been made of an anti-air-craft gunnery training establishment at Portsmouth. That had been carried on before in conjunction with the ordinary gunnery establishment, but it was felt that the time had arrived when it ought to have an establishment of its own where a longer and more concentrated training could be given. It also excludes an extension at Alexandria in Dumbartonshire to the Royal Naval Torpedo Works, which is a necessary extension also of existing training establishment. That, I think, deals with all the salient points of the Supplementary Estimates.
In conclusion I would only say again that only a comparatively small portion of the total asked for represents expenditure which serves exclusively the special needs of the moment. The major part of it is in anticipation of future programmes and does not represent an actual increase in the total amount which would in any case have to be spent on the Navy in the near future. As regards that part of the money for which we ask in this Estimate, which depends on the action which His Majesty's Government have taken during the past year, I feel that the Committee is in agreement that that


action was right, that the movement of the Fleet was justified. If that be so we ought to take, and will rightly take, every precaution to look after our lives and property in the shape of our ships and of our personnel. If the Committee feel that that action was right, then the Estimates which we are now presenting should, as a logical conclusion, be passed without a Division.

10.38 p.m.

Mr. ALEXANDER: I beg to move to reduce the Vote by 100 men.
We are indebted to the Noble Lord for two things: first, for his quiet and calm exposition of his Supplementary Estimate; and, second, for so kindly and tacitly admitting at the conclusion of his speech that in fact there is very little in this Supplementary Estimate which is attached to the special measures and dispositions in regard to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, and that most of the expenditure is, indeed, and in fact an expansion of naval expenditure and provision. The Noble Lord shakes his head. but I was careful to note what he said on that point, because, if he had not said it, I was going to put him a series of questions as to, how certain items in this Estimate came to be there, if they were really to be included in that large sum at the foot of page 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which puts the special measures down to the sum of £4,392,000.

Lord STANLEY: The reason I did not give details is that obviously it would be wrong to make public the precautions which we have taken in the Mediterranean, and which do account for the great majority of the expenditure in this Vote.

Mr. ALEXANDER: If that is the revised position of the Noble Lord I am afraid I shall have to put these specific questions which I had prepared. Having regard to the paucity of the answers made to my right hon. Friend on this bench in the previous Debate, and having regard to the nature of this Estimate, we are entitled to say that the Noble Lord should tell us exactly from what date the special measures in the Mediterranean were necessary. Of course, I do not ask for confidential information as to the dispositions of the Fleet, I do not at all suggest we want information on that,

but I want to know from what date the actual provision of this special expenditure came to be incurred. I have a recollection that on 17th December the Prime Minister referred to the movements in the Mediterranean as being part of the normal cruising operations of the Fleet. That being so, is 17th December the date on which the special expenditure in the Mediterranean began to be necessary? If we could not get that answer out of either the Foreign Secretary or the Under-Secretary, at least we ought to expect it from the Minister responsible for this Estimate. I shall be prepared to sit down if the Noble Lord will give the information. It might save some debate. He is not prepared to do it at the moment, I gather, but will do it later. But we are not going to let the Government get away from this point —when the special measures became necessary and the amount of expenditure due to the special measures.
That leads me to deal with the financial aspect of the whole thing. If we look at the summary in the White Paper we see that in consequence of these Supplementary Estimates the gross total required for naval provision in the financial year up to 31st March, 1936, is no less than £67,915,000. There are appropriations-in-aid of about £3,000,000, which bring the total down to £64,900,000—in round figures £65,000.000. That is the largest expenditure on naval provision at any time in the last 14 years. My right hon. Friend, on the many occasions on which he has addressed the House in the last few months on the policy of collective security, was entitled, I think, to point to the dualism of the policy of the National Government. The Government are trying to make the best of both worlds. They want a very large addition to naval expenditure, this figure representing an increase of more than £14,000,000 compared with 1931, but on the other hand they are not prepared to give us in return the exercise of effective League sanctions against the aggressor. And yet they come here to-night for an additional £5,000,000 as though it were necessary for them to take action on behalf of the League. We cannot get any effective action out of this Government on behalf of the League, but they still ask for this huge increase in naval expenditure. On that ground we are entitled to challenge the policy of the


Government, and to move a reduction of the Vote in order to call attention to the dualism of the Government.
Now a word or two about the general effect upon the finances. It is very interesting and satisfactory that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be present at this Debate. We all have a great deal of sympathy with him in his financial worries on this matter. It does not require any party colour to be sympathetic, because he must have a very difficult situation to face. We are asked to spend £65,000,000 on. the Navy. We are to spend, I gather, over £30,000,000 on the Air Force. I have not the exact figure. We are to spend rather more than the usual amount on the Army and, by the time the Supplementary Estimates are through this year, this country will have been asked to provide for the three fighting Services very little short of £140,000,000. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will correct me if I am wrong.
I would point out to some hon. Members on the other side who were hilarious just now that no person cam. look upon this situation in the light of the financial position of the country without being seriously perturbed. Look at it how you will, we are being asked to approve in anticipation an expansion of the armaments programme costing more and more money. We are, in other words, leading an armaments race from to-night. This is the first big Vote you take, and you are doing it at a time when the country owes on its National Debt £8,000,000,000. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall) built up a similar case when speaking on the Naval Estimates, last March I think it was.
We are opening up this armaments race in a vastly different position from that in which we were opening the armaments race in 1907–08. We are starting with Income Tax not at one shilling in the £ but at 4s. 6d., and with total taxation coming to the Chancellor of the Exchequer from Customs and Excise Duties not of 70,000,000 as in 1909, but of £304,000,000. Here is a position in which you do not have a Government owing not a penny to any foreign Government, but with a Government owing over. £900,000,000 to the United States. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the great supporter of orthodox finance, is making

no move to pay America, but cleverly, not repudiating the debt, he leaves it for his successor to meet.

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: I cannot help thinking that the argument which the right hon. Gentleman is presenting would be more suitable to a Debate upon the subject of Defence. We are debating Supplementary Estimates and the Debate on them is necessarily rather restrictive.

Mr. ALEXANDER: I should always be unhappy to depart at any great length from your Ruling, Captain Bourne, but the Noble Lord submitted to us a White Paper on which he is not only asking for £5,000,000 to-night, but on which he drew attention to the fact that the Estimates would cost £65,000,000, and making the announcement he said that this was, in effect, an anticipation of expenditure. Surely we are entitled to call attention to what are the logical results of that which he has put before us. If we are to judge the financial situation by the standards of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, you are beginning to-night a rake's progress to national bankruptcy as certain as you are here.

Sir RONALD ROSS: You ought to know.

Mr. ALEXANDER: The hon. Gentleman can very well talk, but he would be among the Members who would refuse us £3,000,000 in order to provide milk for school children.

Sir R. ROSS: I think that the right hon. Gentleman makes a mistake. Milk for school children is not an affair which is considered over here at all. It is considered there on his benches. It is an old taunt. Why the right hon. Gentleman should attack me I do not know. Perhaps he feels that he has hit himself, and so has to say something nasty.

Mr. ALEXANDER: When a little extra money is needed for social provision, the hon. Member and his Friends will not be found in the Lobby in support of it. Surely we are entitled to call attention to what is likely to be the financial result on the country as a whole of the expenditure outlined here? We are asked to vote this instalment of expansion, and yet there has been not a single word


yet from the Government as to any reasonable co-ordination of the defence Services.

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: I think that that matter must await the general debate.

Mr. ALEXANDER: I bow to your Ruling, but I shall make careful note to raise it on a subsequent occasion. In spite of the last words of the Noble Lord, an analysis of this White Paper shows clearly that it is, as he rather innocently let out in his first remark, an anticipation of a wide expansion programme. Let us take Vote A. He is asking us to approve an extension of the personnel of the Fleet by something like 3,500. He would ask us to believe that that is in the main necessary in order to keep on certain men who want. to stay on, and to help in the special measures that have been taken. But that does not square with the statements that were made on behalf of the Admiralty during the course of the debates on the main Estimates last year. Do not forget that these 3,500 men are a superimposed addition on an addition of 2,000 that took place last March. There were hon. Members supporting the Government who thought that an addition of 2,000 did not go far enough. They said that it was not enough. Let us see what the Civil Lord of the Admiralty at the time said:
This increase will make the mobility of the Fleet perfectly satisfactory. Further, what in described as the present concentration n Home waters is in no way due to the fact that we cannot man the ships anywhere else."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th March, 1935; col. 721, Vol. 299.]
So that the Vote of 2,000 additional men last March was to anticipate the immediate manning of the Fleet both at home and abroad. On what ground, therefore, is there a suggestion to-night that we require to expand the Fleet by another 3,500 men because of the special disposition of the Fleet in the Mediterranean? If the Noble Lord were able to demonstrate that the whole or a substantial part of this expenditure were due to special measures, he would have a different case to put to my hon. Friends on these benches. Up to the present we can find no such proof in that direction. If it is expansion, the Noble Lord surely ought to consult the Board of Admiralty again and be frank with the Committee and say that it is expansion, and even

the mirth of the Noble Lord the "Minister for Thought" will not prevent my asking the Government to be quite frank in that respect.
Now I come to the question of the request to the Committee to provide the initial expenditure for the new flotilla of destroyers. The Noble Lord in this case has anticipated to some extent the question I was going to ask. He admits that this is quite a change of policy. I want to ask him, however, whether the actual projection of the building of these seven new destroyers of the larger type is in fact also going to be a permanent enlargement of the aggregate tonnage. He said, quite rightly, that we had pursued a policy of a steady replacement programme. Up to the present we have never had any announcement to show that that replacement programme would be outside the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, where we provided for a maximum provision of 150,000 tons in the destroyer category. The replacement of one flotilla of destroyers and one leader every year during the course of a cycle of 13 years, the Treaty life of a destroyer, would have given at the end of the 13 years a continuous process of ships that would all be either under age or of normal age. It was necessary for us, in order to come into line with the London Naval Treaty, gradually to drop below the total tonnage of destroyers which we had in use in 1930, many of which, of course, were actually over age.
Do I understand that this announcement of the new flotilla of seven destroyers, in addition to the flotilla of nine destroyers ordered last Autumn, means that you are departing from that steady replacement policy and that in fact you are really announcing to-night that you are going to build to a figure larger than the aggregate allowed under the London Naval Treaty? That is a specific question, to which I should like an answer. My reading of the situation is that there is going to be a permanent expansion of the number. The Noble Lord says he is going to build a flotilla of seven destroyers, that they are going to be of a new and larger type to compete with certain classes building abroad, and that they are going to be of 1,850 tons instead of the average of 1,350 to 1,375 tons. Are these seven destroyers going to be the complete flotilla, or are you going to add another destroyer of the line


and a leader as well? You have not told us that, and we should like to know, because if ultimately you are going to have one, two, or three flotillas of this type, it is a type that will be very expensive.
The other thing I think I might ask is, What is to be the armament of these ships? If they are going to be as large as that, are they going to be armed with 4.7 guns, or with 5.5 guns, or what size? We have heard a great deal of talk about the provision by other countries of this destroyer type of ships, which are far more like small cruisers. I have no special complaint to make that you should, if possible, be on a par of efficiency with other types of destroyer building if you will say what the danger is that is to be met, but certainly we are entitled to full and complete information on what we are being asked to provide to-night.
I rather think, however, that we are being asked for a permanent expansion, and that entitles me to say this: In the main the need for going above the normal number of destroyers is the actual provision of submarine attack against us. I think one of the most crass blunders the Government have committed was to whitewash Hitler's breaking of the Versailles Treaty and to give them the power to build up to 45 per cent. of the London Naval Treaty tonnage in submarines, and on their own initiation, if they said the circumstances warranted it, to be able to go actually up to equal tonnage with ourselves. I remember reading, after that, about the immediate reaction on the Naval Affairs Committee of the French Chamber. They immediately expanded their naval commitments, and immediately provided additional ships; and you have facing you to-day a widening additional development of naval building of this character, against which you will, apparently, be forced to provide. The suffering taxpayer is to be asked to pay the piper for the grave and stupid blunders of the Government in this regard. I see some smiles yonder, but I met, while travelling in Europe last summer, representatives of a great many countries, and I found that they all, without exception, were of the view that this was a notable example of perfidious Albion.

Sir R. ROSS: On a point of Order. May I ask your guidance, Captain

Bourne, as to whether, when it comes to our turn, we also shall be permitted to discuss the ethics of the Naval Agreement with Germany, on a Supplementary Estimate?

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: The right hon. Gentleman was speaking pretty far from the Supplementary Estimate. He must keep to the figures that are before the Committee.

Mr. ALEXANDER: If the Admiralty come down here and ask us to provide an additional flotilla of destroyers, absolutely new and additional, surely we are entitled to ask what those destroyers are wanted for?

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: The right hon. Gentleman has gone rather farther than that.

Mr. ALEXANDER: Surely we are entitled to say what has created the circumstances against which the Government now find it necessary to build destroyers; and in that respect I say that our entering into that agreement unilaterally, and going back on our pledges to France, has led to the trouble which now exists, and leaves us almost without a friend in naval affairs on the Continent of Europe to-day.
I turn to one or two details in the Estimate. In paragraph (2) of the explanatory memorandum we are told that the Estimate is in the main for special measures in respect of the action with regard to Italy and Abyssinia. Does the Noble Lord say that Item B of Vote 8, which shows an increase of £670,000 for metals, is a special measure in that connection; or is it actual expansion I think he might tell us. In Section III of Vote 8, there is an actual increase of £700,000 for propelling machinery. Will the Noble Lord say whether that increase is in order to meet special conditions in the Mediterranean? Of course, that is an actual, definite speeding up of the Fleet of an expanded Navy, announced and pushed in the middle of the Government's calling another Naval Conference to discuss disarmament. Well might a writer have said, when that conference was called, that a scroll should have been put over the door:
Abandon hope of Disarmament all ye who enter here.
Item C of this Section—Hulls of Ships, etc—shows an increase of £200,000, and


in contract work alone, taking credit for £5,000 of appropriations-in-aid, there is an increase of £1,397,000. Does the Noble Lord say that that is in respect of special measures in the Mediterranean? I would agree with him at once in regard to Vote 9. We accept that as being specially connected with the special measures. I can well understand, for instance, that, with the economies of previous years, you were probably short of stores of the kind that are described. I should raise no objection in those circumstances to that Vote, because those are actual requirements which might well be needed to expand when we are having to make special arrangements, but apart from that there is no case at all.
I should like to ask a question about motor torpedo boats. What is the item in the Estimate for these boats? I find in section III of contract work a line that speaks of the purchase of ships, but I can find no other reference to them. I should like to know whether this £329,000 is the actual provision for these six motor torpedo boats? Are they the exact type of motor coastal boats that we have provided in the past? Why this change of name to torpedo boats? Are they of the type that we hear stories about on the Continent, with very high speed and naturally discharging torpedoes? If so, are they to take any part of the work formerly done by torpedo flotillas? Is it intended to expand beyond the six mentioned? What is their armament tonnage and cost? We have had a very poor explanation. We should get that information before we come to a decision.
There is an item in Vote 9, dealing with freight, for an increase of £185,000. We have heard a good deal about, roil tonight. There has been a good deal of carrying to and fro of oil in the last few months. Some of the charges for freight, I have no doubt, are concerned with oil. We have had information recently of things that are going on in the case of the running of oil tankers by the Admiralty which, if true, is not at all desirable. We have, for example, information as to the running of an oil tanker—I think the name is the "Delphinia"—from America to Gibraltar with 6,000 tons of oil—her net register is 4,600 tons—crossing the Atlantic, in this stormy weather, being

forced to throw overboard 700 tons to prevent the ship foundering, reaching Gibraltar still with an overload, a plate strained and forced finally to go into dry dock at Cardiff for overhaul and repair. If this story is true, men's lives are being risked in Admiralty service where they never ought to be by the very kind of overloading about which we have been complaining in regard to the merchant service.
We are told that this is going on while the Admiralty have much newer oil tankers available. I am told that you have a much newer tanker now doing regular, continuous service between America and the Far East let out on freight to someone else. We are entitled to an explanation of these facts and to ask whether the sort of conditions which we are informed arose in the case of the "Delphinia" are going to be prevented from arising in the case of the other ships. From the points that we have put to the Government it will be seen that this Vote really is the beginning of an attempt to get a great expansion in naval provisions. During the election, when the Prime Minister was seeking to stampede the country into great new armaments expenditure without giving details as to how they were going to expend it or against whom they were going to arm, I held the view and still hold it, that, so far from the British Navy being weak, being insecure, being unable to fulfil its commitments, the British Navy is the strongest and most powerful—

Mr. LEVY: Rot !

Mr. ALEXANDER: I am very glad to hear that criticism from a. special Conservative supporter of the National Government. I say that it is the largest, most efficient and the most powerful Navy in the world, and if you are really relying upon the statements made by the Foreign Secretary from that bench to-day upon developing the policy of collective security, there is not the slightest need, in concert with the other countries in the League prepared to accept their responsibility in collective security, for a wide and deep expansion of naval armaments at the present time. If you can show that you have actually consulted with the other nations, and that there have been conferences with them showing exactly what naval forces are available, and there


is still a gap to be made up, then any concerned with the implementation of the Covenant of the League will be prepared to consider the circumstances. But up to this moment we have not had a single line in that connection, and until we get that information we must go on voting against the expansion of naval armaments.

11.13 p.m.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I must say that I thought the right hon. Member for Hillsborough (Mr. Alexander) a little unreasonable in the attitude which he took up of general opposition to all naval expenditure mentioned in this Vote, whether it be emergency expenditure or expenditure preparatory to the large expansion programmes which await us in the near future. After all, the Fleet is in the Mediterranean under conditions of very great strain and anxiety. Deep anxiety should be in all our hearts for our sailors and ships, which month after month are remaining there under conditions certainly approximate to those which prevail during a period of strained relations. No one has more urged the use of those forces in this quarter than the body opposite. Only to-day we have heard their strenuous appeals to the Government to proceed upon a course of sanctions in respect of a military commodity, oil, which from other quarters we have learned might precipitate, even at a moment's notice, the bloody explosion of war. That is the position which he invites us to take up and one into which we may be drawn by the workings of the consultations which will be taking place at Geneva. Yet there are sailors and officers and ships in this position, and when a Vote it put down in order to pay for the necessary emergency expenditure—for that is part of the Vote—in order to bring from a state of lamentable peace-time relaxation the Fleet into the thorough conditions of immediate preparedness in which I have every reason to believe it now is, the right hon. Member for Hillsborough who has been First Lord of the Admiralty, gets up and employs a whole catalogue of the old stale arguments which we have heard any time in the last 25 years when the Opposition has had to oppose Navy Estimates. That is a very deplorable exhibition, but from the point of view of those who support the Government I derive much encouragement from it,

because if that is going to be the attitude which the official Opposition is going to adopt in all the critical and anxious years that lie before this Parliament; if there is to be blind, unreasoning opposition to naval expenditure or armament expension, not only for the emergency but in connection with the long programme that will lie before us, I can hardly conceive an issue on which they are going to suffer more condign punishment at the hands of the country.

Mr. ALEXANDER: I admire the right hon. Gentleman's dialectical skill, but his statement is a travesty of my argument, which was put in order to get from the Government a reason for these proposals. Moreover, I pointed out that there are items in Vote 9 for bringing the Fleet up to its proper requirements for its work in the Mediterranean, to which we have no objection.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It must be a great relief to the Committee to learn that the right hon. Gentleman's thaumeturgical harangue was no more than a few discriminating inquiries designed to place the Committee in full possession of the details. I am glad that he has seen the red light which I exhibited to him, and I trust that he will keep himself to more discriminating tone and less to the violence which characterised his speech.
There is a great deal that can be said on this subject, not from the angle from which he has spoken. This expenditure was badly necessary to put the Fleet in a proper position of preparedness, and one was hardly prepared to believe that such measures would be necessary. It certainly appears disquieting that such extraordinary measures were necessary. I am very glad that they have been taken and now that they have been taken and the Fleet is in complete readiness, we can talk about it with some composure. I have heard it said in regard to a number of our large vessels that they were not ready for immediate service when the emergency arose in the Mediterranean. Now, they are, no doubt, ready but, when the Great War broke out, if a large number of our important units had been absent from their places on the general mobilisation, we might not have been here debating these matters so quietly at the present time. The class of criticism which might much more justly


be brought to bear upon the Government is, why was it that there were all these serious gaps? If we could go into details we might see how serious and numerous the gaps were. The criticism that the gaps should not be repaired, that the deficiencies should not be made good, at the earliest possible moment and that the Fleet should remain in a condition of danger, is a criticism which I am sure the Committee will unhesitatingly repulse.

Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCE: If anybody had taken that view, it would be.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I certainly derived that impression from listening to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, and I can quite see the anxiety of the hon. Member to free himself from the indiscretions of his right hon. Friend, a former First Lord of the Admiralty. He knows perfectly well how disastrous such an attitude would be in our forthcoming Debates. Undoubtedly, the party opposite have to make up their minds where they stand about the maintenance of the reasonable defences of this country. I take it as a good augury that in this the preliminary skirmish, in the first challenge we have made, they have already hoisted the white flag. The right hon. Gentleman had the audacity, I had almost said the effrontery, to refer to the London Naval Treaty, to which we shall have to refer often during our debates. No treaty ever mutilated the British Navy in a more cruel and unwarrantable manner than the London. Treaty, for which he was directly responsible. If to-day our destroyer flotillas are far below proper strength in numbers, in modernity, size, calibre of guns, it is largely due to the restrictions imposed at that time. If to-day our cruisers are armed with guns extremely inadequate for their work it is due to the agreement made by the London Treaty, and now the right hon. Gentleman comes along and preaches to us of the London Treaty as something sacrosanct, something to be admired': whereas there is no one concerned with the wellbeing of the Navy who does not long for the day when we shall he free from the shameful and foolish shackles into which we were then ensnared.

Mr. GALLAGHER: rose—

Mr. CHURCHILL: The hon. Member has had a pretty good show for a party which consists of one, and he must not mistake for approbation what is only clue to chivalry.

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: I must remind the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. Gallacher) that he cannot speak unless the right hon. Gentleman gives way.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The right hon. Gentleman opposite appeared concerned, greatly shocked, because a flotilla of seven destroyers was apparently being prepared, set upon the slips, somewhat before the normal time and greatly concerned as to whether it would make an addition to our flotilla forces. There was one part of his speech with which I agreed. It is to be regretted that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement authorised Germany in circumstances, which at any time she was to be the judge, to create a submarine force equal to our whole submarine force. But I must remind the right hon. Gentleman that when the Germans had a much smaller tonnage of submarines than they have now or will be entitled to have under the Treaty—and may have in a very few years—they made a most severe submarine attack upon our commerce in the spring of 1915, causing the very deepest anxiety and very heavy losses.
How was that attack defeated? It was defeated by the fact that we had 220 destroyers. How many have we now? Not half, hardly a third; and now, when this tardy, this modest, this super-modest, this shrinking, timid, tentative proposal, this beginning, this snowdrop—a few little tender shoots that have come forward—when that is brought forward, he holds up his hands -n holy horror. Let me say that if era this country has fewer destroyers than it had in bygone days, when it is exposed to the same kind of attack, that indeed will be a case in which the Opposition may claim their retribution upon the Government and in which they will be joined by a great number of Members in all parts of the House.

11.28 p.m.

Mr. AMMON: Tie House will have listened to the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) with a good deal of interest, and I am sure the Government will think of the right hon. Gentleman when they


start forming their opinions regarding the Minister for Defence. But the right hon. Gentleman in no way dealt with the points raised by my right hon. Friend. He rather sought to play a part in a pantomime, and he in no way added to the knowledge of the House in its discussions on this matter. In the first place, it is as well to remember—although I have not the exact words here, I have some remembrances—that the present First Lord of the Admiralty stated that during the time the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping was Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Navy was cramped by monetary considerations. I would also like to ask the right hon. Gentleman how many destroyers he built during the time he was Chancellor of the Exchequer. He did more than anybody else to limit the supply of destroyers.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The hon. Gentleman is speaking of a situation which existed ten years ago, when the ships of the Navy were half the age they are now, and when no question of rearmament was disturbing Europe at all. The situation was entirely different. Nothing could give me more pleasure than to justify every restriction I made upon what I considered to be unnecessary demands for expenditure. Obviously, I cannot do so in an interruption.

Mr. AMMON: The right hon. Gentleman showed himself not quite so adept as usual in that interruption. As a matter of fact, he did let them down, and now he is trying to pass it on. The London Naval Conference took place 12 months after the right hon. Gentleman was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and is certainly something of which my right hon. Friend may be proud. After all, it must be remembered that a gentleman who now occupies a very honoured position on the Government Benches was leader at the London Naval Conference. What my right hon. Friend asked was, having regard to all the discussion that has taken place in this House about this nation and other nations honouring their word, whether or not this would be done in defiance and outside the agreement already arrived at in the London Treaty without any other decision or agreement being arrived at. That is an entirely different aspect of the matter. It is different from the conclusion into which the right hon. Gentleman endeavoured to mis-

lead us. My right hon. Friend is not attempting, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to argue against the necessary making good of actual deficiencies in the way of the repair of the Navy. What he did say was that under cover of this Supplementary Estimate there is an endeavour to start already a policy of expansion which the House has not yet had a full opportunity of discussing. That is a different thing altogether but the right hon. Gentleman with his usual glibness has endeavoured to lead the Committee off the track of the discussion on this Vote in order, no doubt, that his own claims may be considered as and when an opportunity arises. I have heard him say that it was unusual for him not to be on the Government Front Bench—presumably, one may add, whatever party was in Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman has simply been putting up dummies in order to knock them down again. The Government have still to answer the questions of my right hon. Friend. From what date did the emergency arise when the special dispositions in the Mediterranean were called for? Does the number of destroyers now proposed exceed the global tonnage laid down by the London Naval Treaty? Is the proposed new flotilla in excess of the number arrived at under the Treaty and is this to be carried out before we have had any opportunity of arriving at a decision or the Naval Conference has arrived at any decision on the matter?

11.32 p.m.

Sir A. SINCLAIR: I have listened with great interest to this Debate, and it seems to me that we have to make up our minds on one preliminary, and that' is whether we are going to take as the chief issue in this Estimate the provision of money for the special measures taken in the Mediterranean, or whether we are to take as the chief issue the provision of £3,500 out of 4,850,000 for the additional destroyer squadron. Frankly, I was a little bewildered by the coruscating wit of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Epping. At one stage he spoke of this as a preliminary skirmish in the great armaments Debate which we are to have and in another part of his speech he drew what I cannot help feeling was a truer picture of the subject, when he referred to the state of tension in the Mediterranean and the need of


support from this House in the carrying out of our obligations.
The right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord who made such a powerful speech, put several questions the answers to which we shall await with interest. He covered a considerable amount of ground which I do not intend to traverse. He discussed the financial predicament of a Chancellor of the Exchequer in an armament race, the co-ordination of the defence services and our American debt and, coming rather closer to the subject of our Debate, he discussed the forthcoming rearmament proposals of the Government. We all admire the ingenuity, courage and fertility of imagination which enabled him to discuss the proposals of the Government and methods of financing them, while, I have no doubt, he remained in as much ignorance as the rest of us of the details of the Government's proposals. I would prefer to leave the discussion of these great issues until the production of the Government's White Paper. Then, I think, we shall be equipped to enter on it with full knowledge. My vote to-night will not be cast in relation at all to that £3,500 Estimate for destroyers, and I do not regard my vote as a commitment in any way to the Government's proposals for rearmament. It seems to me, however, that we have urged upon the Government a policy of strong support of the League in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and that the Estimate which is being presented to the Committee to-night is the bill for that policy.
The right hon. Gentleman asked what we have got for it in return. More than one detached, impartial foreign statesman has declared that but for the presence of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean it would have been impossible for the League to take the stand it has taken in this dispute. That, I think, is the answer to the right hon. Gentleman's question. Because the Fleet has been there, because it has been equipped for the purpose which the House desires, and which I and my hon. Friends desire it to fulfil, I must be prepared to face up to the bill and vote for this Estimate. When the time comes to discuss the large question of the Government's rearmament proposals, we shall have to consider all those matters which the ex-First Lord so powerfully urged.

I was interested to hear him say, because I so much agree with the view that he took, that if indeed the Government assure us, when they table these proposals, that they have been discussed with other nations who are our fellow-members of the League, or that they will be, and that they are a necessary part of an essential contribution that we have to make, roughly commensurate with our resources and responsibilities, to the system of collective security, then I agree with him that that will be a powerful influence in determining our attitude towards the rearmament proposals.
Although I am not entirely satisfied with the speeches that have been made from the Government Bench in the foreign affairs Debate earlier to-day, I await next week's test of action which the Government will have to take at Geneva, but, meanwhile, I recognise that the Bill which is presented to-night is a Bill for the carrying oat of a policy which the House his imposed on the Government, and I shall therefore cast my vote for it.

11.39 p.m.

Mr. BOOTHBY: The Fleet has been in Eastern Mediterranean waters for several months under conditions which practically amount to war conditions, and I think that hon. Members on all sides realise that that is a great strain on the officers and men. My Noble Friend probably realises, as hon. Members who have friends and relations in the Fleet do, that the strain is beginning to tell. Nobody knows how long this situation will go on; we hope it may be over soon, but it may be several months before we can withdraw the hulk of the Fleet. I would, therefore, ask my Noble Friend whether he is giving consideration to two aspects of the situation. The first is the question of reliefs. Could the Noble Lord devise some means by which ships of the Home Fleet, not only battleships but cruisers and torpedo boat destroyers, could relieve the ships of the Mediterranean Fleet on specified dates of which the officers and men could have due notice? In this connection I may say that there has been lately a little unnecessary secrecy over the movements of the Fleet. Nobody here wants to know the tactical or strategical dispositions of the Fleet but every country in the world, including Italy, has known


for weeks and months past of every British ship that has been in the Mediterranean, and I think that in the interests of the officers and men and their wives and families a little more information might be given to the British public about the movements of their own Fleet. We have reached the fantastic position now that we are the only people in the whole world who are not allowed to know where our ships are and I make an appeal to the Noble Lord to give consideration to this matter.
One last point. I think arrangements will have to be made for, and even some money spent upon, recreation grounds and similar facilities for the men, particularly of the Fleet. If they are to remain in Alexandria for several months to come then money must be spent and we ought not to grudge it to make conditions more endurable than they have been. It was not to deal with any of the wider aspects of policy but simply to raise these questions which vitally affect the welfare of the officers and men that I have intervened.

11.42 p.m.

Lord STANLEY: I can assure my hon. Friend the Member for East Aberdeen (Mr. Boothby) that the question of relief is under careful consideration. Wherever we can arrange for these men, who really ought to be doing home service now, to come home we do so, and shall continue to do so. As regards recreation, we have started a large club in Alexandria which, I understand, is working very well. As to providing entertainment and recreation for the men of the Fleet I assure the Committee that money will not be allowed to stand in the way. I am grateful to the right hon. and gallant Member for Caithness (Sir A. Sinclair) for his speech and for his support. The major part of the Estimate deals simply with emergency expenditure in the Mediterranean, but when one saw the general agreement on all sides of the House with the speeches in the earlier Debate on foreign affairs I thought it was unnecessary to stress the object. I felt that everybody, if they agreed with our policy, would agree with the measures we have taken to carry it out, and I thought it was improper to give details of the expenditure, and that the best thing I could do was to be candid about those items of expenditure not immediately related to

the emergency period in the Mediterranean.
We on this side of the Committee can agree with the right hon. Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) in looking forward with some confidence to future debates when we see that on this narrow issue the right hon. Member who is to be one of the chief opponents of putting our defences into a satisfactory condition again has had to resort to so many contradictions and so much wandering away from the points at issue. All through his speech he tried to make out that in this Estimate we were anticipating a large future programme, and pointed to what I have said to stress that point of view, but—I am sure unintentionally—he took a wrong view of what I did say. The gist of my speech was that in this Estimate we were anticipating payments on existing commitments. I never said we were anticipating large future programmes. The only anticipation of future building in this Estimate is the seven destroyers, the trawlers and the torpedo motor boats. Two or three of his questions I can answer at once. First, he complained that the increase in Vote A is not due to the emergency but to a proposed general increase in the Fleet in future. I can tell him that when we were preparing our Vote A programme, in the beginning of last year, we had no idea that this emergency was likely to come. The increase for which we are asking to-day is due entirely, or practically entirely, to the emergency in the Mediterranean.

Mr. ALEXANDER: The Noble Lord will agree that the statement was definitely made by the Civil Lord last March that the increase of 2,000 men enabled him to man ships at home and abroad. What extra ships have you had to man?

Lord STANLEY: That was in normal conditions. I am afraid the right hon. Gentleman did not listen to what I said about destroyers. When I told him about the destroyers I said that the aggregate tonnage was being kept within the position of the London Naval Treaty. The information as to the armaments of the destroyers will be made public when the keels are laid down.

Mr. ALEXANDER: The Noble Lord has not answered my question. We are perfectly well aware that within the total replacement tonnage available under the


Naval Treaty you are not exceeding the replacement tonnage laid down for this year. What we are putting is that the First Lord has said that it is advisable to have a steady building programme, and not to build up to-day, but in a cycle of 13 years to accomplish the total of the Naval Treaty of London, 150,000 tons aggregate. I am asking: "Is your putting this flotilla into this year an indication that you are going to announce an increase in the global tonnage of 150,000 in the destroyer category, as laid down in the Naval Treaty? [HON. MEMBERS: "Wait and see!"] Please answer "Yes," or "No."

Lord STANLEY: I refuse to say "Yes" or "No." The right hon. Gentleman must wait for the full discussion of this year's Estimates, for the building programme for 1936. He seems to forget that we are discussing only the Supplementary Estimates; we must also wait and see the conclusions of the Naval Conference which is sitting at the present time.
The next question was with regard to an oil tanker. I am very glad to say that from information, which I had before he spoke—I am afraid it is too late an hour for me to get the full information—the right hon. Gentleman will be very much relieved to know that his information has been grossly exaggerated. I do not think there are the difficulties with this oil tanker that the right hon. Gentleman made out, but I will certainly make inquiries. The right hon. Gentleman gave the Committee the impression that while this tanker was battling against the waves we were using our best and newest tankers for commercial purposes; but there is only one freighter on charter in the whole of the Fleet.

The right hon. Gentleman stressed the fact that the Estimates for 1935, in the aggregate, and the Supplementary Estimates, make the largest provision that has been made for the Navy for 14 years. I think the Committee will agree that it is quite time that there should have been something done. When the right hon. Gentleman says that this is the largest expenditure for 14 years, it is true. During those 14 years we have shown to the world an example in disarmament which the rest of the world has not accepted. The Government do not intend to continue the policy of unilateral disarmament, and as it showed at the General Election the country is in complete agreement with them on that point. When we compare these Estimates with the Navy Estimates for 1930, I can only say that in these Estimates we are trying to make up some of the worst of the deficiencies for which the right hon. Gentleman is responsible. If we are to be challenged as to the necessity for the attitude we have taken in the Mediterranean, if we are to be challenged as to the necessity for increasing our expenditure on the Navy in the future, everyone on this side of the House will go into the Lobby in no apologetic spirit.

Mr. PERKINS: Can the hon. Gentleman tell the House whether any steps have been taken in the design of these new destroyers to safeguard them against air attack?

Question put,
That an additional number, not exceeding 3,400, be en ployed for the said Service.

The Committee divided: Ayes, 95; Noes, 286.

Division No. 54.]
AYES.
[11.54 p.m.


Adams, D. (Consett)
Burke, W. A.
Gardner, B. W.


Adamson, W. M.
Cape, T.
Garro-Jones, G. M.


Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (H'lsbr.)
Charleton, H. C.
Green, W. H. (Deptford)


Ammon, C. G.
Chater, D.
Griffiths, G. A. (Hemsworth)


Anderson, F. (Whitehaven)
Cove, W. G.
Hall, G. H. (Aberdare)


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Cripps, Hon. Sir Stafford
Hall, J. H. (Whitechapel)


Banfleld, J. W.
Daggar, G.
Handie, G. D.


Barnes, A. J.
Davies, D. L. (Pontypridd)
Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)


Batey, J.
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Henderson, J. (Ardwick)


Bellenger, F.
Day, H.
Henderson, T. (Tradeston)


Benson, G.
Dobbie, W.
Hicks, E. G.


Bevan, A.
Ede, J. C.
Holland, A.


Broad, F. A.
Edwards, Sir C. (Bedwellty)
Hopkin, D


Bromfield, W.
Fletcher, Lt.-Comdr. R. T. H.
Jagger, J.


Brown, C. (Mansfield)
Frankel, D.
Jenkins, A. (Pontypool)


Buchanan, G.
Gallacher, W.
Jones, A. C. (Shipley)




Kelly, W. T.
Muff, G.
Smith, Ben (Rotherhithe)


Kirby, B. V.
Oliver, G. H.
Smith, E. (Stoke)


Lawson, J. J.
Paling, W.
Smith, T. (Normanton)


Leonard, W.
Parker, H. J H.
Sorensen, R. W.


Logan, D. G.
Pethick- Lawrence, F. W.
Stephen, C.


Lunn, W.
Potts, J.
Stewart, W. J. (H'ght'n-le-Sp'ng)


McEntee, V. La T.
Pritt, D. N.
Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, N.)


McGovern, J.
Riley, B.
Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)


Maclean, N.
Ritson, J.
Tinker, J. J.


MacMillan, M. (Western Isles)
Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O. (W. Brom.)
Wilkinson, Ellen


Mainwaring. W. H.
Robinson, W. A. (St. Helens)
Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)


Marklew, E.
Rowson, G.
Windsor, W. (Hull, C.)


Marshall, F.
Salter, Dr. A.
Young, Sir R. (Newton)


Messer, F,
Sexton, T. M.



Milner, Major J.
Short, A.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES —


Montague, F.
Silverman, S. S.
Mr. Whiteley and Mr. Mathers.


Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Ha'kn'y, S.)
Simpson, F. B.





NOES.


Acland, R. T. D. (Barnstaple)
Croft, Brig. -Gen. Sir H. Page
Harris, Sir P. A.


Acland-Troyte, Lt.-Col. G. J.
Crooke, J. S.
Harvey, G.


Agnew, Lieut.-Comdr. P. G.
Crookshank, Capt. H. F. C.
Haslam, Sir J. (Bolton)


Albery, I. J.
Croom-Johnson, R. P.
Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.


Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'kn'hd)
Cross, R. H.
Heneage, Lieut. -Colonel A. P.


Amery, Rt. Hon. L. C. M. S.
Crowder, J F. E.
Hepburn, P. G. T. Buchan-


Anderson, Sir A. Garrett (C. of Ldn.)
Cruddas, Col. B.
Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)


Anstruther-Gray, W. J.
Davidson, Rt. Hon. Sir J. C. C.
Holmes, J. S.


Apsley, Lord
Davies, C, (Montgomery)
Hope, Captain Hon. A. O. J.


Aske, Sir R. W.
Davies, Major G. F. (Yeovil)
Hopkinson, A.


Assheton, R.
De Chair, S. S.
Hore-Belisha, Rt. Hon. L.


Astor, Hon. W. W. (Fulham, E.)
Denman, Hon. R. D.
Horsbrugh, Florence


Baldwin-Webb, Col. J.
Dodd, J. S.
Hulbert, N. J.


Ballour, G. (Hampstead)
Donner, P. W.
Hunter, T.


Balfour, Capt. H. H. (Isle of Thanet)
Dorman-Smith, Major R. H.
Jackson, Sir H.


Balniel, Lord
Dugdale, Major T. L.
Jones, Sir G. W. H. (S'k N'w'gt'n)


Barclay-Harvey, C. M.
Duggan, H. J.
Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth)


Baxter, A. Beverley
Duncan, J. A. L.
Jones, L. (Swansea, W.)


Beauchamp, Sir B. C.
Dunglass, Lord
Kerr, H. W. (Oldham)


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'h)
Dunne, P. R. R.
Kerr, J. Graham (Scottish Univs.)


Beit, Sir A. L.
Eastwood, J. F.
Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet Sir R.


Bernays, R. H.
Eckcrsley, P. T.
Kimball, L.


Birchall, Sir J. D.
Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Kirkpatrick, W. M.


Blair, Sir R.
Edmondson, Major Sir J.
Lamb, Sir J. Q.


Blindell, Sir J.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Latham, Sir P.


Boothby, R. J. G.
Ellis, Sir G.
Law, R. K. (Hull, S.W.)


Borodale, Viscount
Elliston, G. S,
Leckie, J. A.


Bossom, A. C.
Emery, J. F.
Leech, Dr. J. W.


Bowater, Col. Sir T. Vansittart
Emmott, C. E. G. C.
Leigh, Sir J.


Bower, Comdr. R. T.
Errington, E.
Lennox-Boyd, A. T. L.


Bowyer, Capt. Sir G. E. W.
Erskine Hill, A. G.
Levy, T.


Boyd- Carpenter, Major Sir A. B.
Evans, D. O. (Cardigan)
Lewis, O.


Bracken, B.
Everard, W. L.
Liddall, W. S.


Bralthwaite, Major A. N.
Findlay, Sir E.
Lindsay, K. M.


Briscoe, Capt. R. G.
Fleming, E. L.
Liewellin, Lieut. -Col. J. J.


Brocklebank, C. E. R.
Foot, D. M.
Locker- Lampson, Comdr. O. S.


Brown, Col. D. C. (Hexham)
Fraser, Capt. Sir I.
Loftus, P. C.


Brown, Rt. Hon. E. (Leith)
Fremantle, Sir F. E.
Lumley, Capt. L. R.


Bull, B. B.
Fyfe, D. P. M.
Mabane, W. (Huddersfield)


Burghley, Lord
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)
Mac Andrew, Lt.-Col. Sir C. G.


Burgin, Dr. E. L.
Gibson, C. G.
McCorquodale, M. S.


Burton, Col. H. W.
Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir J.
MacDonald, Rt. Hn. J. R. (Scot. U.)


Butler, R. A.
Gledhill, G.
MacDonald, Rt. Hon. M. (Ross)


Campbell, Sir E. T.
Gluckstein, L. H.
McEwen, Capt. H. J.F


Cartland, J. R. H.
Glyn, Major Sir R. G. C.
McKie, J. H.


Cary. R. A.
Goldie, N. B.
Maclay, Hon. J. P.


Castlereagh, Viscount
Goodman, Col. A. W
Macnamara, Capt. J. R. J.


Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Graham, Captain A. C. (Wirral)
Maitland, A.


Cazaiet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)
Greene, W. P. C. (Worcester)
Makins, Brig.-Gen. E.


Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. N. (Edgb't'n)
Gretton, Col. Rt. Hon. J.
Manningham-Buller, Sir M,


Channon, H.
Gridley, Sir A. B.
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.


Chapman, A. (Rutherglen)
Griffith, F. Kingsley (M'ddl'sbro, W.)
Mason, Lt.-Col. Hon. G. K. M.


Choriton, A. E. L.
Grimston, R. V.
Maxwell, S. A.


Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.
Gritten, W. G. Howard
Mayhew, Lt.-Col. J.


Clarke, F. E.
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E. (Drake)
Mellor, Sir J. S. P. (Tamworth)


Clydesdale, Marquess of
Guest, MaJ. Hon. O.(C'mb'rw'll,N.W.)
Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)


Colfox, Major W. P.
Guinness, T. L. E. B.
Mitchell, H. (Brentford and Chiswick)


Colman, N. C. D,
Gunston, Capt. D, W.
Moreing, A. C.


Colville, Lt.-Col. D. J.
Guy, J. C. M.
Morris, J. P. (Salford, N.)


Cook, T. R. A. M. (Norfolk, N.)
Hacking, Rt. Hon. D. H.
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univ's.)


Cooke, J. D. (Hammersmith, S.)
Hamilton, Sir G. C.
Morrison, W. S. (Cirencester)


Cooper, Rt. Hn. A. Duff(W'st'r S.G'gs)
Hanbury, Sir C.
Muirhead, Lt.-Col. A. J.


Courtauld, Major J. S.
Hannah, I. C.
Nail, Sir J.


Courlhope, Col. Sir G. L.
Hannon, Sir P. J. H.
Nicolson, Hon. H. G.


Craven-Ellis, W.
Harbord, A.
Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. G.







Orr-Ewing, I. L.
Russell, S. H. M. (Darwen)
Sutclific, H.


Palmer, G. E. H.
Salmon, Sir I.
Tate, Mavis C.


Patrick, C. M.
Samuel, M. R. A. (Putney)
Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)


Peat, C. U.
Sandys, E. D.
Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (Padd., S.)


Penny, Sir G.
Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir P.
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Derby)


Percy, Rt. Hon. Lord E.
Scott, Lord William
Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)


Perkins, W. R. D.
Seely, Sir H. M.
Touche, G. C.


Petherick, M.
Shakespeare, G. H.
Tree, A. R. L. F.


Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Shaw, Major P. S. (Wavertree)
Tryon, Major Rt. Hon. G. C.


Pilkington, R.
Shaw, Captain W. T. (Forfar)
Tufnell, Lieut.-Com. R. L.


Plugge, L. F.
Shepperson, Sir E. W.
Turton, R. H.


Ponsonby, Col. C. E.
Shute, Colonel Sir J. J.
Wakefield, W. W.


Power, Sir J, C.
Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A.
Ward, Lieut. -col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Pownall, Sir A. Assheton
Sinclair, Rt. Hon. Sir A. (C'thn's)
Ward, Irene (Wallsend)


Radford, E. A.
Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's U. B'lf'st),
Warrender, Sir V.


Raikes, H. V. A. M.
Smiles, Lieut-Colonel Sir W. D.
Waterhouse, Captain C.


Ramsay, Captain A. H. M.
Smith, L. W. (Hallam)
Wedderburn. H. J. S.


Ramsbotham, H.
Smith, Sir R. W. (Aberdeen)
White, H. Graham


Rankin, R.
Somerset, T.
Wickham, Lt.-Col. E. T. R.


Rathbone, J. R. (Bodmin)
Somervelli, sir D. B. (Crewe)
Williams. H. G. (Croydon, S.)


Rayner, Major R. H.
Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, E.)
Wilson, Lt.-Col. Sir A. T. (Hitchin)


Reed, A. C. (Exeter)
Southby, Comdr. A. R. J.
Windsor-Clive, Lieut. -Colonel G.


Remer, J. R.
Spender-Clay, Lt.-CI. Rt. Hn. H. H.
Wise, A. R.


Rickards, G. W. (Skipton)
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)
Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount


Robinson, J. R. (Blackpool)
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'm'I'd)
Womersley, Sir W. J.


Ropner, Colonel L.
Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)
Wragg, H.


Ross, Major Sir R. D. (L'derry)
Storey, S.
Young, A. S. L. (Partick)


Ross Taylor, W. (Woodbridge)
Strauss, E. A. (South wark, N.)



Rothschild, J. A. de
Strauss, H. G. (Norwich)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Rowlands, G.
Strickland, Captain W. F.
Mr. James Stuart and Dr. Morris-


Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir E. A.
Stuart, Lord C. Crichton- (N'thw'h)
Jones.


Russell, A. West (Tynemouth)
Sueter, Rear- Admiral Sir M. F.



Original Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £4,850,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Navy Services for the year, including expenditure consequent upon the special measures taken in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.

ARMY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1935

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £1,350,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Army Services for the year, including expenditure consequent upon the special measures taken in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.

12.3 a.m.

The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Duff Cooper): This Estimate is under three heads: first, for additional pay which was necessitated by the restoration of the cuts imposed in last year's Budget; secondly, for the amount of money that has been spent owing to the emergency in the Mediterranean, the greater portion of which was for travelling expenses; and the third is in connection with the sum which the Sultan of Johore generously contributed towards the defence of the Empire, a very small-

fraction of which we are glad to be able to expend this year on hastening the defences of Singapore. There is another Estimate which will shortly follow for the ordnance factories which has been necessitated by the same cause—the emergency.

Mr. LAWSON: I beg to move, to reduce the Vote by£100.
When we come to the Report stage there are more questions that we shall have to ask. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that there is much more in it than he has conveyed to the House.

Sir H. CROFT: I should like to ask a question with regard to Vote 2 (d), Grants to County Associations for the Territorial Army. There is a decrease of £21,000. I was wondering if my right hon. Friend could explain whether this is due to a drop in the numbers of that force or whether the.-e is any reduction in the grant to territorial associations. The Territorial Army has been starved for the last few years. Year after year we have seen items cut down. I should like to have an assurance that this is not due to any economy of that description.

Mr. COOPER: I can give my hon. and gallant Friend that assurance. He knows as well as I do that the numbers of the Territorial Army have decreased during the past year. We deplore it as much as he does. I hope to do something in the coming year to put it right.

Question put,"That a sum, not exceeding £1,349,900, be granted for the said Service."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 88; Noes, 268.

Division No. 55.]
AYES.
[12.10 a.m.


Adams, D. (Consett)
Gardner, B. W.
Messer, F.


Adamson, W. M.
Garro-Jones, G. M.
Milner, Major J.


Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (H'lsbr.)
Green, W. H. (Deptford)
Montague, F.


Amman, C. G.
Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A.
Muff, G.


Anderson, F. (Whitehaven)
Hall, G. H. (Aberdare)
Oliver, G. H.


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Hall, J. H. (Whitechapel)
Paling, W.


Banfield, J. W.
Hardie, G. D.
Parker, H. J. H,


Barnes, A. J.
Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)
Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.


Bellenger, F
Henderson, J. (Ardwick)
Potts, J.


Benson, G.
Henderson, T. (Tradeston)
Pritt, D. N.


Bevan, A.
Hicks, E. G.
Ritson, J.


Broad, F. A.
Holland, A.
Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O. (W. Brom.)


Bromfield, W.
Hopkln, D.
Robinson, W. A. (St. Helens)


Brown, C. (Mansfield)
Jagger, J.
Rowson, G.


Buchanan, G.
Jenkins, A. (Pontypool)
Sexton, T. M.


Burke, W. A.
Jones, A. C. (Shipley)
Silverman, S. S.


Cape, T.
Kelly, W. T.
Simpson, F. B.


Charleton, H. C.
Kirby, B. V.
Smith, Ben (Rotfierhithe)


Cove, W. G.
Lawson, J, J,
Smith, E. (Stoke)


Cripps, Hon. Sir Stafford
Leonard, W.
Smith, T. (Normanton)


Daggar, G.
Logan, D. G.
Stephen, C.


Davies, D. L. (Pontypridd)
Lunn, W.
Stewart, W. J. (H'ght'n-le-Sp'ng)


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
McEntee, V. La T.
Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, N.)


Day, H.
McGovern, J.
Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)


Gobble, W.
MacLaren, A.
Tinker, J. J.


Ede, J. c.
Maclean, N.
Wilkinson, Ellen


Edwards, Sip C. (Bedwellty)
MacMilIan, M. (Western Isles)
Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)


Fletcher, Lt.-Comdr. R. T. H,
Mainwaring, W. H.
Windsor, W. (Hull, C.)


Frankel, D.
Marklew, E.



Gallacher, W.
Marshall, F.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES—




Mr. Whitely and Mr, Mathers.




NOES.


Acland, R. T. D. (Barnstaplel)
Castlereagh, Viscount
Errington, E.


Acland-Troyte, Lt.-Col. G. J.
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Erskine Hill, A. G.


Agnew. Lieut. -Comdr. P. G.
Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)
Evans, D. O. (Cardigan)


Albery, I. J.
Channon, H.
Everard, W. L.


Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'kn'hd)
Chapman, A. (Rutherglen)
Findlay, Sir E.


Amery, Rt. Hon. L. C. M. S.
Chorlton, A. E. L.
Fleming, E. L.


Anderson, Sir A. Garrett (C. of Ldn.)
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.
Foot, D. M.


Anstruther-Gray, W. J.
Clydesdale, Marquess of
Fraser, Capt, Sir I.


Apsley, Lord
Colfox, Major W. P.
Fremantle, Sir F. E.


Aske, Sir R. W.
Calman, N. C. D.
Fyfe, D. P. M.


Assneton, R.
Colville, Lt.-Col. D. J.
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)


Astor, Hon. W. W. (Fulham, E.)
Cook, T. R, A. M. (Norfolk, N.)
Gibson, C. G.


Baldwin-Webb, Col. J.
Cooke, J. D. (Hammersmith, S.)
Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir J.


Balfour, Capt. H. H. (Isle of Thanet)
Cooper, Rt. Hn. A. Duff(W'st S.G'gs)
Gledhill, G.


Balniel, Lord
Courtauld, Major J. S.
Gluckstein, L. H.


Barclay-Harvey, C. M.
Courthope, Col. Sir G. L.
Glyn, Major Sir R. G. C.


Baxter, A. Beverley
Craven-Ellis, W.
Goldie, N. B.


Beauchamp, Sir B. C.
Croft, Brig.-Gen. Sir H. Page
Goodman, Col. A. W.


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'h)
Crooke, J. S.
Graham, Captain A. C. (Wirral)


Beit, Sir A. I
Crookshank, Capt. H. F. C.
Greene, W. P. C. (Worcester)


Bernays, R. H,
Croom-Johnson, R. P.
Gretton, Col. Rt. Hon. J.


Birchall, Sir J. D.
Cross, R. H.
Gridley, Sir A. B.


Blair, Sir R.
Crowder, J. F. E.
Griffith, F. Kingsley (M'ddl'sbro, W.)


Blindell, Sir J.
Cruddas, Col. B.
Grimston, R. V.


Boothby, R. J. G.
Davidson, Rt. Hon. Sir J. C. C.
Gritten, W. G. Howard


Borodale, Viscount
Davies, C. (Montgomery)
Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E. (Drake)


Bossom, A. C.
Davies, Major G. F. (Yeovil)
Guest, Maj. Hon. O.(C'mb'rw'll, N.W.)


Bowater, Col. Sir T. Vansittart
De Chair, S. S.
Guinness, T. L. E. B.


Bower, Comdr. R. T.
Denman, Hon. R. D.
Gunston, Capt. D. W.


Bowyer, Capt. Sir G. E. W.
Dodd, J. S.
Guy, J. C. M.


Boyd-Carpenter, Major Sir A. B.
Donner, P. W.
Hacking, Rt. Hon. D. H. '


Bracken, B.
Dorman-Smith, Major R. H.
Hamilton, Sir G. C.


Braithwaite. Major A. N.
Dugdale, Major T. L.
Hanbury, Sir C.


Briscoe, Capt. R. G.
Duggan, H. J.
Hannah, I. C.


Brocklebank, C. E. R.
Duncan, J. A. L.
Hannon, Sir P. J. H.


Brown, Rt. Hon. E. (Leith)
Dunglass, Lord
Harbord, A.


Bull, B. B.
Dunne, P. R. R.
Harris, Sir P. A.


Burghley, Lord
Eastwood, J. F.
Harvey, G.


Burglin, Or. E. L.
Eckcrsley, P. T.
Haslam, Sir J. (Boltonl)


Burton, Col. H. W.
Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.


Butler. R. A.
Edmondson, Major Sir J
Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel A. P.


Campbell, Sir E. T.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Hepburn, p. G. T. Buchan


Cartland. J. R. H.
Emery, J. F.
Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)


Cary, R. A.
Emmott, C. E. G. C.
Holmes, J. S.




Hope, Captain Hon. A. O. J.
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univ's.)
Sinclair, Rt. Hon. Sir A. (C'thn's)


Hore-Belisha, Rt. Hon. L.
Morrison, W. S. (Cirencester)
Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's U. B'lf'st),


Horsbrugh, Florence
Muirhead, Lt.-Col. A. J.
Smiles, Lieut. -Colonel Sir W. D.


Hulbert, N. J.
Nall, Sir J.
Smith, L. W. (Hallam)


Hunter, T.
Nicolson, Hon. H. G.
Smith, Sir R. W. (Aberdeen)


Jackson, Sir H.
Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. G.
Somerset, T.


Jones, Sir G. W. H. (S'k N'Wgfn)
Orr-Ewing, I. L.
Somervell. Sir D. B. (Crewe)


Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth)
Palmer, G. E. H.
Southby, Comdr. A. R. J.


Jones, L. (Swansea, W.)
Patrick, C. M.
Spender-Clay, Lt.-CI. Rt. Hn. H. H.


Kerr, H. W. (Oldham)
Peat, C. U.
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)


Kerr, J. Graham (Scottish Univs.)
Penny, Sir G.
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (W'm'l'd)


Keyes. Admiral of the Fleet Sir R.
Percy, Rt. Hon. Lord E.
Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)


Kimbali. L.
Perkins, W. R. D.
Storey, S.


Lamb, Sir J. Q.
Petherick, M.
Strauss, E. A. (Southwark, N.)


Latham, Sir P.
Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Strauss, H. G. (Norwich)


Law, R. K. (Hull, S.W.)
Pilkington, R.
Strickland, Captain W. F.


Leckie, J. A.
Plugge, L. F
Stuart, Lord C. Crichton- (N'thw'n)


Leech, Dr. J. W.
Ponsonby, Col. C, E.
Sueter, Rear-Admiral Sir M. F.


Lennox- Boyd, A. T. L.
Power, Sir J. C.
Sutcliffe, H.


Levy, T.
Pownall, Sir A. Assheton
Tate, Mavis C.


Lewis, O.
Radford, E. A.
Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)


Liddall, W. S.
Raikes, H. V. A. M.
Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (Padd., S.)


Lindsay, K. M.
Ramsay, Captain A. H. M.
Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)


Liewellln, Lieut. -Col. J. J.
Ramsbotham, H.
Touche,. G. C.


Locker-Lampson, Comdr. O. S.
Rankin, R.
Tree, A. R. L. F.


Loftus, P. C.
Rathbone, J. R. (Bodmin)
Tryon, Major Rt. Hon. G. C.


Lumley, Capt. L. R.
Reed, A. C. (Exeter)
Tufnell, Lieut. -Com. R. L.


Mabane, W. (Huddersfleld)
Rlckards, G. W. (Skipton)
Turton, R. H.


MacAndrew, Lt.-Col. Sir C. G.
Robinson, J. R. (Blackpool)
Wakefield, W. W.


McCorquodale, M. S.
Ropner, Colonel L.
Ward, Lieut. -com. Sir A. L. (Hull)


MacDonald, Rt. Hn. J. R. (Scot. U.)
Ross, Major Sir R. D. (L'derry)
Ward, Irene (Wallsend)


MacDonald, Rt. Hon. M. (Ross)
Ross Taylor, W. (Woodbridge)
Warrender. Sir V.


McKle, J. H.
Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir E. A.
Waterhouse, Captain C.


Maclay, Hon. J. P.
Russell, A. West (Tynemouth)
Wickham, Lt.-Col. E. T. R.


Macnamara, Capt. J. R. J.
Russell, S. H. M. (Darwen)
Williams, H. G. (Croydon, S.)


Maitland, A.
Salmon, Sir I.
Wilson, Lt.-Col. Sir A. T. (Hitchin)


Makins, Brig.-Gen. E.
Samuel, M. R. A. (Putney)
Windsor-Clive, Lieut. -Colonel G.


Mannlngham-Buller, Sir M.
Sandys, E. D.
Wise, A. R.


Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir P.
Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount


Mason, Lt.-Col. Hon. G. K. M.
Scott, Lord William
Womersley. Sir W. J.


Maxwell, S. A.
Seely, Sir H. M.
Wragg, H.


Mayhew, Lt.-Col. J.
Shakespeare, G. H.
Young, A. S. L. (Partick)


Mellor, Sir J. S. P. (Tamworth)
Shaw, Major P. S. (Wavertree)



Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)
Shaw, Captain W. T. (Forfar)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES —


Mitchell, H. (Brentford and Chiswick)
Shepperson, Sir E. W.
Mr. James Stuart and Dr. Morris-


Moreing, A. C.
Shute, Colonel Sir J. J.
Jones.


Morris, J. P. (Salford, N.)
Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A.



Original Question put, and agreed to.

ARMY (ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES) SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1935.

Resolved,
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to 'defray the charge (reduced by a sum not exceeding £35.000 to be transferred from the Supplies Suspense Account), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936, for expenditure beyond the sum already granted for the Service of the Royal Ordnance Factories.

AIR SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1935.

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £1,611,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Air Services for the year, including expenditure consequent upon the special measure taken in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.

12.18 a.m.

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for AIR (Sir Philip Sassoon): The greater part of this Supplementary Estimate of £1,611,000 net is due chiefly to the measures taken in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian war. These special measures necessitate d substantial expenditure on transportation, additional technical equipment, the provision of temporary accommodation and general stores. The expenditure on these special measures amounts to just over £1,000,000. The balance of the provision in the Estimate, £604,000 net, is due to the fact that the progress on the expansion scheme which was announced in the Supplementary Estimate in July last, has been more rapid than was anticipated. The bulk of the additional expenditure under this head falls on the Works Vote, Vote 4, for acquisition of lands and the pushing on with aerodromes. I do not think I need say anything more at this late hour. These are briefly the reasons for the additional provision required, and


as this provision is for the purposes already fully accepted by the House in principle, I hope we may now have the Vote.

12.19 a.m.

Mr. MONTAGUE: I beg to move to reduce the Vote by £100.
The same consideration applies with regard to this Vote as to the last one, and I propose to move a reduction of the Vote by £100, practically formally, except for one point of correction that is necessary in regard to what the Under-Secretary has just said. The statement is that this Vote is for the main part of it for purposes connected with the situation arising from the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. If the right hon. Gentleman will look at the Estimate he will find that taking the gross figure into account and allowing for appropriations-in-aid and savings upon other Votes, Votes 2, 3 and 4, the total amount of expenditure for the Air Force expansion is practically the same as for other purposes and as a matter of fact, over his own signature is a statement that Air Force expansion accounts, not for £600,000, but for £1,000,000. Subject to that correction, I move formally, reserving the general discussion to a more appropriate moment.

12.20 a.m.

Miss WILKINSON: I am very sorry to detain the House at this late hour, but there are certain matters to which the House ought to give consideration, and this specially applies to the Air Vote. In moving it the Minister dwelt on the fact that the greater part of the Supplementary Estimate dealt with the acceleration of expansion. The Air Force is a new service and even this Supplementary Vote at this time brings forward certain matters of principle and certain questions about which the public at large are very much concerned. There is a general feeling in the country, which has found its way into the Press, that the acceleration of expansion, as the Minister calls it, is being made the excuse for a terrific profiteering ramp in providing aeroplanes and other supplies for the Air Services. There has been nothing like it since the boom of 1929, or since the early days of the War for that matter. Look at the enormous profits that are being made. I do not want to weary the Committee, but I want to give one example.

On the shares of 20 aircraft companies —

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: Does the hon. Lady suggest that this could be done without legislation, or alternatively, how is the Air Ministry responsible for it?

Miss WILKINSON: If you will forgive me, Captain Bourne, I was merely going on to ask the Minister what lie proposes to do. I know perfectly well that the answer will be that he is not responsible for these profits, but it must be obvious that these vast sums in some ways will be passed on to the cost of the commodity.

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: The hon. Lady has just stated that this is a Stock Exchange matter. What causes her to suggest that the Air Ministry has any responsibility in this matter?

Miss WILKINSON: If you will forgive me, that is precisely what I am about to ask the Minister. What control has he over the Stock Exchange? Obviously he has no control over it, although the Government might take some if it wanted to do so. I want to ask the Minister what he proposes to do to ensure that the profits that will be made —

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: We are not dealing with profits that will be made, but with the sums to be voted in this Estimate.

Miss WILKINSON: Quite so. I therefore ask the Minister whether we can 'have on this Supplementary Estimate—which is in itself more important than the others because it is the beginning of what the Minister himself described as the acceleration of expansion—some assurance that his Department is taking the very greatest care to see that these profits are not passed on to the community, which will have to foot the bill—or, if I may put the matter in another way to meet you, Captain Bourne, that this Supplementary Estimate that we are now voting is, in fact, to be used to provide the most efficient service possible, and not in order to provide profits for the people who are behind this ramp. This seems to me to be an extremely important matter at the present time, and I think it would be well if we could have some assurance from the Minister regarding the costings department he has set up, as to how


efficiently it is working and how the public is being protected in this matter.

12.28 a.m.

Sir P. SASSOON: The hon. Lady has opened up a rather wide and important subject, and one which, I think, can perhaps be discussed more suitably in the Debates which we shall have in the course of the next few weeks. I would like to assure her, however, that the Government is watching this matter extremely carefully. We are not responsible in any way for the boom in aircraft shares, nor are the companies respon-

sible. Moreover, the boom has nothing to do with the payments to be made for aircraft by the Government. But the Government are determined to take all possible steps to ensure that the prices that we pay for our armament requirements shall not be in any way excessive. We are also convinced that the industry will help us and co-operate with us in this matter.

Question put,
That a suns, not exceeding £1,610,900, be granted for the said Service.

The Committee divided: Ayes, 82; Noes, 258.

Division No. 56.]
AYES.
[12.29 a.m.


Adams, D. (Consett)
Hall, G. H. (Aberdare)
Muff, G.


Adamson, W. M.
Hall, J. H. (Whitechapel)
Oliver, G. H.


Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (H'lsbr.)
Hardle, G. D.
Paling, W.


Ammon, C. G.
Henderson, A. (Kingswinford)
Parker, H. J. H.


Anderson, F. (Whitehaven)
Henderson, J. (Ardwick)
Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Henderson, T, (Tradeston)
Potts, J.


Banfield, J. W.
Hicks, E. G.
Pritt, D. N.


Bellenger, F.
Holland, A.
Ritson, J.


Benson, G.
Hopkin, D.
Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O. (W. Brom.)


Bevan, A.
Jagger, J.
Robinson, W. A. (St. Helens)


Broad, F. A.
Jenkins, A. (Pontypool)
Rowson, G.


Bromfield, W.
Jones, A. C. (Shipley)
Sexton, T. M.


Brown, C. (Mansfield)
Kelly, W. T.
Silverman, S. S.


Buchanan, G.
Kirby, B. V.
Simpson, F. B.


Burke, W. A.
Lawson, J. J.
Smith, Ben (Rotherhithe)


Cove, W. G.
Leonard, W.
Smith, E. (Stoke)


Cripps, Hon. Sir Stafford
Logan, D. G.
Smith, T. (Normanton)


Daggar, G.
Lunn, W.
Stephen, C.


Day, H.
McEntee, V. La T.
Stewart, W. J. (H'ght'n-le-Sp'ng)


Dobble, W.
McGovern, J.
Strauss, G. R. (Lambeth, N.)


Ede, J. C.
MacLaren, A.
Taylor, R. J. (Morpeth)


Edwards, Sir C. (Bedwellty)
MacMillan, M. (Western Isles)
Tinker, J. J.


Fletcher, Lt.-Comdr. R. T. H.
Mainwaring, W. H.
Whiteley, W.


Frankel, D.
Marklew, E.
Wilkinson, Ellen


Gallacher, W.
Marshall, F.
Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)


Garro-Jones, G. M.
Messor, F.
Windsor, W. (Hull, C.)


Green, W. H. (Deptford)
Mliner, Major J.



Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A.
Montague, F.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES—




Mr. Charleton and Mr. Mathers.




NOES.


Acland, R. T. D. (Barnstaple)
Bowyer, Capt, Sir G. E. W.
Courthope, Col. Sir G. L.


Acland-Troyte, Lt.-Col. G. J.
Boyd-Carpenter, Major Sir A. B.
Craven-Ellis, W.


Agnew, Lieut. -Comdr. P. G.
Bracken, B.
Croft, Brig. -Gen. Sir H. Page


Albery, I. J.
Braithwaite, Major A, N.
Crooke, J. S.


Allen, Lt.-Col. J. Sandeman (B'kn'hd)
Briscoe, Capt R. G.
Crookshank, Capt. H. F. C.


Amery, Rt. Hon. L. C. M. S.
Brocklebank, C. E. R.
Croom-Johnson, R. P.


Anderson, Sir A. Garrett (C. of Ldn.)
Brown, Rt. Hon. E. (Leith)
Cross, R. H.


Anstruther-Gray, W. J.
Bull, B. B.
Crowder, J. F. E.


Apsley, Lord
Burghley, Lord
Cruddas, Col. B.


Aske, Sir R. W.
Burgin, Dr. E. L.
Culverwell, C. T.


Assheton, R.
Burton, Col. H. W.
Davidson, Rt. Hon. Sir J. C. C.


Astor, Hon. W. W. (Fulham, E.)
Butler, R. A.
Davies, C. (Montgomery)


Baldwin-Webb, Col. J.
Campbell, Sir E. T.
De Chair, S. S.


Balfour, Capt. H. H. (Isle of Thanet)
Cartland, J. R. H.
Dodd, J. S.


Balniel, Lord
Cary, R. A.
Donner, P. W.


Barclay-Harvey, C. M.
Castlereagh, Viscount
Dorman-Smith, Major R. H.


Beauchamp, Sir B. C.
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Dugdale, Major T. L.


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'h)
Cazalet, Capt. V. A. (Chippenham)
Duggan, H. J.


Belt, Sir A. L.
Channon, H.
Duncan, J A. L.


Bernays, R. H.
Chapman, A. (Rutherglen)
Dunglass, Lord


Birchall, Sir J. D.
Chorlton, A. E. L.
Dunne, P. R. R.


Blair, Sir R.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.
Eastwood. J. F.


Blindell, Sir J.
Clydesdale, Marquess of
Eckersley. P. T.


Boothby, R. J. G.
Colfox, Major W. P.
Eden, Rt. Hon. A.


Borodale, Viscount
Colman, N. C. D.
Edmondson, Major Sir J.


Bossom, A. C.
Colville, Lt.-Col. D. J.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.


Bowater, Col. Sir T. Vansittart
Cooke, J. D, (Hammersmith, S.)
Emmott, C. E. G. C.


Bower, Comdr. R. T.
Courtauld, Major J. S.
Errington, E.




Erskine Hill, A. G.
Levy, T.
Russell, A. West (Tynemouth)


Evans, D. O. (Cardigan)
Lewis, O.
Russell, S. H. M. (Darwen)


Everard, W. L,
Liddall, W. S.
Salmon, Sir I.


Findlay, Sir E.
Lindsay, K. M.
Samuel, M. R, A. (Putney)


Fleming, E. L,
Liewellin, Lieut.-Col. J. J.
Sandys, E. D.


Foot, D. M.
Locker-Lampson, Comdr. O. S.
Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir P.


Fraser, Capt. Sir I.
Loftus, P. C.
Scott, Lord William


Fremantle, Sir F. E.
Lumley, Capt. L. R.
Seely, Sir H. M,


Fyfe, D. P. M.
Mabane, W. (Huddersfield)
Shakespeare, G. H.


George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)
MacAndrew, Lt.-Col. Sir C. G.
Shaw, Major p. S. (Wavertree)


Gibson, C. G.
McCorquodale, M. S.
Shaw, Captain W. T. (Forfar)


Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir J
MacDonald, Rt. Hn. J. R. (Scot. U.)
Shute, Colonel Sir J. J.


Gledhill, G.
MacDonald, Rt. Hon M. (Ross)
Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A.


Gluckstein, L. H.
McKle, J. H.
Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's U. B'lf'st)


Goldie, N. B.
Maclay, Hon. J. P.
Smiles, Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. D.


Goodman, Col. A. W.
Macnamara, Capt. J. R. J.
Smith, L. W. (Hallam)


Graham, Captain A. C. (Wirral)
Maltland, A.
Smith, Sir R. W. (Aberdeen)


Greene, W. P. C. (Worcester)
Makins, Brig. -Gen. E.
Somerset, T.


Gridley, Sir A. B.
Manningham-Buller, Sir M.
Somervell, Sir D. B. (Crewe)


Griffith, F Kingsley (M'ddl'sbro, W.)
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Southby, Comdr. A. R. J.


Grimston, R. V.
Mason, Lt.-Col. Hon. G. K. M.
Spender-Clay Lt.-CI. Rt. Hn. H. H.


Gritten, W. G. Howard
Maxwell, S. A.
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Lord (Fylde)


Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. F. E. (Drake)
Mayhew, Lt.-Col. J.
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Oliver (Wm'l'd)


Guest, Maj. Hon. O.(C'mb'rw', ll, N.W.)
Mellor, Sir J. S. P. (Tamworth)
Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)


Guinness, T. L. E. B.
Mills, Major J. D. (New Forest)
Storey, S.


Gunston, Capt. D. W.
Mitchell, H. (Brentford and Chiswick)
Strauss, E. A. (Southwark, N.)


Guy, J. C. M.
Moreing, A. C.
Strauss, H. G. (Norwich)


Hacking, Rt. Hon. D. H.
Morris, J. P. (Salford, N.)
Strickland, Captain W. F.


Hamilton, Sir G. C.
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univ's.)
Stuart, Lord C. Crichton- (N'thw'h)


Hannah, I. C.
Morrison, W. S. (Cirencester)
Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)


Hannon, Sir P. J. H.
Muirhead, Lt.-Col. A. J.
Sueter. Rear-Admiral Sir M. F.


Harbord, A.
Nail, Sir J.
Sutcliffe, H.


Harris, Sir P. A.
Nicolson, Hon. H. G.
Tate, Mavis C.


Harvey, G.
Orr-Ewing, I. L.
Taylor, C. S. (Eastbourne)


Haslam, Sir J. (Bolton)
Palmer, G. E. H.
Taylor, Vice-Adm. E. A. (Padd., S.)


Hellgers, Captain F. F. A.
Peat, C. U.
Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)


Heneage, Lieut. -Colonel A. P.
Penny, Sir G.
Touche, G. C.


Hepburn, P. G. T. Bnchan
Percy, Rt. Hon. Lord E.
Tree, A. R. L. F.


Herbert, Major J. A. (Monmouth)
Perkins, W. R. D.
Tryon, Major Rt. Hon. G. C.


Holmes, J. S.
Petherick, M.
Tufnell, Lieut.-Com. R. L.


Hope, Captain Hon. A. O. J.
Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Turton, R. H.


Hore-Belisha, Rt. Hon. L.
Pilkington, R.
Wakefield, W. W.


Horsbrugh, Florence
Plugge, L. F
Ward, Lieut.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Hulbert, N. J.
Ponsonby, Col. C. E.
Ward, Irene (Wallsend)


Hunter, T.
Power, Sir J. C.
Warrender, Sir V.


Jackson, Sir H.
Pownalt, Sir A. Assheton
Waterhouse, Captain C.


Jones. Sir G. W. H. (S'k N'w'gt'n)
Radford, E. A.
Wickham, Lt.-Col. E. T. R.


Jones, H. Haydn (Merioneth)
Raikes, H. V. A M.
Williams, H. G. (Croydon, S.)


Jones, L. (Swansea, W.)
Ramsay, Captain A. H. M.
Wilson, Lt.-Col. Sir A. T. (Hitchin)


Kerr, H. W. (Oldham)
Ramsbotham, H.
Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel G.


Kerr, J. Graham (Scottish Univs.)
Rankin, R.
Wise, A. R.


Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet Sir R.
Rathbone, J. R. (Bodmin)
Wolmer, Rt. Hon. Viscount


Kimball, L.
Reed, A. C. (Exeter)
Womersley, Sir W. J.


Lamb, Sir J. Q.
Rickards, G. W. (Skipton)
Wragg, H.


Latham, Sir P.
Robinson, J. R. (Blackpool)
Young, A. S. L. (Partick)


Law, R. K. (Hull, S.W.)
Ropner, Colonel L.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES—


Leckie, J. A.
Ross, Major Sir R. D. (L'nderry)
Major George Davies and Dr.


Leech, Dr. J. W.
Ross Taylor, W. (Woodbridge)
Morris-Jones.


Lennox-Boyd, A. T. L.
Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir E. A.



Question put, and agreed to.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.

WAYS AND MEANS.

Considered in Committee.

[Captain BOURNE in the Chair.]

Resolved,
That, towards making good the Supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1936, the sum of £10,551,100 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom."—[Mr. W. S. Morrison.]

Resolution to be. reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again To-morrow.

Orders of the Day — DEBTS CLEARING OFFICES AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ACT, 1934.

12.40 a.m.

The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. W. S. Morrison): I beg to move:
That the Clearing Office (Spain) Order, 1936, dated the ninth day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, made by the Treasury under the Debts Clearing Offices and Import Restrictions Act, 1934, a copy of which was presented to this House on the twenty-second day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, be approved.
The Order explains itself, and I have not the least doubt that hon. Members have seen that the purpose of this Order


is to give effect to an agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Spanish Republic.
The object of the Agreement is to provide a means of liquidating a debt that has accrued in trading accounts between the two countries. The method taken is that of a Clearing Office. His Majesty's Government hope by this Agreement with the Spanish Government, if the House approves this Order, that we shall have this debt owed by Spanish traders to our traders liquidated in a short time. As soon as the debt is liquidated, and as soon as payments are made without delay by Spain to our traders, this Order will cease to have effect and trade will resume its normal relations.

12.42 a.m.

Mr. PETHICK-LAWRENCE: Though I am not enamoured of the proceedings under these Clearing Agreements, which in the main are restrictive and inconvenient, the explanation which the hon. Gentleman has given on this particular use of the system seems to remove it from the category of permanent and injurious restrictions on trade. I am glad to hear that it is intended only to be temporary, and I hope that it will not be long before it can be dispensed with. I would like to ask whether as this Agreement was made with what is now the late Spanish Government, any attempt has been made to obtain the views of the present Spanish Government on this matter?

12.43 a.m.

Mr. PETHERICK: Even at this time of night an Agreement of this kind should not be passed without comment. I should like to make sure that we are on safe ground in this Agreement. I understand that we are owed a considerable amount of money by Spanish traders, and that all sums due to Spain are to be paid into the Bank of England for the Account of the Anglo-Spanish Clearing Control by the Treasury. I understand that these sums are not to be applied to all the debts due to the United Kingdom from Spain. We are taking moneys due to Spain for the benefit of our own subjects who are owed money by Spanish subjects. This is an improvement on the Italo-British Agreement concluded about a year ago, which I thought then was an unfortunate

Agreement so far as British nationals were concerned. Under the Italian Agreement, debts in respect of goods passed through the Customs prior to 19th March did not come into the sterling agreement. I hope this is not a parallel case. The result under the Italian Agreement was that those British subjects who were owed money in respect of goods passed through the Italian Customs prior to 19th March have not received their money, and they are likely to be obliged to wait a long time until the present international debts with Italy are settled

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Sir Dennis Herbert): I think the hon. Member is now going too far. He can discuss the Order now before us, but not one that was dealt with a long time ago.

Mr. PETHERICK: I am sorry. I was trying to make a parallel case. We have had little time to consider this Order, and I hope we shall have from the Financial Secretary an explanation that this Agreement will facilitate debts due at the present time and prior to the date named in Agreement to British subjects, and will not, as in the case of the Italian Agreement, invalidate debts prior to the date named.

12.45 a.m.

Mr. W. S. MORRISON: In reply to the hon. Member opposite I would say that this Order was made on 9th January, and has been in operation since 13th January. In respect of it negotiations have been continually going on with the Spanish side, and though there has been a change in that Government there has been no change in the policy of that Government with regard to the observance of this Order. In reply to the hon. Member for Penryn and Falmouth (Mr. Petherick) the operation of the Agreement is as follows: After the date when it came into force, 13th January, it covers all outstanding debts at that date. In regard to other debts contracted after that date, only debts on account of the sale of United Kingdom goods and certain other specified debts will be included in it. The interests of our traders are adequately met. Assuming that our trade with Spain remains the same as it is at the moment, that is, favourable for Spain, we hope that there will come into this Account in the Clearing Office sufficient sterling to liquidate the debts


within a measurable time. After that has been done we shall resume normal trading relations.

Resolved,
That the Clearing Office (Spain) Order, 1936, dated the ninth day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, made by the Treasury under the Debts Clearing Offices and Import Restrictions Act, 1934, a copy of which was presented to this House on the twenty-second day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, be approved.

Orders of the Day — GAS UNDERTAKINGS ACTS, 1920 TO 1934.

Resolved,
That the draft of a Special Order proposed to be made by the Board of Trade under the Gas Undertakings Acts, 1920 to 1934, on the application of the Deal and Wahner Gas Company, which was presented on the 4th day of February and published, be approved.

Resolved,
That the draft of a Special Order proposed to be made by the Board of Trade under the Gas Undertakings Acts, 1920 to 1934, on the application of the Dunstable Gas and Water Company, which was presented on the 4th day of February and published, be approved.

Resolved,
That the draft of a Special Order proposed to be made by the Board of Trade under the Gas Undertakings Acts, 1920 to 1934, on the application of the Folkestone Gas and Coke Company, which was presented on the 4th day of February and published, be approved.

Resolved,
That the draft of a Special Order proposed to be made by the Board of Trade under the Gas Undertakings Acts, 1920 to 1934, on the application of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of the city of Leeds, which was presented on the 4th day of February and published, be approved.

Resolved,
That the draft of a Special Order proposed to be made by the Board of Trade under the Gas Undertakings Acts, 1920 to 1934, on the application of the urban district council of Newton in Macketheld, which was presented on the 4th day of February and published, be approved."—[Dr. Burgin.]

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

It being after Half-past Eleven of the Clock upon Monday evening, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Nine Minutes before One o'Clock.

Orders of the Day — TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES.

In pursuance of Standing Order No. 80 (Deputy-Speaker and Chairmen), Mr. SPEAKER has nominated Charles Malcolm Barclay-Harvey, Esquire, to act as a temporary Chairman of Committees when requested by the Chairman of Ways and Means, in the room of Commander the Honourable Archibald Douglas Cochrane, D.S.O., appointed Steward of the Manor of Northstead.